From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA?
Date: Wed, 03 Apr 2019 08:11:18 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1554293478.7309.54.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACdnJusPpis1JJgfNOrQoqPcVk0q2OGbosrXOVtZmG0cSqkotw@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, 2019-04-02 at 15:31 -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 5:50 AM Igor Zhbanov <i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru> wrote:
> > I want to be sure that no unsigned code page could be executed. So exploits
> > could only be of ROP kind and not being able to download any extra code
> > from their servers. That's why I found that disabling of anonymous executable
> > pages could be useful for that (as well as disabling of making executable
> > pages writable to modify already mapped code). In conjunction with IMA it
> > should guarantee that no untrusted code could be executed.
>
> Remember that many interpreted languages allow execution of code
> provided to them on the command line (eg, python -c) and also grant
> access to arbitrary syscalls, so there's still no guarantee that
> you're only executing trusted code.
Interpreters are a known concern, as Yves-Alexis Perez pointed out in
his LSS-2018 Europe talk[1].
Mimi
[1] https://events.linuxfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Linu
x-Kernel-Security-Contributions-by-ANSSI-Yves-Alexis-Perez-ANSSI.pdf
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-03 12:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-03-18 15:18 Should mprotect(..., PROT_EXEC) be checked by IMA? Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-18 21:48 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 7:50 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-19 11:22 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-19 12:19 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-19 17:05 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-20 8:11 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-20 17:23 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-20 18:08 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-21 11:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-21 11:48 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-21 18:04 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-22 7:59 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-28 17:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-29 10:00 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-03-29 10:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-29 11:51 ` Jordan Glover
2019-03-29 12:28 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-03-29 12:50 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-02 22:31 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 9:59 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 16:58 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 17:31 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 18:19 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-03 18:47 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 19:25 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-04-04 11:44 ` Igor Zhbanov
2019-04-03 12:11 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2019-04-03 13:18 ` Perez Yves-Alexis
2019-04-03 11:57 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-03 13:10 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-03 14:33 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-04-03 14:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-04-03 16:21 ` Mimi Zohar
2019-03-21 18:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-03-19 17:07 ` Matthew Garrett
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