From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use
Date: Mon, 09 Dec 2019 07:38:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1575905895.3340.8.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <89e3c7c531b228673089ad892d5e6390642ced85.camel@infradead.org>
On Mon, 2019-12-09 at 08:31 +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> On Sat, 2019-12-07 at 21:07 -0800, James Bottomley wrote:
> > The trusted keys code currently loads a blob into the TPM and
> > unseals
> > on the handle. However, it never flushes the handle meaning that
> > volatile contexts build up until the TPM becomes unusable. Fix
> > this
> > by flushing the handle after the unseal.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.c
> > om>
> > ---
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 1 -
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 1 +
> > include/linux/tpm.h | 1 +
> > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 1 +
> > 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> > index b9e1547be6b5..5620747da0cf 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
> > @@ -218,7 +218,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32
> > pcr_idx,
> > int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> > struct tpm_digest *digests);
> > int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, size_t max);
> > -void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle);
> > ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,
> > u32 *value, const char *desc);
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-
> > cmd.c
> > index fdb457704aa7..b87592f4a6c7 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > @@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> > u32 handle)
> > tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "flushing context");
> > tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > }
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(tpm2_flush_context);
>
>
> Everything else is EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(). Why EXPORT_SYMBOL() here?
No reason ... well, except I'm not sure the difference has any utility,
but since I don't really care either way, I'll change all the exports.
James
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-09 15:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-08 5:06 [PATCH 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:07 ` [PATCH 1/8] security: keys: trusted: flush the key handle after use James Bottomley
2019-12-09 8:31 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 15:38 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2019-12-08 5:08 ` [PATCH 2/8] lib: add asn.1 encoder James Bottomley
2019-12-09 8:50 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 15:46 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-09 22:05 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-12-09 22:43 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:09 ` [PATCH 3/8] oid_registry: Add TCG defined OIDS for TPM keys James Bottomley
2019-12-09 8:55 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 16:21 ` James Bottomley
2020-06-19 20:45 ` Wiseman, Monty (GE Research, US)
2020-06-19 22:50 ` Jerry Snitselaar
2020-06-20 15:36 ` James Bottomley
2020-06-23 1:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-08 5:10 ` [PATCH 4/8] security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 tpm2 key format for the blobs James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:04 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 16:31 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:11 ` [PATCH 5/8] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:09 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 17:23 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:12 ` [PATCH 6/8] security: keys: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2019-12-09 10:18 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 18:03 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-09 18:44 ` David Woodhouse
2019-12-09 19:11 ` James Bottomley
2019-12-25 17:08 ` Ken Goldman
2019-12-08 5:13 ` [PATCH 7/8] security: keys: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2019-12-08 5:14 ` [PATCH 8/8] security: keys: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2019-12-09 20:20 ` [PATCH 0/8] Fix TPM 2.0 trusted keys Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-12-09 20:57 ` James Bottomley
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1575905895.3340.8.camel@HansenPartnership.com \
--to=james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
--cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
--cc=jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).