linux-hwmon.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Guenter Roeck" <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: linux-hwmon@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] hwmon: (corsair-psu) Fix linear11 calculation
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2026 23:40:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260803234013.190861F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803232005.2339611-1-linux@roeck-us.net>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing null termination in USB string attributes leads to a kernel memory disclosure.
- [High] Concurrent sysfs and debugfs reads cause a data race on the shared USB command buffer and wait completion.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH] hwmon: (corsair-psu) Fix linear11 calculation ---
Note: The format of this report has been altered to use a free-form summary 
rather than inline diff quotes due to recitation restrictions.

commit 00dd75e6c6959cf10ed39455a52e60c23722db89
Author: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Subject: hwmon: (corsair-psu) Fix linear11 calculation

This commit fixes the linear11 to integer calculation by correctly casting 
the shifted values to s16 and using 64-bit temporary variables. It prevents 
sign-extension issues with negative temperatures and clamps the final result 
to avoid overflow.

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is it possible for the USB
string attributes to lack null termination, leading to a kernel memory
disclosure?

Looking at corsairpsu_usb_cmd() in drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c, it
unconditionally copies REPLY_SIZE bytes from the USB response into the
string buffers like priv->vendor using memcpy(). If a USB device returns
exactly 24 bytes of non-null characters, no null terminator is appended.

Later, when a user reads the corresponding world-readable debugfs file,
vendor_show() uses seq_printf() with "%s" to read priv->vendor. Could this
result in an out-of-bounds read that leaks adjacent kernel memory fields?

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this code have a data race when
handling concurrent sysfs and debugfs reads?

In drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c, the shared USB command buffer
(priv->cmd_buffer) and wait_completion state are mutated in
corsairpsu_usb_cmd() without thread synchronization. While sysfs accesses
are protected by the hwmon core lock, debugfs callbacks like print_uptime()
funnel through to the USB request path without acquiring any locks.

If a user issues concurrent reads to hwmon sysfs attributes and debugfs
attributes, could this mutate the shared priv->cmd_buffer and
priv->wait_completion simultaneously, potentially leading to data corruption
or deadlocks via corrupted wait_completion state?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260803232005.2339611-1-linux@roeck-us.net?part=1

      reply	other threads:[~2026-08-03 23:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-03 23:20 [PATCH] hwmon: (corsair-psu) Fix linear11 calculation Guenter Roeck
2026-08-03 23:40 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260803234013.190861F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-hwmon@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@roeck-us.net \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).