Re: [RFC PATCH v19 1/5] exec: Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2)

Mickaël Salaün
2024-07-06T14:56:07Z

On Fri, Jul 05, 2024 at 08:03:14PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Mickaël Salaün:
>
> > Add a new AT_CHECK flag to execveat(2) to check if a file would be
> > allowed for execution. The main use case is for script interpreters and
> > dynamic linkers to check execution permission according to the kernel's
> > security policy. Another use case is to add context to access logs e.g.,
> > which script (instead of interpreter) accessed a file. As any
> > executable code, scripts could also use this check [1].
>
> Some distributions no longer set executable bits on most shared objects,
> which I assume would interfere with AT_CHECK probing for shared objects.

A file without the execute permission is not considered as executable by
the kernel. The AT_CHECK flag doesn't change this semantic. Please
note that this is just a check, not a restriction. See the next patch
for the optional policy enforcement.

Anyway, we need to define the policy, and for Linux this is done with
the file permission bits. So for systems willing to have a consistent
execution policy, we need to rely on the same bits.

> Removing the executable bit is attractive because of a combination of
> two bugs: a binutils wart which until recently always set the entry
> point address in the ELF header to zero, and the kernel not checking for
> a zero entry point (maybe in combination with an absent program
> interpreter) and failing the execve with ELIBEXEC, instead of doing the
> execve and then faulting at virtual address zero. Removing the
> executable bit is currently the only way to avoid these confusing
> crashes, so I understand the temptation.

Interesting. Can you please point to the bug report and the fix? I
don't see any ELIBEXEC in the kernel.

FYI, AT_CHECK doesn't check the content of the file (unlike a full
execve call).

Anyway, I think we should not design a new kernel interface to work
around a current user space bug.