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From: Kameron Carr <kameroncarr@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
	Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
	Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Cc: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 5/5] Documentation: hyperv: Describe validation of the ring buffer indices
Date: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 16:09:50 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261019230950.1573677-6-kameroncarr@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261019230950.1573677-1-kameroncarr@linux.microsoft.com>

Document that the guest must snapshot and validate the read and write
indices before using them to index into the ring buffer or to compute
the available space.

Signed-off-by: Kameron Carr <kameroncarr@linux.microsoft.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/hyperv/coco.rst | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/coco.rst b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/coco.rst
index 3231e51..3e20249 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/hyperv/coco.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/hyperv/coco.rst
@@ -200,7 +200,10 @@ validation is performed. For messages passed from the host to the guest in a
 VMBus ring buffer, the length of the message is validated, and the message is
 copied into a temporary (encrypted) buffer for further validation and
 processing. The copying adds a small amount of overhead, but is the only way
-to protect against a malicious host. See hv_pkt_iter_first().
+to protect against a malicious host. See hv_pkt_iter_first(). Similarly, the
+ring buffer header is shared with the host, so the guest must snapshot and
+validate the read and write indices before using them to index into the ring
+buffer or to compute available space.
 
 Many drivers for VMBus devices have been "hardened" by adding code to fully
 validate messages received over VMBus, instead of assuming that Hyper-V is

-- 
2.45.4

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-19 23:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-19 23:09 [PATCH v2 0/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Harden the ring buffer against a malicious host Kameron Carr
2026-10-19 23:09 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Bounds check the shared ring buffer indices Kameron Carr
2026-10-19 23:09 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Use *_ONCE() to access " Kameron Carr
2026-10-19 23:09 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Compute ring byte counts from a caller-held snapshot Kameron Carr
2026-10-19 23:09 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Keep the ring byte counts sane for a bad index Kameron Carr
2026-10-19 23:09 ` Kameron Carr [this message]

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