From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.1 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 21020C433E5 for ; Mon, 13 Jul 2020 15:04:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E99FF20578 for ; Mon, 13 Jul 2020 15:04:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="MgfC4ELU" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729889AbgGMPEU (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Jul 2020 11:04:20 -0400 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.120]:36675 "EHLO us-smtp-1.mimecast.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1729884AbgGMPEU (ORCPT ); Mon, 13 Jul 2020 11:04:20 -0400 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1594652658; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=y5LgY+HXOyC1qLXaav2qwG6qSNorPKc5IVKdxzKAFRE=; b=MgfC4ELUJ4pmjWKagOK1l17nxFUdWXsTHk/vRiqRRyINIPL2BMDxoDj96VTAJfdm+xFMfL IRLWWpdXDOowAucl8nWzOqgg4E72V2XTgT9SdkDOVkcZgQr2LIiEIEljsU/ynx1Mvd9STg KoA7K0/LNY4dBYP7iZW8CUsEZFLeA/w= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-434-O4iVewDkOQWpoMSBO_vvTQ-1; Mon, 13 Jul 2020 11:03:55 -0400 X-MC-Unique: O4iVewDkOQWpoMSBO_vvTQ-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx08.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.23]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 66D4D1083E84; Mon, 13 Jul 2020 15:03:53 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost (ovpn-116-148.gru2.redhat.com [10.97.116.148]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B5BD619D7D; Mon, 13 Jul 2020 15:03:52 +0000 (UTC) Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2020 12:03:51 -0300 From: Bruno Meneguele To: Mimi Zohar Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, erichte@linux.ibm.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] ima: move APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM dependency on ARCH_POLICY to runtime Message-ID: <20200713150351.GC4730@glitch> References: <20200709164647.45153-1-bmeneg@redhat.com> <1594401804.14405.8.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20200710180338.GA10547@glitch> <20200710183420.GB10547@glitch> <1594407288.14405.36.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20200710192516.GC10547@glitch> MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200710192516.GC10547@glitch> X-PGP-Key: http://keys.gnupg.net/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x3823031E4660608D X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.23 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha256; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="/e2eDi0V/xtL+Mc8" Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-integrity-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org --/e2eDi0V/xtL+Mc8 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 04:25:16PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 02:54:48PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Fri, 2020-07-10 at 15:34 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 03:03:38PM -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:23:24PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > > On Thu, 2020-07-09 at 13:46 -0300, Bruno Meneguele wrote: > > > > > > APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM has been marked as dependent on !ARCH_POLICY= in compile > > > > > > time, enforcing the appraisal whenever the kernel had the arch = policy option > > > > > > enabled. > > > > >=20 > > > > > > However it breaks systems where the option is set but the syste= m didn't > > > > > > boot in a "secure boot" platform. In this scenario, anytime an = appraisal > > > > > > policy (i.e. ima_policy=3Dappraisal_tcb) is used it will be for= ced, without > > > > > > giving the user the opportunity to label the filesystem, before= enforcing > > > > > > integrity. > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > Considering the ARCH_POLICY is only effective when secure boot = is actually > > > > > > enabled this patch remove the compile time dependency and move = it to a > > > > > > runtime decision, based on the secure boot state of that platfo= rm. > > > > >=20 > > > > > Perhaps we could simplify this patch description a bit? > > > > >=20 > > > > > The IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM config allows enabling different > > > > > "ima_appraise=3D" modes - log, fix, enforce - at run time, but no= t when > > > > > IMA architecture specific policies are enabled. =A0This prevents > > > > > properly labeling the filesystem on systems where secure boot is > > > > > supported, but not enabled on the platform. =A0Only when secure b= oot is > > > > > enabled, should these IMA appraise modes be disabled. > > > > >=20 > > > > > This patch removes the compile time dependency and makes it a run= time > > > > > decision, based on the secure boot state of that platform. > > > > >=20 > > > >=20 > > > > Sounds good to me. > > > >=20 > > > > > > > > > >=20 > > > > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/i= ntegrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > > > > > index a9649b04b9f1..884de471b38a 100644 > > > > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > > > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > > > > > @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ > > > > > > static int __init default_appraise_setup(c > > > > >=20 > > > > > > har *str) > > > > > > { > > > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM > > > > > > +=09if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { > > > > > > +=09=09pr_info("appraise boot param ignored: secure boot enable= d"); > > > > >=20 > > > > > Instead of a generic statement, is it possible to include the act= ual > > > > > option being denied? =A0Perhaps something like: "Secure boot enab= led, > > > > > ignoring %s boot command line option" > > > > >=20 > > > > > Mimi > > > > >=20 > > > >=20 > > > > Yes, sure. > > > >=20 > > >=20 > > > Btw, would it make sense to first make sure we have a valid "str" > > > option and not something random to print? > > > =20 > > > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integri= ty/ima/ima_appraise.c > > > index a9649b04b9f1..1f1175531d3e 100644 > > > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c > > > @@ -25,6 +25,16 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str= ) > > > ima_appraise =3D IMA_APPRAISE_LOG; > > > else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) =3D=3D 0) > > > ima_appraise =3D IMA_APPRAISE_FIX; > > > + else > > > + pr_info("invalid \"%s\" appraise option"); > > > + > > > + if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { > > > + if (!is_ima_appraise_enabled()) { > > > + pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_ap= praise=3D%s boot parameter option", > > > + str); > > > + ima_appraise =3D IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; > > > + } > > > + } > >=20 > > Providing feedback is probably a good idea. =A0However, the > > "arch_ima_get_secureboot" test can't come after setting > > "ima_appraise." > >=20 >=20 > Sorry, but I'm not sure if I got the reason to why it can't be done > after: would it be basically to prevent any further processing about > ima_appraise as a matter of security principle? Or maybe to keep the > dependency between secureboot and bootparam truly strict?=20 >=20 > Or are there something else I'm missing? >=20 I'm going to send a v6 with the pr_info() placed in the beginning directly printing 'str', thus we can have the actual issue solved.=20 Then later I send another patches to handle the other cases of limiting 'str' printing and also giving the user a feedback about invalid ima_appraise=3D options. So we can discuss further on that. Thanks Mimi. > > Mimi > >=20 > > > #endif > > > return 1; > > > } > > >=20 > > >=20 > > > The "else" there I think would make sense as well, at least to give t= he > > > user some feedback about a possible mispelling of him (as a separate > > > patch). > > >=20 > > > And "if(!is_ima_appraise_enabled())" would avoid to print anything ab= out > > > "ignoring the option" to the user in case he explicitly set "enforce"= , > > > which we know there isn't any real effect but is allowed and shown in > > > kernel-parameters.txt. > > >=20 > > > > Thanks! > > > >=20 > > > > > > +=09=09return 1; > > > > > > +=09} > > > > > > + > > > > > > =09if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) =3D=3D 0) > > > > > > =09=09ima_appraise =3D 0; > > > > > > =09else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) =3D=3D 0) > > > > >=20 > > > >=20 > > > > --=20 > > > > bmeneg=20 > > > > PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt > > >=20 > > >=20 > > >=20 > >=20 >=20 > --=20 > bmeneg=20 > PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt --=20 bmeneg=20 PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt --/e2eDi0V/xtL+Mc8 Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQEzBAEBCAAdFiEEdWo6nTbnZdbDmXutYdRkFR+RokMFAl8Md9cACgkQYdRkFR+R okMtIQf8DZC6eBugwiFWL2eAc5ePgbdsvuo5aPMkQvTR20E/jr44coEpbyLHg4dI v3/6Rl0NqtJpe+qXbBBQDneG5H3BmfV/fa34ie39pwc36ExkHsMEzlM8XWqK6pfW fjlP16BYuwEcReffrmXPYOpDT0Ohl9tMqX6CVY16o2/8TELnTaWSY1Iq7ot+oPet PnTIIFqFQ41o4nS31BssLtEChs1ZhPwiTCTWBQnDWOaFfL0IZAkaCdp13J8WRTEK poTKWGTcw1TqtiRdppy7Gbs1ysCTrpAVlTRJyZKHIECFm3I/HH5breKFbom0GjWT UgzMxlFa2Fwt5uTeSR8xvmVzIZXR+g== =QwKI -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --/e2eDi0V/xtL+Mc8--