From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:33436 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751291AbdJBMZW (ORCPT ); Mon, 2 Oct 2017 08:25:22 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.21/8.16.0.21) with SMTP id v92COooi111280 for ; Mon, 2 Oct 2017 08:25:21 -0400 Received: from e23smtp04.au.ibm.com (e23smtp04.au.ibm.com [202.81.31.146]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2dbeytbfh5-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 02 Oct 2017 08:25:21 -0400 Received: from localhost by e23smtp04.au.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Mon, 2 Oct 2017 22:25:18 +1000 Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3] fs: detect that the i_rwsem has already been taken exclusively From: Mimi Zohar To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Dave Chinner , Linus Torvalds , LSM List , linux-fsdevel , Christoph Hellwig , "Theodore Ts'o" , Jan Kara , Linux Kernel Mailing List , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Sascha Hauer Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2017 08:25:09 -0400 In-Reply-To: <87zi9ai63l.fsf@xmission.com> References: <20170928220215.GC15067@dastard> <1506643967.5691.46.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1506649980.5691.100.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87mv5blki7.fsf@xmission.com> <1506859691.5691.211.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171001223402.GG15067@dastard> <1506901362.5691.247.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87zi9ai63l.fsf@xmission.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <1506947109.5691.282.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Sun, 2017-10-01 at 22:25 -0500, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > Mimi Zohar writes: > > There should be no open writers in ima_check_last_writer(), so the > > file shouldn't be changing. > > This is slightly tangential but I think important to consider. > What do you do about distributed filesystems fuse, nfs, etc that > can change the data behind the kernels back. Exactly! > Do you not support such systems or do you have a sufficient way to > detect changes? Currently, only the initial file access in policy is measured, verified, audited. Even if there was a way of detecting the change, since we can't trust these file systems, the performance would be awful, but we should probably not be caching the measurement/verification results. Mimi