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From: Mukesh R <mrathor@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>,
	Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: "kys@microsoft.com" <kys@microsoft.com>,
	"haiyangz@microsoft.com" <haiyangz@microsoft.com>,
	"wei.liu@kernel.org" <wei.liu@kernel.org>,
	"decui@microsoft.com" <decui@microsoft.com>,
	"longli@microsoft.com" <longli@microsoft.com>,
	"linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org" <linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] mshv: Make MSHV mutually exclusive with KEXEC
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2026 18:52:59 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6e480ee7-683a-e5f1-7448-51f257d58614@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <SN6PR02MB4157EDC69791EF24D5DA8661D491A@SN6PR02MB4157.namprd02.prod.outlook.com>

On 1/28/26 07:53, Michael Kelley wrote:
> From: Mukesh R <mrathor@linux.microsoft.com> Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2026 11:56 AM
>> To: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Cc: kys@microsoft.com; haiyangz@microsoft.com; wei.liu@kernel.org;
>> decui@microsoft.com; longli@microsoft.com; linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org; linux-
>> kernel@vger.kernel.org
>> Subject: Re: [PATCH] mshv: Make MSHV mutually exclusive with KEXEC
>>
>> On 1/27/26 09:47, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 05:39:49PM -0800, Mukesh R wrote:
>>>> On 1/26/26 16:21, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
>>>>> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 03:07:18PM -0800, Mukesh R wrote:
>>>>>> On 1/26/26 12:43, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jan 26, 2026 at 12:20:09PM -0800, Mukesh R wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 1/25/26 14:39, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Jan 23, 2026 at 04:16:33PM -0800, Mukesh R wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 1/23/26 14:20, Stanislav Kinsburskii wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> The MSHV driver deposits kernel-allocated pages to the hypervisor during
>>>>>>>>>>> runtime and never withdraws them. This creates a fundamental incompatibility
>>>>>>>>>>> with KEXEC, as these deposited pages remain unavailable to the new kernel
>>>>>>>>>>> loaded via KEXEC, leading to potential system crashes upon kernel accessing
>>>>>>>>>>> hypervisor deposited pages.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Make MSHV mutually exclusive with KEXEC until proper page lifecycle
>>>>>>>>>>> management is implemented.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskii <skinsburskii@linux.microsoft.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>>>>>        drivers/hv/Kconfig |    1 +
>>>>>>>>>>>        1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/hv/Kconfig b/drivers/hv/Kconfig
>>>>>>>>>>> index 7937ac0cbd0f..cfd4501db0fa 100644
>>>>>>>>>>> --- a/drivers/hv/Kconfig
>>>>>>>>>>> +++ b/drivers/hv/Kconfig
>>>>>>>>>>> @@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ config MSHV_ROOT
>>>>>>>>>>>        	# e.g. When withdrawing memory, the hypervisor gives back 4k pages in
>>>>>>>>>>>        	# no particular order, making it impossible to reassemble larger pages
>>>>>>>>>>>        	depends on PAGE_SIZE_4KB
>>>>>>>>>>> +	depends on !KEXEC
>>>>>>>>>>>        	select EVENTFD
>>>>>>>>>>>        	select VIRT_XFER_TO_GUEST_WORK
>>>>>>>>>>>        	select HMM_MIRROR
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Will this affect CRASH kexec? I see few CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP in kexec.c
>>>>>>>>>> implying that crash dump might be involved. Or did you test kdump
>>>>>>>>>> and it was fine?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes, it will. Crash kexec depends on normal kexec functionality, so it
>>>>>>>>> will be affected as well.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So not sure I understand the reason for this patch. We can just block
>>>>>>>> kexec if there are any VMs running, right? Doing this would mean any
>>>>>>>> further developement would be without a ver important and major feature,
>>>>>>>> right?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is an option. But until it's implemented and merged, a user mshv
>>>>>>> driver gets into a situation where kexec is broken in a non-obvious way.
>>>>>>> The system may crash at any time after kexec, depending on whether the
>>>>>>> new kernel touches the pages deposited to hypervisor or not. This is a
>>>>>>> bad user experience.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I understand that. But with this we cannot collect core and debug any
>>>>>> crashes. I was thinking there would be a quick way to prohibit kexec
>>>>>> for update via notifier or some other quick hack. Did you already
>>>>>> explore that and didn't find anything, hence this?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This quick hack you mention isn't quick in the upstream kernel as there
>>>>> is no hook to interrupt kexec process except the live update one.
>>>>
>>>> That's the one we want to interrupt and block right? crash kexec
>>>> is ok and should be allowed. We can document we don't support kexec
>>>> for update for now.
>>>>
>>>>> I sent an RFC for that one but given todays conversation details is
>>>>> won't be accepted as is.
>>>>
>>>> Are you taking about this?
>>>>
>>>>           "mshv: Add kexec safety for deposited pages"
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>>>> Making mshv mutually exclusive with kexec is the only viable option for
>>>>> now given time constraints.
>>>>> It is intended to be replaced with proper page lifecycle management in
>>>>> the future.
>>>>
>>>> Yeah, that could take a long time and imo we cannot just disable KEXEC
>>>> completely. What we want is just block kexec for updates from some
>>>> mshv file for now, we an print during boot that kexec for updates is
>>>> not supported on mshv. Hope that makes sense.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The trade-off here is between disabling kexec support and having the
>>> kernel crash after kexec in a non-obvious way. This affects both regular
>>> kexec and crash kexec.
>>
>> crash kexec on baremetal is not affected, hence disabling that
>> doesn't make sense as we can't debug crashes then on bm.
>>
>> Let me think and explore a bit, and if I come up with something, I'll
>> send a patch here. If nothing, then we can do this as last resort.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> -Mukesh
> 
> Maybe you've already looked at this, but there's a sysctl parameter
> kernel.kexec_load_limit_reboot that prevents loading a kexec
> kernel for reboot if the value is zero. Separately, there is
> kernel.kexec_load_limit_panic that controls whether a kexec
> kernel can be loaded for kdump purposes.
> 
> kernel.kexec_load_limit_reboot defaults to -1, which allows an
> unlimited number of loading a kexec kernel for reboot. But the value
> can be set to zero with this kernel boot line parameter:
> 
> sysctl.kernel.kexec_load_limit_reboot=0
> 
> Alternatively, the mshv driver initialization could add code along
> the lines of process_sysctl_arg() to open
> /proc/sys/kernel/kexec_load_limit_reboot and write a value of zero.
> Then there's no dependency on setting the kernel boot line.
> 
> The downside to either method is that after Linux in the root partition
> is up-and-running, it is possible to change the sysctl to a non-zero value,
> and then load a kexec kernel for reboot. So this approach isn't absolute
> protection against doing a kexec for reboot. But it makes it harder, and
> until there's a mechanism to reclaim the deposited pages, it might be
> a viable compromise to allow kdump to still be used.

Mmm...eee...weelll... i think i see a much easier way to do this by
just hijacking __kexec_lock. I will resume my normal work tmrw/Fri,
so let me test it out. if it works, will send patch Monday.

Thanks,
-Mukesh



> Just a thought ....
> 
> Michael
> 
>>
>>
>>> It?s a pity we can?t apply a quick hack to disable only regular kexec.
>>> However, since crash kexec would hit the same issues, until we have a
>>> proper state transition for deposted pages, the best workaround for now
>>> is to reset the hypervisor state on every kexec, which needs design,
>>> work, and testing.
>>>
>>> Disabling kexec is the only consistent way to handle this in the
>>> upstream kernel at the moment.
>>>
>>> Thanks, Stanislav


  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-30  2:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-23 22:20 [PATCH] mshv: Make MSHV mutually exclusive with KEXEC Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-24  0:09 ` Nuno Das Neves
2026-01-24  0:16 ` Mukesh R
2026-01-25 22:39   ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-26 20:20     ` Mukesh R
2026-01-26 20:43       ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-26 23:07         ` Mukesh R
2026-01-27  0:21           ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-27  1:39             ` Mukesh R
2026-01-27 17:47               ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-27 19:56                 ` Mukesh R
2026-01-28 15:53                   ` Michael Kelley
2026-01-30  2:52                     ` Mukesh R [this message]
2026-01-28 23:08                   ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-30  2:59                     ` Mukesh R
2026-01-30 17:17                       ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-01-30 18:41                         ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-30 19:47                           ` Mukesh R
2026-02-02 16:43                             ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-02 20:15                               ` Mukesh R
2026-02-04  2:46                                 ` Mukesh R
2026-01-26 18:49 ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-01-26 20:46   ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-28 16:16     ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-01-28 23:11       ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-30 17:11         ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-01-30 18:46           ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-01-30 20:32             ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-02-02 17:10               ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-02 19:01                 ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-02-02 19:18                   ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-03  5:04                     ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-02-03 15:40                       ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-03 16:46                         ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-02-03 19:42                           ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-04  5:33                             ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-02-04 18:33                               ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-05  4:59                                 ` Anirudh Rayabharam
2026-02-05 17:12                                   ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-02 18:09           ` Stanislav Kinsburskii
2026-02-02 16:56 ` Naman Jain

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