Re: [PATCH v2] mm: Make ksize() a reporting-only function

Kees Cook
2022-11-27T00:55:17Z

On Sat, Nov 26, 2022 at 06:04:39PM +0100, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 18, 2022 at 4:57 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > With all "silently resizing" callers of ksize() refactored, remove the
> > logic in ksize() that would allow it to be used to effectively change
> > the size of an allocation (bypassing __alloc_size hints, etc). Users
> > wanting this feature need to either use kmalloc_size_roundup() before an
> > allocation, or use krealloc() directly.
> >
> > For kfree_sensitive(), move the unpoisoning logic inline. Replace the
> > some of the partially open-coded ksize() in __do_krealloc with ksize()
> > now that it doesn't perform unpoisoning.
> >
> > Adjust the KUnit tests to match the new ksize() behavior.
> >
> > Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
> > Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
> > Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
> > Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
> > Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
> > Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>
> > Cc: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
> > Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> > Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
> > Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> > Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
> > Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com
> > Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > v2:
> > - improve kunit test precision (andreyknvl)
> > - add Ack (vbabka)
> > v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221022180455.never.023-kees@kernel.org
> > ---
> > mm/kasan/kasan_test.c | 14 +++++++++-----
> > mm/slab_common.c | 26 ++++++++++----------------
> > 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
> > index 7502f03c807c..fc4b22916587 100644
> > --- a/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
> > +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan_test.c
> > @@ -821,7 +821,7 @@ static void kasan_global_oob_left(struct kunit *test)
> > KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, *(volatile char *)p);
> > }
> >
> > -/* Check that ksize() makes the whole object accessible. */
> > +/* Check that ksize() does NOT unpoison whole object. */
> > static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> > {
> > char *ptr;
> > @@ -829,15 +829,19 @@ static void ksize_unpoisons_memory(struct kunit *test)
> >
> > ptr = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> > KUNIT_ASSERT_NOT_ERR_OR_NULL(test, ptr);
> > +
> > real_size = ksize(ptr);
> > + KUNIT_EXPECT_GT(test, real_size, size);
> >
> > OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(ptr);
> >
> > - /* This access shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
> > - ptr[size] = 'x';
> > + /* These accesses shouldn't trigger a KASAN report. */
> > + ptr[0] = 'x';
> > + ptr[size - 1] = 'x';
> >
> > - /* This one must. */
> > - KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size]);
> > + /* These must trigger a KASAN report. */
> > + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[size]);
> > + KUNIT_EXPECT_KASAN_FAIL(test, ((volatile char *)ptr)[real_size - 1]);
>
> Hi Kees,
>
> I just realized there's an issue here with the tag-based modes, as
> they align the unpoisoned area to 16 bytes.
>
> One solution would be to change the allocation size to 128 -
> KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 5, the same way kmalloc_oob_right test does it,
> so that the last 16-byte granule won't get unpoisoned for the
> tag-based modes. And then check that the ptr[size] access fails only
> for the Generic mode.

Ah! Good point. Are you able to send a patch? I suspect you know exactly
what to change; it might take me a bit longer to double-check all of
those details.

-Kees

--
Kees Cook