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From: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
To: arnd@arndb.de, bp@alien8.de, bagasdotme@gmail.com,
	corbet@lwn.net, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, decui@microsoft.com,
	haiyangz@microsoft.com, hpa@zytor.com, kys@microsoft.com,
	mikelley@microsoft.com, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
	Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com, wei.liu@kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: benhill@microsoft.com, bperkins@microsoft.com, sunilmut@microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH hyperv-next v7 13/17] Drivers: hv: Allocate encrypted buffers when requested
Date: Wed,  8 Oct 2025 16:34:15 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251008233419.20372-14-romank@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251008233419.20372-1-romank@linux.microsoft.com>

Confidential VMBus is built around using buffers not shared with
the host.

Support allocating encrypted buffers when requested.

Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel <romank@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
---
 drivers/hv/channel.c      | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h |  3 ++-
 drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c  |  5 ++--
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c
index 162d6aeece7b..d69713201bef 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/channel.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c
@@ -444,20 +444,23 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * Set the "decrypted" flag to true for the set_memory_decrypted()
-	 * success case. In the failure case, the encryption state of the
-	 * memory is unknown. Leave "decrypted" as true to ensure the
-	 * memory will be leaked instead of going back on the free list.
-	 */
-	gpadl->decrypted = true;
-	ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer,
-				   PFN_UP(size));
-	if (ret) {
-		dev_warn(&channel->device_obj->device,
-			 "Failed to set host visibility for new GPADL %d.\n",
-			 ret);
-		return ret;
+	gpadl->decrypted = !((channel->co_external_memory && type == HV_GPADL_BUFFER) ||
+		(channel->co_ring_buffer && type == HV_GPADL_RING));
+	if (gpadl->decrypted) {
+		/*
+		 * The "decrypted" flag being true assumes that set_memory_decrypted() succeeds.
+		 * But if it fails, the encryption state of the memory is unknown. In that case,
+		 * leave "decrypted" as true to ensure the memory is leaked instead of going back
+		 * on the free list.
+		 */
+		ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer,
+					PFN_UP(size));
+		if (ret) {
+			dev_warn(&channel->device_obj->device,
+				"Failed to set host visibility for new GPADL %d.\n",
+				ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	init_completion(&msginfo->waitevent);
@@ -545,8 +548,10 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel,
 		 * left as true so the memory is leaked instead of being
 		 * put back on the free list.
 		 */
-		if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size)))
-			gpadl->decrypted = false;
+		if (gpadl->decrypted) {
+			if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size)))
+				gpadl->decrypted = false;
+		}
 	}
 
 	return ret;
@@ -677,12 +682,13 @@ static int __vmbus_open(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel,
 		goto error_clean_ring;
 
 	err = hv_ringbuffer_init(&newchannel->outbound,
-				 page, send_pages, 0);
+				 page, send_pages, 0, newchannel->co_ring_buffer);
 	if (err)
 		goto error_free_gpadl;
 
 	err = hv_ringbuffer_init(&newchannel->inbound, &page[send_pages],
-				 recv_pages, newchannel->max_pkt_size);
+				 recv_pages, newchannel->max_pkt_size,
+				 newchannel->co_ring_buffer);
 	if (err)
 		goto error_free_gpadl;
 
@@ -863,8 +869,11 @@ int vmbus_teardown_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, struct vmbus_gpadl *gpad
 
 	kfree(info);
 
-	ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)gpadl->buffer,
-				   PFN_UP(gpadl->size));
+	if (gpadl->decrypted)
+		ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)gpadl->buffer,
+					PFN_UP(gpadl->size));
+	else
+		ret = 0;
 	if (ret)
 		pr_warn("Fail to set mem host visibility in GPADL teardown %d.\n", ret);
 
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
index 552ed782bcfc..f7fc2630c054 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
+++ b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ extern int hv_synic_cleanup(unsigned int cpu);
 void hv_ringbuffer_pre_init(struct vmbus_channel *channel);
 
 int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info,
-		       struct page *pages, u32 pagecnt, u32 max_pkt_size);
+		       struct page *pages, u32 pagecnt, u32 max_pkt_size,
+			   bool confidential);
 
 void hv_ringbuffer_cleanup(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info);
 
diff --git a/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c b/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c
index 23ce1fb70de1..3c421a7f78c0 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c
@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ void hv_ringbuffer_pre_init(struct vmbus_channel *channel)
 
 /* Initialize the ring buffer. */
 int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info,
-		       struct page *pages, u32 page_cnt, u32 max_pkt_size)
+		       struct page *pages, u32 page_cnt, u32 max_pkt_size,
+			   bool confidential)
 {
 	struct page **pages_wraparound;
 	int i;
@@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info,
 
 	ring_info->ring_buffer = (struct hv_ring_buffer *)
 		vmap(pages_wraparound, page_cnt * 2 - 1, VM_MAP,
-			pgprot_decrypted(PAGE_KERNEL));
+			confidential ? PAGE_KERNEL : pgprot_decrypted(PAGE_KERNEL));
 
 	kfree(pages_wraparound);
 	if (!ring_info->ring_buffer)
-- 
2.43.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-08 23:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-08 23:34 [PATCH hyperv-next v7 00/17] Confidential VMBus Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 01/17] Documentation: hyperv: " Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 02/17] Drivers: hv: VMBus protocol version 6.0 Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 03/17] arch/x86: mshyperv: Discover Confidential VMBus availability Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 04/17] arch: hyperv: Get/set SynIC synth.registers via paravisor Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 05/17] arch/x86: mshyperv: Trap on access for some synthetic MSRs Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 06/17] Drivers: hv: Rename fields for SynIC message and event pages Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 07/17] Drivers: hv: Allocate the paravisor SynIC pages when required Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 08/17] Drivers: hv: Post messages through the confidential VMBus if available Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 09/17] Drivers: hv: remove stale comment Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 10/17] Drivers: hv: Check message and event pages for non-NULL before iounmap() Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 11/17] Drivers: hv: Rename the SynIC enable and disable routines Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 12/17] Drivers: hv: Functions for setting up and tearing down the paravisor SynIC Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` Roman Kisel [this message]
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 14/17] Drivers: hv: Free msginfo when the buffer fails to decrypt Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 15/17] Drivers: hv: Support confidential VMBus channels Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 16/17] Drivers: hv: Set the default VMBus version to 6.0 Roman Kisel
2025-10-08 23:34 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 17/17] Drivers: hv: Support establishing the confidential VMBus connection Roman Kisel
2025-10-13 19:01 ` [PATCH hyperv-next v7 00/17] Confidential VMBus Wei Liu

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