From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
To: Bruno Meneguele <bmeneg@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
erichte@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 07:00:48 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1593514848.5085.82.camel@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200629234744.GA2756@glitch>
On Mon, 2020-06-29 at 20:47 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote:
>
> > I'm not if the "secure_boot" flag is available prior to calling
> > default_appraise_setup(), but if it is, you could modify the test
> > there to also check if the system is booted in secure boot mode (eg.
> > IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM) &&
> > !arch_ima_get_secureboot())
> >
>
> Well pointed. I built a custom x86 kernel with some workaround to get
> this flag status within default_appraise_setup() and as a result the
> flag is was correctly available.
>
> Considering the nature of this flag (platform's firmware (in all
> arches?)) can we trust that every arch supporting secure/trusted boot
> will have it available in the __setup() call time?
Calling default_appraise_setup() could be deferred.
>
> > > + /* In secure and/or trusted boot the appraisal must be
> > > + * enforced, regardless kernel parameters, preventing
> > > + * runtime changes */
> >
> > Only "appraise" rules are enforced.
> >
>
> Hmm.. do you mean the comment wording is wrong/"could be better",
> pointing the "appraise" action explicitly?
No, it's more than just the comment. Like "trusted boot", IMA-
measurement only measures files, never enforces integrity.
"ima_appraise" mode is only applicable to IMA-appraisal.
Mimi
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-30 11:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-23 20:26 [PATCH v3 0/2] ima: make appraisal state runtime dependent on secure boot Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-23 20:26 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] arch/ima: extend secure boot check to include trusted boot Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-26 20:23 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-29 23:52 ` Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-23 20:26 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-26 20:40 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-06-29 23:47 ` Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-30 11:00 ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2020-06-30 17:00 ` Bruno Meneguele
2020-07-02 19:12 ` Bruno Meneguele
2020-06-26 14:46 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] ima: make appraisal state runtime dependent on secure boot Bruno Meneguele
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