From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id A6ED63B8D75; Sat, 13 Dec 2025 20:32:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765657959; cv=none; b=GfPLdvpU95vUr0CUep4IMin0dABcMt20bnC6hFRiXTcNWyPeb/yBTdcckDp2BcBMR8NUzPEimXKAq6za3XsbvlwJ8fQaGaru9oXsWVlDsOSrjRp6fx9ku2EiBBL55jAfX/Nlf2S9FwnNvzqeGqc/dSIlLr5HBRxt8A/y/h4gYBQ= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765657959; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Mlf+h2u0SS1ZrLHa8+NCP1TYeFPqVUTOuV8Y6ejrIOI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=OMWfXgUf9D5Zywin6p5QBYwTuiEfO2IwNvzDsqkfj/kpt0ohBOanYqqi2i/VQepYBESAsI8HqaGCYET59Xcqp4M41pyYyuqVZhgWrexUuUkM7vgWUob1Kz8swyjU+tDkdvCDJFek78dywJ3cGx3Qh3BHnzx2Emi2yM1m6dpOwPo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=iM4XhHK1; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="iM4XhHK1" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C9C47C113D0; Sat, 13 Dec 2025 20:32:38 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765657959; bh=Mlf+h2u0SS1ZrLHa8+NCP1TYeFPqVUTOuV8Y6ejrIOI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=iM4XhHK1dN6AMyX/YMeQC42/67KsotC5jjsElV/sXuT0cgx0JtYha4eHKCK2wblgw Rnflbl0uNFwQTKoOrL5NaQO2cQBTW9cxXuKrHw13REY9eCuRT+elOPyV9InGfmKjOA CD56JolBEd7vgf2CJnuWXQdKiaHDkgBQs1QR2YXkl6ioIvgN0B7wUy5Xnko8bWB5I2 P15IKDlRn9vlBcBnE2dkaEzDe/lE/Kh8w50oL8YbciNX9zBr6uZRaAzmo9chI/8f5V yLmRqTguKfYkWpKIkbbaVsxcHZJBHadnrJL5coAkOv0/G0LIEMWy/3U3XkRGony1Ey 5EQ9sHAMHbJXw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ross Philipson , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jonathan McDowell , David Howells , Jarkko Sakkinen , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM), linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v5 01/12] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2025 22:32:08 +0200 Message-Id: <20251213203220.317498-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20251213203220.317498-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251213203220.317498-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jarkko Sakkinen tpm2_buf_append_auth() has only single call site and most of its parameters are redundant. Open code it to the call site. Remove illegit FIXME comment as there is no categorized bug and replace it with more sane comment about implementation (i.e. "non-opionated inline comment"). Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 52 +++++------------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index a7ea4a1c3bed..d25d065c2af0 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -190,36 +190,6 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen, return 0; } -/** - * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer. - * - * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance - * @session_handle: session handle - * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used - * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used - * @attributes: the session attributes - * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used - * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used - */ -static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle, - const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len, - u8 attributes, - const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len) -{ - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len); - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len); - - if (nonce && nonce_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len); - - tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes); - tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len); - - if (hmac && hmac_len) - tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len); -} - /** * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key * @@ -508,19 +478,17 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, options->blobauth_len); } else { /* - * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the - * kernel so we don't known the nonce and thus can't - * calculate a HMAC on it. Therefore, the user can - * only really use TPM2_PolicyPassword and we must - * send down the plain text password, which could be - * intercepted. We can still encrypt the returned - * key, but that's small comfort since the interposer - * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated - * password. + * The policy session is generated outside the kernel, and thus + * the password will end up being unencrypted on the bus, as + * HMAC nonce cannot be calculated for it. */ - tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle, - NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9 + options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->policyhandle); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0); + tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len); + tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); + if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); } else { -- 2.39.5