From: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@microsoft.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 4/6] x86/amd: Configure necessary MSRs for SNP during CPU init when running as a guest
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 16:51:26 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230123165128.28185-5-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230123165128.28185-1-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
From: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@microsoft.com>
Hyper-V may expose the SEV/SEV-SNP CPU features to the guest, but it is
up to the guest to use them. early_detect_mem_encrypt() checks
SYSCFG[MEM_ENCRYPT] and HWCR[SMMLOCK] and if these are not set the
SEV-SNP features are cleared. Check if we are running under a
hypervisor and if so - update SYSCFG and skip the HWCR check.
It would be great to make this check more specific (checking for
Hyper-V) but this code runs before hypervisor detection on the boot cpu.
Signed-off-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c7884198ad5b..17d91ac62937 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -565,6 +565,12 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
+ msr |= MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
+ }
+
/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
@@ -584,7 +590,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
- if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
goto clear_sev;
return;
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-23 16:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-23 16:51 [RFC PATCH v1 0/6] Support nested SNP KVM guests on Hyper-V Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-23 16:51 ` [RFC PATCH v1 1/6] x86/hyperv: Allocate RMP table during boot Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-28 19:26 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-30 15:03 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-23 16:51 ` [RFC PATCH v1 2/6] x86/sev: Add support for NestedVirtSnpMsr Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-28 19:48 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-30 15:25 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-30 15:39 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-23 16:51 ` [RFC PATCH v1 3/6] x86/sev: Maintain shadow rmptable on Hyper-V Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-29 4:37 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-30 16:51 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-23 16:51 ` Jeremi Piotrowski [this message]
2023-01-29 4:44 ` [RFC PATCH v1 4/6] x86/amd: Configure necessary MSRs for SNP during CPU init when running as a guest Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-01-30 17:25 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-23 16:51 ` [RFC PATCH v1 5/6] iommu/amd: Don't fail snp_enable when running virtualized Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-01-23 16:51 ` [RFC PATCH v1 6/6] crypto: ccp - Introduce quirk to always reclaim pages after SEV-legacy commands Jeremi Piotrowski
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