linux-hyperv.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: vdso@hexbites.dev
To: ltykernel@gmail.com
Cc: decui@microsoft.com, haiyangz@microsoft.com, kys@microsoft.com,
	linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	longli@microsoft.com, tiala@microsoft.com, vdso@hexbites.dev,
	wei.liu@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] Drivers: hv: Confidential VMBus exernal memory support
Date: Wed, 26 Nov 2025 21:15:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251127051559.60238-1-vdso@hexbites.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251124182920.9365-1-tiala@microsoft.com>

From: Roman Kisel <vdso@hexbites.dev>

Tianyu Lan wrote:

> In CVM(Confidential VM), system memory is encrypted
> by default. Device drivers typically use the swiotlb
> bounce buffer for DMA memory, which is decrypted
> and shared between the guest and host. Confidential
> Vmbus, however, supports a confidential channel
> that employs encrypted memory for the Vmbus ring
> buffer and external DMA memory. The support for
> the confidential ring buffer has already been
> integrated.
>
> In CVM, device drivers usually employ the standard
> DMA API to map DMA memory with the bounce buffer,
> which remains transparent to the device driver.
> For external DMA memory support, Hyper-V specific
> DMA operations are introduced, bypassing the bounce
> buffer when the confidential external memory flag
> is set. These DMA operations might also be reused
> for TDISP devices in the future, which also support
> DMA operations with encrypted memory.
>
> The DMA operations used are global architecture
> DMA operations (for details, see get_arch_dma_ops()
> and get_dma_ops()), and there is no need to set up
> for each device individually.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>

Tinayu,

Looks great to me!

Reviewed-by: Roman Kisel <vdso@hexbites.dev>

P.S. For the inclined reader, here is how the old, only for
storage and not satisfactory in other ways my attempt to solve this:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/20250409000835.285105-6-romank@linux.microsoft.com/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hyperv/20250409000835.285105-7-romank@linux.microsoft.com/

Maybe it'd be a good idea to CC folks who provided feedback back then.

> ---
>  drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 89 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
> index 0dc4692b411a..ca31231b2c32 100644
> --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
> +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@
>  #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
>  #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
>  #include "hyperv_vmbus.h"
> +#include "../../kernel/dma/direct.h"
> +
> +extern const struct dma_map_ops *dma_ops;
>
>  struct vmbus_dynid {
>  	struct list_head node;
> @@ -1429,6 +1432,88 @@ static int vmbus_alloc_synic_and_connect(void)
>  	return -ENOMEM;
>  }
>
> +
> +static bool hyperv_private_memory_dma(struct device *dev)
> +{
> +	struct hv_device *hv_dev = device_to_hv_device(dev);
> +
> +	if (hv_dev && hv_dev->channel && hv_dev->channel->co_external_memory)
> +		return true;
> +	else
> +		return false;
> +}
> +
> +static dma_addr_t hyperv_dma_map_page(struct device *dev, struct page *page,
> +		unsigned long offset, size_t size,
> +		enum dma_data_direction dir,
> +		unsigned long attrs)
> +{
> +	phys_addr_t phys = page_to_phys(page) + offset;
> +
> +	if (hyperv_private_memory_dma(dev))
> +		return __phys_to_dma(dev, phys);
> +	else
> +		return dma_direct_map_phys(dev, phys, size, dir, attrs);
> +}
> +
> +static void hyperv_dma_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_addr_t dma_handle,
> +		size_t size, enum dma_data_direction dir, unsigned long attrs)
> +{
> +	if (!hyperv_private_memory_dma(dev))
> +		dma_direct_unmap_phys(dev, dma_handle, size, dir, attrs);
> +}
> +
> +static int hyperv_dma_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sgl,
> +		int nelems, enum dma_data_direction dir,
> +		unsigned long attrs)
> +{
> +	struct scatterlist *sg;
> +	dma_addr_t dma_addr;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	if (hyperv_private_memory_dma(dev)) {
> +		for_each_sg(sgl, sg, nelems, i) {
> +			dma_addr = __phys_to_dma(dev, sg_phys(sg));
> +			sg_dma_address(sg) = dma_addr;
> +			sg_dma_len(sg) = sg->length;
> +		}
> +
> +		return nelems;
> +	} else {
> +		return dma_direct_map_sg(dev, sgl, nelems, dir, attrs);
> +	}
> +}
> +
> +static void hyperv_dma_unmap_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sgl,
> +		int nelems, enum dma_data_direction dir, unsigned long attrs)
> +{
> +	if (!hyperv_private_memory_dma(dev))
> +		dma_direct_unmap_sg(dev, sgl, nelems, dir, attrs);
> +}
> +
> +static int hyperv_dma_supported(struct device *dev, u64 mask)
> +{
> +	dev->coherent_dma_mask = mask;
> +	return 1;
> +}
> +
> +static size_t hyperv_dma_max_mapping_size(struct device *dev)
> +{
> +	if (hyperv_private_memory_dma(dev))
> +		return SIZE_MAX;
> +	else
> +		return swiotlb_max_mapping_size(dev);
> +}
> +
> +const struct dma_map_ops hyperv_dma_ops = {
> +	.map_page               = hyperv_dma_map_page,
> +	.unmap_page             = hyperv_dma_unmap_page,
> +	.map_sg                 = hyperv_dma_map_sg,
> +	.unmap_sg               = hyperv_dma_unmap_sg,
> +	.dma_supported          = hyperv_dma_supported,
> +	.max_mapping_size	= hyperv_dma_max_mapping_size,
> +};
> +
>  /*
>   * vmbus_bus_init -Main vmbus driver initialization routine.
>   *
> @@ -1479,8 +1564,11 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void)
>  	 * doing that on each VP while initializing SynIC's wastes time.
>  	 */
>  	is_confidential = ms_hyperv.confidential_vmbus_available;
> -	if (is_confidential)
> +	if (is_confidential) {
> +		dma_ops = &hyperv_dma_ops;
>  		pr_info("Establishing connection to the confidential VMBus\n");
> +	}
> +
>  	hv_para_set_sint_proxy(!is_confidential);
>  	ret = vmbus_alloc_synic_and_connect();
>  	if (ret)
> --
> 2.50.1

  reply	other threads:[~2025-11-27  5:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-11-24 18:29 [RFC PATCH] Drivers: hv: Confidential VMBus exernal memory support Tianyu Lan
2025-11-27  5:15 ` vdso [this message]
2025-11-27  9:16   ` Tianyu Lan
2025-11-28 17:47 ` Michael Kelley
2025-12-03 14:21   ` Tianyu Lan
2025-12-04  3:35     ` Michael Kelley
2025-12-04 11:35       ` Tianyu Lan
2025-12-05  4:10         ` Tianyu Lan

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20251127051559.60238-1-vdso@hexbites.dev \
    --to=vdso@hexbites.dev \
    --cc=decui@microsoft.com \
    --cc=haiyangz@microsoft.com \
    --cc=kys@microsoft.com \
    --cc=linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=longli@microsoft.com \
    --cc=ltykernel@gmail.com \
    --cc=tiala@microsoft.com \
    --cc=wei.liu@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).