From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6B8D2C00140 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 15:49:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1343838AbiHRPtM (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 11:49:12 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:44998 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1343810AbiHRPtK (ORCPT ); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 11:49:10 -0400 Received: from mail-pg1-x52d.google.com (mail-pg1-x52d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::52d]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6DE133F1DD for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 08:49:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-pg1-x52d.google.com with SMTP id v4so1580044pgi.10 for ; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 08:49:09 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20210112; h=in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id :subject:cc:to:from:date:from:to:cc; bh=LQ6UTD1yLdKaL5goe/L0O22+iQnu8B1xU3ILfSRgLVU=; b=ORK33PPK2YMP/eBCehAb42fbmv5vTU6yt8havKC23HmQcG+OAYh2OiafQyDYwhdM5g k7kJX39oN9vTjbU8tWzRW9r7cXrZ7vjJWDGv5FvQXuZJdW/njaY7dsYEcCNXWT9z+9J9 BO4s+IXcrRw3pFWg1EUTjXc3kYHYNPrryjlXrjOT198NuKz/0BUyRkBSF9J9L18EQ7Nn u9oEP4D5LtIFV7fULPfc7P+5Qwi2LLVYeOy3kYgvuNBaXaTSYPL7yEUuU2QVxAOXrzjo b95RdyszkjZVtAErs8b5myNT8P4sgRJbkCihDweoeUm7sEt6vHxaG1/gN20Fx/NiOSBa JKmA== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20210112; h=in-reply-to:content-disposition:mime-version:references:message-id :subject:cc:to:from:date:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc; bh=LQ6UTD1yLdKaL5goe/L0O22+iQnu8B1xU3ILfSRgLVU=; b=7w5wBYlb/bsxMGwg5N5CJEP+LfkE2KdIb/1aqR+ZDvqiy+MIIz4mojkXRRkSnEoLAK YYOgCtoAua2rxyK4Thod9Ndg/CAZSPFpun9sGAuuHHKJ8Fi8MHBlOtlCZZ5wUFQk0eHd g1nCYztLZWrB2jNLKVD1y8Uvq2e/pHOJCuJoxoPf6Va9eCkg4aokRW29L1H9ndtgteWP W0Ithc0XgiJCbFDa54/A+SzLl49kB5R01XVU2j7VSgP+m6HQQZvCdbfI8Ft/fX0evYZg P+pDPIhV+YwFebQlYYWxozYr6c8HekgUZgiuVocqHFdVOFnGSDC18HwwuJSLAZbspnYX eHGQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ACgBeo3mb4pOCCZcALBA05//OR+vJEbBgsbCacK4Ivx4JdoHSt0MKQIM pAXd6hkMYixZLuQXtDin6+jqWQ== X-Google-Smtp-Source: AA6agR6E4897lIuYKGsSz0ut9vsvJlkvFxFYvtJrCtNMpXYg1SBoAvrzoosw4V61otC455Hi5rzF3A== X-Received: by 2002:a63:2008:0:b0:41d:7ab5:ca31 with SMTP id g8-20020a632008000000b0041d7ab5ca31mr2837101pgg.17.1660837748592; Thu, 18 Aug 2022 08:49:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from google.com (7.104.168.34.bc.googleusercontent.com. [34.168.104.7]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id z16-20020aa79590000000b0052d8405bcd2sm1786323pfj.163.2022.08.18.08.49.07 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 18 Aug 2022 08:49:08 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2022 15:49:04 +0000 From: Sean Christopherson To: Vitaly Kuznetsov Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini , Anirudh Rayabharam , Wanpeng Li , Jim Mattson , Maxim Levitsky , Nathan Chancellor , Michael Kelley , linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/26] KVM: x86: hyper-v: Expose access to debug MSRs in the partition privilege flags Message-ID: References: <20220802160756.339464-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> <20220802160756.339464-2-vkuznets@redhat.com> <878rnltw7b.fsf@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <878rnltw7b.fsf@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Aug 18, 2022, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: > Sean Christopherson writes: > > > On Tue, Aug 02, 2022, Vitaly Kuznetsov wrote: > >> For some features, Hyper-V spec defines two separate CPUID bits: one > >> listing whether the feature is supported or not and another one showing > >> whether guest partition was granted access to the feature ("partition > >> privilege mask"). 'Debug MSRs available' is one of such features. Add > >> the missing 'access' bit. > >> > >> Note: hv_check_msr_access() deliberately keeps checking > >> HV_FEATURE_DEBUG_MSRS_AVAILABLE bit instead of the new HV_ACCESS_DEBUG_MSRS > >> to not break existing VMMs (QEMU) which only expose one bit. Normally, VMMs > >> should set either both these bits or none. > > > > This is not the right approach long term. If KVM absolutely cannot unconditionally > > switch to checking HV_ACCESS_DEBUG_MSRS because it would break QEMU users, then we > > should add a quirk, but sweeping the whole thing under the rug is wrong. > > > > First, this patch is kind of unrelated to the series so in case it's the > only thing which blocks it from being merged -- let's just pull it out > and discuss separately. Regarding the series, are there any true dependencies between the eVMCS patches (1 - 11) and the VMCS sanitization rework (12 - 26)? I.e. can the VMCS rework be queued ahead of the eVMCS v1 support?