From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from casper.infradead.org (casper.infradead.org [90.155.50.34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7F8323A9; Wed, 24 Jul 2024 00:16:07 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=90.155.50.34 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1721780170; cv=none; b=WVWDDO+rSHrlTgon03wPOxV8AeB69Ki0VHjm68WstMJAkFutrtIYTlq7bc4iPGMJRpo61pUFcIXL0C+o+Ldbar2cLS7gFtJVGP4tb6WoxhEV9f5NTTvk56hKUrK6rfHlITTiWav4dWRNkl+MAAaIdhN3DuD1ylNsSLk+zz0T7KE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1721780170; c=relaxed/simple; bh=wqyFpyf6PrzKEVik7xeRK0++sjEqWq5lBT4FsmzwMqU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=Sr7MH6NSDDTMdHd/L+TaMaJdQNA2WQW+Hjj3GNwl/ule9PMVcOx2EW7NKCXUk6mkORTHBdtMMjV5EFfinnIoKjXY3VoOP5aA9DljzTpnBBeN66Lc7euyXRLMc8hunYqo4ssZ/clV+7dakyYBQjqNbaf3RlHdiTn5z842Q3uazjU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=infradead.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b=B6s/WTDW; arc=none smtp.client-ip=90.155.50.34 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=infradead.org Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=infradead.org header.i=@infradead.org header.b="B6s/WTDW" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=infradead.org; s=casper.20170209; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:Sender:Reply-To: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-ID:Content-Description; bh=+13C47ZHmH1+/AbC2K1sE8rWUkwncoQ44bN8mj3d5O8=; b=B6s/WTDWl83ZaD7yEFAS5kvS/j zeehTkADxlXDIhox/7Vr4pUxISf8qKbn7gjOKHBuw2Dj11UlM/o3qJVtERnlkp0O2mjc0klL2bKc5 hg7VrztKoOwoE9xHIGY1eMMXnDN1I6ygfSKrmSXGVL5VCMz9oIfCrKasAqDxgQHKgXKTXxhb3sxTK WPYgfQ2X54HsStH68nb99M8jELASZpcKwz86ijr9BxsrrBGkctkEzjaxyMR5+yksCwbm0ZJSymAp5 NAvwc9UYsogKL/RDaHpODA6TL8BXIaQHowLg/yBmn8IucoZH7J8So5wNsERvv99tuqYJCLJRjPF1y C0JgeUKA==; Received: from willy by casper.infradead.org with local (Exim 4.97.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1sWPfm-00000007Kfm-0ye4; Wed, 24 Jul 2024 00:16:02 +0000 Date: Wed, 24 Jul 2024 01:16:02 +0100 From: Matthew Wilcox To: Andrew Morton Cc: Mary Strodl , Christian Gmeiner , Christoph Hellwig , Mary Strodl , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, urezki@gmail.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, lee@kernel.org, andi.shyti@kernel.org, linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org, s.hauer@pengutronix.de Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] mm: vmalloc: export __vmalloc_node_range Message-ID: References: <20240718143103.82e33c556b2d1b6145ae43e0@linux-foundation.org> <20240718143924.43e22f68cf639b064a83f118@linux-foundation.org> <20240723170043.4f17a3d0b6280e57561ba1f5@linux-foundation.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-i2c@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20240723170043.4f17a3d0b6280e57561ba1f5@linux-foundation.org> On Tue, Jul 23, 2024 at 05:00:43PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Fri, 19 Jul 2024 13:42:40 +0100 Matthew Wilcox wrote: > > > On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 07:58:40AM -0400, Mary Strodl wrote: > > > Maybe some of the stuff the driver does right now could be moved into > > > vmalloc? In other words, we could provide a different function that > > > allocates an executable page, copies memory into it, then marks it > > > read-only. Would that do better to alleviate concerns? > > > > No. We are not running arbitrary x86 code. That is a security > > nightmare. > > Sure, if such a thing were to be done we'd want it localized within the > driver rather than offered globally. > > But if there was some hack within the driver to do this, what problems > might that cause? What are the scenarios? That we're running arbitrary x86 code (provided by the manufacturer) inside the kernel where it can undermine every security guarantee we provide?