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From: ross.philipson@oracle.com
To: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org,
	James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de,
	jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net,
	nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au,
	davem@davemloft.net, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2024 14:20:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <01c5bcf2-33fb-4723-bc6d-590b5d2d2eb9@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMj1kXHxvmHo-FWa8PXoZSTVyeSsgFyOaSuXP=2Bhj2YjxCALQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/14/24 11:59 PM, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On Wed, 14 Feb 2024 at 23:31, Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com> wrote:
>>
>> Initial bits to bring in Secure Launch functionality. Add Kconfig
>> options for compiling in/out the Secure Launch code.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++
>>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> index 5edec175b9bf..d96d75f6f1a9 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>> @@ -2071,6 +2071,18 @@ config EFI_RUNTIME_MAP
>>
>>            See also Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-firmware-efi-runtime-map.
>>
>> +config SECURE_LAUNCH
>> +       bool "Secure Launch support"
>> +       default n
> 
> 'n' is already the default, so you can drop this line.

Ack

> 
>> +       depends on X86_64 && X86_X2APIC
> 
> This depends on CONFIG_TCG_TPM as well (I got build failures without it)

Yes I will add that. I may have to add a couple of other things too.

Thanks
Ross

> 
>> +       help
>> +          The Secure Launch feature allows a kernel to be loaded
>> +          directly through an Intel TXT measured launch. Intel TXT
>> +          establishes a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM)
>> +          where the CPU measures the kernel image. This feature then
>> +          continues the measurement chain over kernel configuration
>> +          information and init images.
>> +
>>   source "kernel/Kconfig.hz"
>>
>>   config ARCH_SUPPORTS_KEXEC
>> --
>> 2.39.3
>>
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-15 22:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-14 22:18 [PATCH v8 00/15] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 01/15] x86/boot: Place kernel_info at a fixed offset Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  7:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 10:56     ` Daniel Kiper
2024-03-21 13:45     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-03-22 14:18       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-03-23  1:33         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-08-28 17:45       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-08-29 14:11         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 02/15] Documentation/x86: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 03/15] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  7:59   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:20     ` ross.philipson [this message]
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 04/15] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:08   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  2:03     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  2:10       ` ross.philipson
2024-02-22 17:49     ` ross.philipson
2024-03-29 22:38   ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-03-29 22:38     ` Kim Phillips
2024-04-01 18:25     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 05/15] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 06/15] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:17   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22  3:04     ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-22  9:34       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 12:30         ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23  9:27           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-23 16:42             ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 17:54               ` Eric Biggers
2024-02-23 18:20                 ` Andrew Cooper
2024-02-23 18:30                   ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-03 16:32                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2024-04-03 23:56                       ` Eric Biggers
2024-04-04  4:55                         ` ross.philipson
2024-04-04 14:55                         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 07/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:29   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-15 22:26     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 08/15] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 09/15] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 10/15] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 11/15] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 12/15] tpm: Add ability to set the preferred locality the TPM chip uses Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 13/15] tpm: Add sysfs interface to allow setting and querying the preferred locality Ross Philipson
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 14/15] x86: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  8:40   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-22 13:57     ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-23  9:36       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-03-21 14:11         ` Daniel P. Smith
2024-02-16  1:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17  7:53   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-14 22:18 ` [PATCH v8 15/15] x86: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2024-02-15  9:01   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-21 20:17     ` ross.philipson
2024-02-21 20:37       ` H. Peter Anvin
2024-02-21 23:24         ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-17  7:31   ` kernel test robot
2024-02-17 20:06   ` kernel test robot

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