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Subject: Re: [RFC] EVM: Add support for portable signature format
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>,
        Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
        "linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Mikhail Kurinnoi <viewizard@viewizard.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 08:38:16 -0400
In-Reply-To: <C2D7A727C393B644B70DF4B4DCFB60B921C471AC@FRAEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com>
References: <20171026083144.16247-1-mjg59@google.com>
         <C2D7A727C393B644B70DF4B4DCFB60B921C471AC@FRAEML521-MBX.china.huawei.com>
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On Fri, 2017-10-27 at 10:41 +0000, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:

> > @@ -345,7 +350,8 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const
> > char *xattr_name,
> >  	if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
> >  		if (!xattr_value_len)
> >  			return -EINVAL;
> > -		if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)
> > +		if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
> > +		    xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
> >  			return -EPERM;
> >  	}
> 
> Also I have an impression that evm_protect_xattr will allow to set
> security.ima for example,
> And it will cause to try to re-calculate hmac over immutable
> signature...

Right, it will allow evm_inode_post_setxattr() to replace the new file
signature with an HMAC.

> 
> >  	return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -