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From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
	Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
	Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
	Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
	Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
	Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
	Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>,
	Chris Lu <chris.lu@mediatek.com>, Mans Rullgard <mans@mansr.com>,
	Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>,
	Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>, Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>,
	linux-sound@vger.kernel.org, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: [PATCH v3 27/31] iommu: Use device trust for DMA restrictions
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 21:26:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261118-device-trust-core-v3-27-d655875c4bfb@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118-device-trust-core-v3-0-d655875c4bfb@nvidia.com>

From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>

PCI-specific untrusted checks exclude devices classified as adversaries
through generic policy. Their DMA protections should depend on the selected
trust policy rather than the source of that classification.

Use policy for early domain selection and active trust for DMA bouncing.
This removes the remaining need for PCI's duplicate untrusted flag.
Changes to IOMMU domains after authorization remain separate work.

Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
---
 drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c   |  3 +--
 drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c   | 14 +++++---------
 drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 14 +++++---------
 drivers/iommu/iommu.c       |  9 +++++----
 drivers/pci/probe.c         |  1 -
 include/linux/pci.h         |  8 --------
 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
index 960e1dc05ec69..e358bbb1f2baa 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/iommu.c
@@ -3401,8 +3401,7 @@ static int amd_iommu_def_domain_type(struct device *dev)
 	if (!dev_is_pci(dev))
 		return 0;
 
-	/* Always use DMA domain for untrusted device */
-	if (to_pci_dev(dev)->untrusted)
+	if (pci_dev_default_is_restricted(to_pci_dev(dev)))
 		return IOMMU_DOMAIN_DMA;
 
 	/* Apply device specific quirks */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
index 78742aeba932d..a48fb511bfe6f 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
@@ -589,16 +589,11 @@ static int iova_reserve_iommu_regions(struct device *dev,
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static bool dev_is_untrusted(struct device *dev)
-{
-	return dev_is_pci(dev) && to_pci_dev(dev)->untrusted;
-}
-
 static bool dev_use_swiotlb(struct device *dev, size_t size,
 			    enum dma_data_direction dir)
 {
 	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SWIOTLB) &&
-		(dev_is_untrusted(dev) ||
+		(device_is_adversarial(dev) ||
 		 dma_kmalloc_needs_bounce(dev, size, dir));
 }
 
@@ -611,7 +606,7 @@ static bool dev_use_sg_swiotlb(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SWIOTLB))
 		return false;
 
-	if (dev_is_untrusted(dev))
+	if (device_is_adversarial(dev))
 		return true;
 
 	/*
@@ -1189,7 +1184,8 @@ static phys_addr_t iommu_dma_map_swiotlb(struct device *dev, phys_addr_t phys,
 	 * swiotlb_tbl_map_single() has initialized the bounce buffer proper to
 	 * the contents of the original memory buffer.
 	 */
-	if (phys != (phys_addr_t)DMA_MAPPING_ERROR && dev_is_untrusted(dev)) {
+	if (phys != (phys_addr_t)DMA_MAPPING_ERROR &&
+	    device_is_adversarial(dev)) {
 		size_t start, virt = (size_t)phys_to_virt(phys);
 
 		/* Pre-padding */
@@ -1790,7 +1786,7 @@ size_t iommu_dma_max_opt_mapping_size(void)
 
 size_t iommu_dma_max_mapping_size(struct device *dev)
 {
-	if (dev_is_untrusted(dev))
+	if (device_is_adversarial(dev))
 		return swiotlb_max_mapping_size(dev);
 
 	return SIZE_MAX;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
index 5a2e705a2f2e0..0202b491f222e 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
@@ -2624,8 +2624,8 @@ static void __init platform_optin_force_iommu(void)
 		return;
 
 	/*
-	 * If Intel-IOMMU is disabled by default, we will apply identity
-	 * map for all devices except those marked as being untrusted.
+	 * If Intel-IOMMU is disabled by default, an external device could
+	 * otherwise receive an identity map despite its adversarial policy.
 	 */
 	if (dmar_policy_off()) {
 		pr_info("Intel-IOMMU force enabled due to platform opt in\n");
@@ -3629,16 +3629,12 @@ static bool intel_iommu_is_attach_deferred(struct device *dev)
 	return translation_pre_enabled(info->iommu) && !info->domain;
 }
 
-/*
- * Check that the device does not live on an external facing PCI port that is
- * marked as untrusted. Such devices should not be able to apply quirks and
- * thus not be able to bypass the IOMMU restrictions.
- */
+/* Bypass quirks must not prevent later adversarial operation. */
 static bool risky_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
-	if (pdev->untrusted) {
+	if (pci_dev_default_is_restricted(pdev)) {
 		pci_info(pdev,
-			 "Skipping IOMMU quirk for dev [%04X:%04X] on untrusted PCI link\n",
+			 "Skipping IOMMU quirk due to trust policy [%04X:%04X]\n",
 			 pdev->vendor, pdev->device);
 		pci_info(pdev, "Please check with your BIOS/Platform vendor about this\n");
 		return true;
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
index b486b8bbd1fcd..891b0cd2dad02 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
@@ -1901,10 +1901,11 @@ static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
 		driver_type = iommu_get_def_domain_type(group, gdev->dev,
 							driver_type);
 
-		if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) && to_pci_dev(gdev->dev)->untrusted) {
+		if (dev_is_pci(gdev->dev) &&
+		    pci_dev_default_is_restricted(to_pci_dev(gdev->dev))) {
 			/*
-			 * No ARM32 using systems will set untrusted, it cannot
-			 * work.
+			 * No ARM32 using systems select a restricted trust
+			 * policy; it cannot work.
 			 */
 			if (WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM_DMA_USE_IOMMU)))
 				return -1;
@@ -1928,7 +1929,7 @@ static int iommu_get_default_domain_type(struct iommu_group *group,
 		if (driver_type && driver_type != IOMMU_DOMAIN_DMA) {
 			dev_err_ratelimited(
 				untrusted,
-				"Device is not trusted, but driver is overriding group %u to %s, refusing to probe.\n",
+				"Device trust policy restricts DMA, but driver is overriding group %u to %s, refusing to probe.\n",
 				group->id, iommu_domain_type_str(driver_type));
 			return -1;
 		}
diff --git a/drivers/pci/probe.c b/drivers/pci/probe.c
index 9aa69d19ceab4..40b449b8e736c 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/probe.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/probe.c
@@ -2080,7 +2080,6 @@ int pci_setup_device(struct pci_dev *dev)
 	set_pcie_cxl(dev);
 
 	pci_set_default_trust_policy(dev);
-	dev->untrusted = device_policy_is_adversarial(&dev->dev);
 	device_trust_init(&dev->dev);
 
 	/* "Unknown power state" */
diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h
index d8edf8403a5ad..17612cb18385e 100644
--- a/include/linux/pci.h
+++ b/include/linux/pci.h
@@ -490,14 +490,6 @@ struct pci_dev {
 	unsigned int	shpc_managed:1;		/* SHPC owned by shpchp */
 	unsigned int	is_thunderbolt:1;	/* Thunderbolt controller */
 	unsigned int	is_cxl:1;               /* Compute Express Link (CXL) */
-	/*
-	 * Devices marked being untrusted are the ones that can potentially
-	 * execute DMA attacks and similar. They are typically connected
-	 * through external ports such as Thunderbolt but not limited to
-	 * that. When an IOMMU is enabled they should be getting full
-	 * mappings to make sure they cannot access arbitrary memory.
-	 */
-	unsigned int	untrusted:1;
 	/*
 	 * Info from the platform, e.g., ACPI or device tree, may mark a
 	 * device as "external-facing".  An external-facing device is

-- 
2.56.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-11-18 19:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 19:26 [PATCH v3 00/31] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 01/31] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 02/31] Bluetooth: btusb: Fix MediaTek ISO claim locking Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 03/31] USB: Lock interfaces during manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 04/31] USB: serial: Register USB drivers with their owning module Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 05/31] USB: Reject claims of DT-disabled interfaces Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 06/31] USB: Release interface claims according to binding state Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 07/31] USB: Reject claims after interface registration failure Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 08/31] ALSA: usb-audio: Release interface claims when probe fails Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 09/31] USB: Pin modules for unregistered interface claims Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 10/31] USB: Add helpers to release unpublished " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 11/31] USB: Unwind interface claims after registration or binding failure Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 12/31] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 13/31] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 14/31] driver core: Report deferred probes through sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 15/31] driver core: Add a compatibility API for manual driver attachment Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 16/31] Input: gameport - use the compatibility driver attachment API Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 17/31] Input: serio " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 18/31] net: phy: Use " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 20:21   ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 19/31] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 20/31] driver core: Expose device trust authorization interfaces Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 21/31] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 22/31] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 23/31] driver core: Expose committed device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 24/31] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 25/31] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 26/31] PCI: Use device trust for platform restrictions Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 28/31] driver core: Allow driver attachment with the device lock held Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:26 ` [PATCH v3 29/31] USB: Retain the result of configuration requests Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:27 ` [PATCH v3 30/31] USB: Authorize interfaces through device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-18 19:27 ` [PATCH v3 31/31] USB: Authorize devices " Leon Romanovsky

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