From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:38622 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732562AbeGMSWF (ORCPT ); Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:22:05 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.22/8.16.0.22) with SMTP id w6DI4D59113281 for ; Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:06:22 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2k70gf9395-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:06:22 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Fri, 13 Jul 2018 19:06:20 +0100 From: Mimi Zohar To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Luis R . Rodriguez" , Eric Biederman , kexec@lists.infradead.org, Andres Rodriguez , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Kees Cook Subject: [PATCH v6 2/8] kexec: add call to LSM hook in original kexec_load syscall Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:05:57 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1531505163-20227-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1531505163-20227-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-Id: <1531505163-20227-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: In order for LSMs and IMA-appraisal to differentiate between kexec_load and kexec_file_load syscalls, both the original and new syscalls must call an LSM hook. This patch adds a call to security_kernel_load_data() in the original kexec_load syscall. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Kees Cook Acked-by: Serge Hallyn --- kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c index aed8fb2564b3..68559808fdfa 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec.c +++ b/kernel/kexec.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -195,10 +196,17 @@ static int do_kexec_load(unsigned long entry, unsigned long nr_segments, static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments, unsigned long flags) { + int result; + /* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM; + /* Permit LSMs and IMA to fail the kexec */ + result = security_kernel_load_data(LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE); + if (result < 0) + return result; + /* * Verify we have a legal set of flags * This leaves us room for future extensions. -- 2.7.5