From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V5 3/3] EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs
Date: Mon, 14 May 2018 13:35:42 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1526319342.3368.2.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1526318354.3898.159.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
On Mon, 2018-05-14 at 13:19 -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Mon, 2018-05-14 at 10:01 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > On Sun, May 13, 2018 at 9:41 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 16:12 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > +
> > > > + if (strcmp(xattr->name, ".") == 0) {
> > > > + evm_xattrs_locked = 1;
> > > > + inode = evm_xattrs->d_inode;
> > > > + inode_lock(inode);
> > > > + newattrs.ia_mode = S_IFREG | 0440;
> > > > + newattrs.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE;
> > > > + err = notify_change(evm_xattrs, &newattrs, NULL);
> > > > + inode_unlock(inode);
> > > > + audit_log_format(ab, "locked");
> > > > + if (!err)
> > > > + err = count;
> > > > + goto out;
> > > > + }
> > > > +
> > > > + audit_log_format(ab, "xattr=");
> > > > + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, xattr->name);
> > > > +
> > > > + if (strncmp(xattr->name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> > > > + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN) != 0) {
> > > > + err = -EINVAL;
> > > > + goto out;
> > > > + }
> >
> > > This test now prevents locking the xattr names list. Making this an
> > > else clause will fix it.
> >
> > Are you sure? The check for "." happens before this, and jumps over the
> > rest of the function.
>
> Oh! It did work, but the messages are confusing.
>
> # cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
> security.selinux
> security.ima
> security.capability
> security.foo
> # echo foo > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
> bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
>
> # echo security.foo > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
> bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
This makes sense, as it was already added.
>
> # cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
> security.selinux
> security.ima
> security.capability
> security.foo
>
> # echo . > /sys/kernel/security/integrity/evm/evm_xattrs
> bash: echo: write error: Operation not permitted
I'm still seeing this message.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-14 17:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-11 23:12 [PATCH V5 1/3] integrity: Add an integrity directory in securityfs Matthew Garrett
2018-05-11 23:12 ` [PATCH V5 2/3] EVM: turn evm_config_xattrnames into a list Matthew Garrett
2018-05-11 23:12 ` [PATCH V5 3/3] EVM: Allow runtime modification of the set of verified xattrs Matthew Garrett
2018-05-13 16:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 17:01 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-05-14 17:19 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 17:35 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2018-05-14 17:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-05-14 18:50 ` Matthew Garrett
2018-05-14 21:02 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-14 23:12 ` Matthew Garrett
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