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From: Ric Wheeler <rwheeler@redhat.com>
To: Greg Freemyer <greg.freemyer@norcrossgroup.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Dongjun Shin <djshin90@gmail.com>,
	IDE/ATA development list <linux-ide@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: SSD data reliable vs. unreliable [Was: Re: Data Recovery from SSDs - Impact of trim?]
Date: Fri, 23 Jan 2009 18:35:08 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <497A542C.1040900@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87f94c370901231526jb41ea66ta1d6a23d7631d63c@mail.gmail.com>

Greg Freemyer wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 23, 2009 at 5:24 PM, James Bottomley
> <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> wrote:
>   
>> On Fri, 2009-01-23 at 15:40 -0500, Ric Wheeler wrote:
>>     
>>> Greg Freemyer wrote:
>>>       
>>>> Just to make sure I understand, with the proposed trim updates to the
>>>> ATA spec (T13/e08137r2 draft), a SSD can have two kinds of data.
>>>>
>>>> Reliable and unreliable.  Where unreliable can return zeros, ones, old
>>>> data, random made up data, old data slightly adulterated, etc..
>>>>
>>>> And there is no way for the kernel to distinguish if the particular
>>>> data it is getting from the SSD is of the reliable or unreliable type?
>>>>
>>>> For the unreliable data, if the determistic bit is set in the identify
>>>> block, then the kernel can be assured of reading the same unreliable
>>>> data repeatedly, but still it has no way of knowing the data it is
>>>> reading was ever even written to the SSD in the first place.
>>>>
>>>> That just seems unacceptable.
>>>>
>>>> Greg
>>>>
>>>>         
>>> Hi Greg,
>>>
>>> I sat in on a similar discussion in T10 . With luck, the T13 people have
>>> the same high level design:
>>>
>>> (1) following a write to sector X, any subsequent read of X will return
>>> that data
>>> (2) once you DISCARD/UNMAP sector X, the device can return any state
>>> (stale data, all 1's, all 0's) on the next read of that sector, but must
>>> continue to return that data on following reads until the sector is
>>> rewritten
>>>       
>> Actually, the latest draft:
>>
>> http://www.t10.org/cgi-bin/ac.pl?t=d&f=08-356r5.pdf
>>
>> extends this behaviour: If the array has read capacity(16) TPRZ bit set
>> then the return for an unmapped block is always zero.  If TPRZ isn't
>> set, it's undefined but consistent.  I think TPRZ is there to address
>> security concerns.
>>
>> James
>>     
>
> To James,
>
> I took a look at the spec, but I'm not familiar with the SCSI spec to
> grok it immediately.
>
> Is the TPRZ bit meant to be a way for the manufacturer to report which
> of the two behaviors their device implements, or is it a externally
> configurable flag that tells the SSD which way to behave?
>
> Either way, is there reason to believe the ATA T13 spec will get
> similar functionality?
>
> To Ric,
>
> First, in general I think is is bizarre to have a device that is by
> spec able to return both reliable and non-reliable data, but the spec
> does not include a signaling method to differentiate between the two.
>
> ===
> My very specific concern is that I work with evidence that will
> eventually be presented at court.
>
> We routinely work with both live files and recoved deleted files
> (Computer Forensic Analysis).  Thus we would typically be reading the
> discarded sectors as well as in-use sectors.
>
> After reading the original proposal from 2007, I assumed that a read
> would provide me either data that had been written specifically to the
> sectors read, or that the SSD would return all nulls.  That is very
> troubling to the ten thousand or so computer forensic examiners in the
> USA, but it true we just had to live with it.
>
> Now reading the Oct. 2008 revision I realized that discarded sectors
> are theoretically allowed to return absolutely anything the SSD feels
> like returning.  Thus the SSD might return data that appears to be
> supporting one side of the trial or the other, but it may have been
> artificially created by the SSD.  And I don't even have a flag that
> says "trust this data".
>
> The way things currently stand with my understanding of the proposed
> spec. I will not be able to tell the court anything about the
> reliability of any data copied from the SSD regardless of whether it
> is part of an active file or not.
>
> At its most basic level, I transport a typical file on a SSD by
> connecting it to computer A, writing data to it, disconnecting from A
> and connecting to computer B and then print it from there for court
> room use.
>
> When I read that file from the SSD how can I assure the court that
> data I read is even claimed to be reliable by the SSD?
>
>  ie. The SSD has no way to say "I believe this data is what was
> written to me via computer A" so why should the court or anyone else
> trust the data it returns.
>
> IF the TPRZ bit becomes mandatory for both ATA and SCSI SSDs, then if
> it is set I can have confidence that any data read from the device was
> actually written to it.
>
> Lacking the TPRZ bit, ...
>
> Greg
>   

I think that the incorrect assumption here is that you as a user can 
read data that is invalid. If you are using a file system, you will 
never be able to read those unmapped/freed blocks (the file system will 
not allow it).

If you read the raw device as root, then you could seem random bits of 
data - maybe data recovery tools would make this an issue?

ric



  reply	other threads:[~2009-01-23 23:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-01-22 23:53 SSD data reliable vs. unreliable [Was: Re: Data Recovery from SSDs - Impact of trim?] Greg Freemyer
2009-01-23 20:40 ` Ric Wheeler
2009-01-23 22:24   ` James Bottomley
2009-01-23 23:26     ` Greg Freemyer
2009-01-23 23:35       ` Ric Wheeler [this message]
     [not found]         ` <7fce22690901260659u30ffd634m3fb7f75102141ee9@mail.gmail.com>
2009-01-26 16:22           ` Ric Wheeler
2009-01-26 17:34             ` Greg Freemyer
2009-01-26 17:46               ` Ric Wheeler
2009-01-26 17:47               ` James Bottomley
2009-01-27  5:16                 ` Neil Brown
2009-01-27 10:49                   ` John Robinson
2009-01-28 20:11                     ` Bill Davidsen
     [not found]                       ` <7fce22690901281556h67fb353dp879f88e6c2a76eaf@mail.gmail.com>
2009-01-29  1:49                         ` John Robinson
2009-01-27 11:23                   ` Ric Wheeler
2009-01-28 20:28                     ` Bill Davidsen
2009-01-27 14:48                   ` James Bottomley
2009-01-27 14:54                     ` Ric Wheeler
2009-01-26 17:51               ` Mark Lord
2009-01-26 18:09                 ` Greg Freemyer
2009-01-26 18:21                   ` Mark Lord
2009-01-29 14:07                     ` Dongjun Shin
2009-01-29 15:46                       ` Mark Lord
2009-01-29 16:27                         ` Greg Freemyer
2009-01-30 15:43                           ` Bill Davidsen

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