From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Guo Zihao" <guozh23@xiaopeng.com>
Cc: linux-input@vger.kernel.org, dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Input: xen-kbdfront - bound the backend-supplied keycode
Date: Fri, 06 Nov 2026 01:56:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-200553@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261106014957.4130059-1-guozh23@xiaopeng.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Input: xen-kbdfront - double-fetch of keycode in xenkbd_handle_key_event()
--
commit b7a9474ab37fe06db55378df5e31d80df12a42ed
Author: Guo Zihao <guozh23@xiaopeng.com>
Input: xen-kbdfront - bound the backend-supplied keycode
This commit adds a bounds check against KEY_MAX in xenkbd_handle_key_event()
to prevent out-of-bounds bitmap reads in test_bit() when a backend supplies
an invalid keycode via the shared ring page.
> diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c b/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c
> index 6471d836f6fe6..e9092a7889261 100644
> --- a/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c
> +++ b/drivers/input/misc/xen-kbdfront.c
> @@ -92,6 +92,11 @@ static void xenkbd_handle_key_event(struct xenkbd_info *info,
> struct input_dev *dev;
> int value = key->pressed;
>
> + if (key->keycode >= KEY_MAX) {
> + pr_warn("unhandled keycode 0x%x\n", key->keycode);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> if (test_bit(key->keycode, info->ptr->keybit)) {
> dev = info->ptr;
> } else if (test_bit(key->keycode, info->kbd->keybit)) {
[Severity: High]
Can a backend bypass this bounds check by modifying key->keycode in the
shared ring page between the KEY_MAX check and the subsequent test_bit() and
input_event() calls?
In xenkbd_connect_backend(), info->page is granted with read-write foreign
access to the backend domain:
ret = gnttab_grant_foreign_access(dev->otherend_id,
virt_to_gfn(info->page), 0);
And input_handler() -> xenkbd_handle_event() -> xenkbd_handle_key_event()
passes a pointer directly into that shared ring page:
for (cons = page->in_cons; cons != prod; cons++)
xenkbd_handle_event(info, &XENKBD_IN_RING_REF(page, cons));
Because key->keycode is not read once into a local variable with READ_ONCE()
before validating it against KEY_MAX, the subsequent test_bit() calls on
info->ptr->keybit, info->kbd->keybit, and info->kbd->key (as well as
input_event()) can re-read key->keycode from shared memory after a
concurrent backend write and still read past the bitmaps.
Should key->keycode be snapshotted into a local variable via READ_ONCE()
before performing the check and bitmap lookups?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261106014957.4130059-1-guozh23@xiaopeng.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-06 1:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-06 1:49 [PATCH] Input: xen-kbdfront - bound the backend-supplied keycode Guo Zihao
2026-11-06 1:56 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-06 2:02 ` [PATCH v2] " Guo Zihao
2026-11-06 6:21 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-06 6:32 ` Guo Zihao
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-200553@kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com \
--cc=guozh23@xiaopeng.com \
--cc=linux-input@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox