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Subject: Re: [PATCH V3 2/2] IMA: Support using new creds in appraisal policy
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
        Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
        Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2017 15:48:55 -0500
In-Reply-To: <20171026084055.25482-2-mjg59@google.com>
References: <20171026084055.25482-1-mjg59@google.com>
         <20171026084055.25482-2-mjg59@google.com>
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Hi Matthew,

On Thu, 2017-10-26 at 01:40 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> The existing BPRM_CHECK functionality in IMA validates against the
> credentials of the existing process, not any new credentials that the
> child process may transition to. Add an additional CREDS_CHECK target
> and refactor IMA to pass the appropriate creds structure. In
> ima_bprm_check(), check with both the existing process credentials and
> the credentials that will be committed when the new process is started.
> This will not change behaviour unless the system policy is extended to
> include CREDS_CHECK targets - BPRM_CHECK will continue to check the same
> credentials that it did previously.

< snip >

> @@ -305,7 +304,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
>  		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
> -			security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
> +			security_cred_getsecid(cred, &sid);
>  			rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
>  							rule->lsm[i].type,
>  							Audit_equal,

Based on the patch description, I wouldn't expect to see any changes
here, unless this is wrong to begin with.  In which case, it should be
a separate patch.

Mimi