From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_2 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id AD73BCA9EAC for ; Sun, 20 Oct 2019 00:17:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7881021D7C for ; Sun, 20 Oct 2019 00:17:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1726191AbfJTARE (ORCPT ); Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:17:04 -0400 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]:22528 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725710AbfJTARE (ORCPT ); Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:17:04 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098420.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x9K0Chx9050583 for ; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:17:02 -0400 Received: from e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com (e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com [195.75.94.100]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2vrbu3he0a-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:17:02 -0400 Received: from localhost by e06smtp04.uk.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Sun, 20 Oct 2019 01:16:55 +0100 Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.61]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x9K0Gs6I60227790 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sun, 20 Oct 2019 00:16:54 GMT Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2716811C050; Sun, 20 Oct 2019 00:16:54 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id EDF1C11C04C; Sun, 20 Oct 2019 00:16:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from localhost.localdomain (unknown [9.85.181.232]) by d06av25.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Sun, 20 Oct 2019 00:16:51 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v8 4/8] powerpc/ima: add measurement rules to ima arch specific policy From: Mimi Zohar To: Nayna Jain , linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Paul Mackerras , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Claudio Carvalho , George Wilson , Elaine Palmer , Eric Ricther , "Oliver O'Halloran" , Prakhar Srivastava , Lakshmi Ramasubramanian Date: Sat, 19 Oct 2019 20:16:50 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1571508377-23603-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> References: <1571508377-23603-1-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> <1571508377-23603-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.20.5 (3.20.5-1.fc24) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19102000-0016-0000-0000-000002BA20E6 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19102000-0017-0000-0000-0000331B51ED Message-Id: <1571530610.5250.311.camel@linux.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:,, definitions=2019-10-19_06:,, signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1908290000 definitions=main-1910200000 Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Sat, 2019-10-19 at 14:06 -0400, Nayna Jain wrote: > This patch adds the measurement rules to the arch specific policies on > trusted boot enabled systems. This version does not add rules to the existing arch specific policy, but defines an arch specific trusted boot only policy and a combined secure and trusted boot policy. > > Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain > --- > arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c > index 65d82ee74ea4..710872ea8f35 100644 > --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c > +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c > @@ -26,6 +26,32 @@ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { > NULL > }; > > +/* > + * The "measure_rules" are enabled only on "trustedboot" enabled systems. Please update the policy name to reflect the new "trusted_rules" name. > + * These rules add the kexec kernel image and kernel modules file hashes to > + * the IMA measurement list. > + */ > +static const char *const trusted_rules[] = { > + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK", > + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK", > + NULL > +}; > + > +/* > + * The "secure_and_trusted_rules" contains rules for both the secure boot and > + * trusted boot. The "template=ima-modsig" option includes the appended > + * signature, when available, in the IMA measurement list. > + */ > +static const char *const secure_and_trusted_rules[] = { > + "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK template=ima-modsig", > + "measure func=MODULE_CHECK template=ima-modsig", > + "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", > +#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE > + "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig|modsig", > +#endif > + NULL > +}; > + > /* > * Returns the relevant IMA arch-specific policies based on the system secure > * boot state. > @@ -33,7 +59,13 @@ static const char *const secure_rules[] = { > const char *const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) > { > if (is_ppc_secureboot_enabled()) > - return secure_rules; > + if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled()) > + return secure_and_trusted_rules; > + else > + return secure_rules; > + else > + if (is_ppc_trustedboot_enabled()) No need for the "if" statement to be on a separate line.  Please combine the "else" and "if" statements. Mimi > + return trusted_rules; > > return NULL; > }