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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v5 08/17] KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffers
Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 14:08:45 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231127190854.13310-9-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231127190854.13310-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

Take advantage of the new sized buffer (TPM2B) mode of struct tpm_buf in
tpm2_seal_trusted(). This allows to add robustness to the command
construction without requiring to calculate buffer sizes manually.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 54 +++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index bc700f85f80b..97b1dfca2dba 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -228,8 +228,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		      struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
 		      struct trusted_key_options *options)
 {
+	off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
+	struct tpm_buf buf, sized;
 	int blob_len = 0;
-	struct tpm_buf buf;
 	u32 hash;
 	u32 flags;
 	int i;
@@ -258,6 +259,14 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 		return rc;
 	}
 
+	rc = tpm_buf_init_sized(&sized);
+	if (rc) {
+		tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
+		tpm_put_ops(chip);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	tpm_buf_reset(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
 	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
 	tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
 			     NULL /* nonce */, 0,
@@ -266,36 +275,36 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 			     TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 
 	/* sensitive */
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 4 + options->blobauth_len + payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->blobauth_len);
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
 	if (options->blobauth_len)
-		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+		tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
 
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, payload->key_len);
-	tpm_buf_append(&buf, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append(&sized, payload->key, payload->key_len);
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
 
 	/* public */
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 14 + options->policydigest_len);
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, hash);
+	tpm_buf_reset_sized(&sized);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, hash);
 
 	/* key properties */
 	flags = 0;
 	flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH;
-	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM |
-					    TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
-	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, flags);
+	flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT);
+	tpm_buf_append_u32(&sized, flags);
 
 	/* policy */
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->policydigest_len);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, options->policydigest_len);
 	if (options->policydigest_len)
-		tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->policydigest,
-			       options->policydigest_len);
+		tpm_buf_append(&sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len);
 
 	/* public parameters */
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_NULL);
-	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, TPM_ALG_NULL);
+	tpm_buf_append_u16(&sized, 0);
+
+	tpm_buf_append(&buf, sized.data, sized.length);
 
 	/* outside info */
 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
@@ -312,21 +321,20 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	blob_len = be32_to_cpup((__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
-	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) {
+	blob_len = tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset);
+	if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) {
 		rc = -E2BIG;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) < TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4 + blob_len) {
+	if (buf.length - offset < blob_len) {
 		rc = -EFAULT;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options,
-				   &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE + 4],
-				   blob_len);
+	blob_len = tpm2_key_encode(payload, options, &buf.data[offset], blob_len);
 
 out:
+	tpm_buf_destroy(&sized);
 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
 
 	if (rc > 0) {
-- 
2.35.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-11-27 19:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-27 19:08 [PATCH v5 00/17] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 01/17] tpm: Remove unused tpm_buf_tag() James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 02/17] tpm: Remove tpm_send() James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 03/17] tpm: Move buffer handling from static inlines to real functions James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 04/17] tpm: Update struct tpm_buf documentation comments James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 05/17] tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 06/17] tpm: TPM2B formatted buffers James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 07/17] tpm: Add tpm_buf_read_{u8,u16,u32} James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` James Bottomley [this message]
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 09/17] crypto: lib - implement library version of AES in CFB mode James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 10/17] tpm: add buffer function to point to returned parameters James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 11/17] tpm: export the context save and load commands James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 12/17] tpm: Add full HMAC and encrypt/decrypt session handling code James Bottomley
2023-12-07  4:52   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-12-07 23:09     ` James Bottomley
2023-12-13 16:42       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 13/17] tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 14/17] tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 15/17] KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 16/17] tpm: add the null key name as a sysfs export James Bottomley
2023-12-07 20:48   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-12-15  3:34   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-11-27 19:08 ` [PATCH v5 17/17] Documentation: add tpm-security.rst James Bottomley

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