From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="BGQv4CNM" Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [134.134.136.126]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA44010F0; Fri, 24 Nov 2023 02:06:35 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1700820395; x=1732356395; h=date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references: mime-version:in-reply-to; bh=ohoDw7JZUTv1RjPou6a4xNAn3GHL7KxVPsE5YzKJdKk=; b=BGQv4CNMGbgTkzoYhne64szpj0gFZ4rf9vxH0sYOFl0YPUwjFfRlWi39 0DdYL77ZHNX5S9yHHALJn+WN6vIx8YHX+DWK167DvqKl3icE3aPCWVz65 laLujl9Fjk8oBNmn4jVGD9SRZ6P1Lb+cbOwXe4PSzrf8qpUzK/veEH1uI LNLoQ39NehRXspUQIX61QvoJtwZp5yGRCi/+m/xz2tU9/Ea6Wbg8smYNE 7jyckZgdO+3jZOyM42KeGtmgj3FkNoNuiqZd2xljU1D8XaIU49BUfiCU/ aSoT45kMybsoQwaIXt6AC7Nmi8+IYUFcLAauGBN+im8nv+y+1up02GnxY w==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10902"; a="377430632" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.04,223,1695711600"; d="scan'208";a="377430632" Received: from fmsmga006.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.20]) by orsmga106.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Nov 2023 02:06:35 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10902"; a="1014863922" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.04,223,1695711600"; d="scan'208";a="1014863922" Received: from dlemiech-mobl.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO box.shutemov.name) ([10.252.59.78]) by fmsmga006-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Nov 2023 02:06:29 -0800 Received: by box.shutemov.name (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 6460210A38A; Fri, 24 Nov 2023 13:06:27 +0300 (+03) Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 13:06:27 +0300 From: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com To: mhklinux@outlook.com Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org, hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, decui@microsoft.com, luto@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, urezki@gmail.com, hch@infradead.org, lstoakes@gmail.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, ardb@kernel.org, jroedel@suse.de, seanjc@google.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/8] x86/coco: Mark CoCo VM pages not present when changing encrypted state Message-ID: <20231124100627.avltdnuhminwuzax@box> References: <20231121212016.1154303-1-mhklinux@outlook.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20231121212016.1154303-1-mhklinux@outlook.com> On Tue, Nov 21, 2023 at 01:20:08PM -0800, mhkelley58@gmail.com wrote: > From: Michael Kelley > > In a CoCo VM when a page transitions from encrypted to decrypted, or vice > versa, attributes in the PTE must be updated *and* the hypervisor must > be notified of the change. Strictly speaking it is not true for TDX. Conversion to shared can be implicit: set shared bit and touch the page will do the conversion. MapGPA is optional. > Because there are two separate steps, there's > a window where the settings are inconsistent. Normally the code that > initiates the transition (via set_memory_decrypted() or > set_memory_encrypted()) ensures that the memory is not being accessed > during a transition, so the window of inconsistency is not a problem. > However, the load_unaligned_zeropad() function can read arbitrary memory > pages at arbitrary times, which could read a transitioning page during > the window. In such a case, CoCo VM specific exceptions are taken > (depending on the CoCo architecture in use). Current code in those > exception handlers recovers and does "fixup" on the result returned by > load_unaligned_zeropad(). Unfortunately, this exception handling can't > work in paravisor scenarios (TDX Paritioning and SEV-SNP in vTOM mode) > if the exceptions are routed to the paravisor. The paravisor can't > do load_unaligned_zeropad() fixup, so the exceptions would need to > be forwarded from the paravisor to the Linux guest, but there are > no architectural specs for how to do that. Hm. Can't we inject #PF (or #GP) into L2 if #VE/#VC handler in L1 sees cross-page access to shared memory while no fixup entry for the page in L1. It would give L2 chance to handle the situation in a transparent way. Maybe I miss something, I donno. -- Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov