From: Zhi Wang <zhi.wang.linux@gmail.com>
To: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>
Cc: luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
jgross@suse.com, tiala@microsoft.com, kirill@shutemov.name,
jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com, peterz@infradead.org,
ashish.kalra@amd.com, srutherford@google.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, anshuman.khandual@arm.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
ray.huang@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com,
sterritt@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
samitolvanen@google.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V3 16/16] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths from #HV exception
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2023 01:20:28 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230203012028.00005ff3@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230122024607.788454-17-ltykernel@gmail.com>
On Sat, 21 Jan 2023 21:46:06 -0500
Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com> wrote:
> From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
>
> Add checks in interrupt exit code paths in case of returns
> to user mode to check if currently executing the #HV handler
> then don't follow the irqentry_exit_to_user_mode path as
> that can potentially cause the #HV handler to be
> preempted and rescheduled on another CPU. Rescheduled #HV
> handler on another cpu will cause interrupts to be handled
> on a different cpu than the injected one, causing
> invalid EOIs and missed/lost guest interrupts and
> corresponding hangs and/or per-cpu IRQs handled on
> non-intended cpu.
>
Why doesn't this problem happen in #VC handler? As #VC handler doesn't have
this special handling.
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 30 +++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> index 652fea10d377..45b47132be7c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
> @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
>
> #include <asm/irq_stack.h>
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +noinstr void irqentry_exit_hv_cond(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state);
> +#endif
> +
> /**
> * DECLARE_IDTENTRY - Declare functions for simple IDT entry points
> * No error code pushed by hardware
> @@ -176,6 +180,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
> #define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(vector, func) \
> DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(vector, func)
>
> +#ifndef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> /**
> * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IRQ - Emit code for device interrupt IDT entry points
> * @func: Function name of the entry point
> @@ -205,6 +210,26 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \
> } \
> \
> static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
> +#else
> +
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(func) \
> +static void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector); \
> + \
> +__visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \
> + unsigned long error_code) \
> +{ \
> + irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs); \
> + u32 vector = (u32)(u8)error_code; \
> + \
> + instrumentation_begin(); \
> + kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(); \
> + run_irq_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs, vector); \
> + instrumentation_end(); \
> + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \
> +} \
> + \
> +static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
> +#endif
>
> /**
> * DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC - Declare functions for system vector entry points
> @@ -221,6 +246,7 @@ static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
> #define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(vector, func) \
> DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
>
> +#ifndef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> /**
> * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC - Emit code for system vector IDT entry points
> * @func: Function name of the entry point
> @@ -245,6 +271,26 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \
> } \
> \
> static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#else
> +
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(func) \
> +static void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs); \
> + \
> +__visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \
> +{ \
> + irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs); \
> + \
> + instrumentation_begin(); \
> + kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(); \
> + run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs); \
> + instrumentation_end(); \
> + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \
> +} \
> + \
> +static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> /**
> * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE - Emit code for simple system vector IDT
> @@ -274,6 +320,26 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \
> } \
> \
> static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#else
> +
> +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC_SIMPLE(func) \
> +static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs); \
> + \
> +__visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \
> +{ \
> + irqentry_state_t state = irqentry_enter(regs); \
> + \
> + instrumentation_begin(); \
> + __irq_enter_raw(); \
> + kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d(); \
> + __##func(regs); \
> + __irq_exit_raw(); \
> + instrumentation_end(); \
> + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \
> +} \
> + \
> +static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
> +#endif
>
> /**
> * DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB - Declare functions for XEN HV callback entry point
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> index b1a98c2a52f8..23f15e95838b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
> @@ -147,6 +147,10 @@ struct sev_hv_doorbell_page {
>
> struct sev_snp_runtime_data {
> struct sev_hv_doorbell_page hv_doorbell_page;
> + /*
> + * Indication that we are currently handling #HV events.
> + */
> + bool hv_handling_events;
> };
>
> static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_snp_runtime_data*, snp_runtime_data);
> @@ -200,6 +204,8 @@ static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
> union hv_pending_events pending_events;
> u8 vector;
>
> + this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_handling_events = true;
> +
> while (sev_hv_pending()) {
> pending_events.events = xchg(
> &sev_snp_current_doorbell_page()->pending_events.events,
> @@ -234,6 +240,8 @@ static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
> common_interrupt(regs, pending_events.vector);
> }
> }
> +
> + this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_handling_events = false;
> }
>
> static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
> @@ -2529,3 +2537,25 @@ static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void)
> return 0;
> }
> device_initcall(snp_init_platform_device);
> +
> +noinstr void irqentry_exit_hv_cond(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Check whether this returns to user mode, if so and if
> + * we are currently executing the #HV handler then we don't
> + * want to follow the irqentry_exit_to_user_mode path as
> + * that can potentially cause the #HV handler to be
> + * preempted and rescheduled on another CPU. Rescheduled #HV
> + * handler on another cpu will cause interrupts to be handled
> + * on a different cpu than the injected one, causing
> + * invalid EOIs and missed/lost guest interrupts and
> + * corresponding hangs and/or per-cpu IRQs handled on
> + * non-intended cpu.
> + */
> + if (user_mode(regs) &&
> + this_cpu_read(snp_runtime_data)->hv_handling_events)
> + return;
> +
> + /* follow normal interrupt return/exit path */
> + irqentry_exit(regs, state);
> +}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-02 23:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-22 2:45 [RFC PATCH V3 00/16] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 01/16] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest specific config Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 17:34 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-02 4:01 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 02/16] x86/hyperv: Decrypt hv vp assist page in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 03/16] x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in vmbus init message Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 17:55 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03 3:32 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 04/16] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 05/16] clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 06/16] x86/hyperv: decrypt vmbus pages for " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 17:58 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03 4:11 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 07/16] drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 18:02 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03 5:23 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 08/16] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for " Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 18:20 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03 5:58 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:45 ` [RFC PATCH V3 09/16] x86/hyperv: SEV-SNP enlightened guest don't support legacy rtc Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 14:03 ` Wei Liu
2023-02-02 3:43 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 10/16] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest Tianyu Lan
2023-01-23 15:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2023-02-03 7:00 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-02-06 20:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-02-07 13:49 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-31 18:34 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-03 6:10 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 11/16] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific hadling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 12/16] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler Tianyu Lan
2023-01-23 7:33 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-03 7:27 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-02-16 13:50 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-09 11:48 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 15:48 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-03-31 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-04-03 18:09 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 13/16] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path Tianyu Lan
2023-03-01 11:11 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-08 16:18 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 15:59 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 14/16] x86/sev: Initialize #HV doorbell and handle interrupt requests Tianyu Lan
2023-02-16 14:46 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-17 12:45 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-01 19:34 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 15/16] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception Tianyu Lan
2023-01-22 2:46 ` [RFC PATCH V3 16/16] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths " Tianyu Lan
2023-02-02 23:20 ` Zhi Wang [this message]
2023-02-08 23:53 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-02-21 16:44 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 16:02 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-02-02 23:00 ` [RFC PATCH V3 00/16] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Zhi Wang
2023-02-03 4:04 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-02-09 11:36 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-17 12:47 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-02-18 7:15 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-03-10 15:35 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-03-10 16:19 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-03-15 6:40 ` Gupta, Pankaj
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