From: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: ltp@lists.linux.it, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
Martin Doucha <mdoucha@suse.cz>,
Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ima_violations.sh: Another fix of condition evaluation
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2025 15:25:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251217142515.GA66146@pevik> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c5450636264354dbf4d5e52d2441904d665e96ee.camel@linux.ibm.com>
> On Thu, 2025-12-11 at 12:10 +0100, Petr Vorel wrote:
> > c0c35509f9 was not enough to fix evaluation against empty
> > $expected_violations:
> > ima_violations 1 TINFO: verify open writers violation
> > /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/ima_violations.sh: line 96: [: 0: unary operator expected
> > Therefore split checks into two if.
> > Also improvements (readability)
> > * shorten line length with saving subtraction into variable
> > * evaluate empty variable with ${:-}
> > Fixes: 726ed71905 ("ima_violations.sh: Update validate() to support multiple violations")
> > Reported-by: Martin Doucha <mdoucha@suse.cz>
> > Signed-off-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
> Thanks, Martin, Petr. LGTM
Thanks! FYI merged with simpler code suggested by Andrea.
> > ---
> > NOTE: this was found on old SLES 4.4 based kernel which does not log
> > validations. But missing validations might be just a Secure Boot related
> > setup problem:
> > $ mokutil --sb-state
> > Secure Boot: EFI variables not supported on SUT
> > Events are logged when Secure Boot is off:
> > $ mokutil --sb-state
> > SecureBoot disabled
> > Or maybe violations worked differently on the old kernel (I remember
> > only 6.15 change).
> Violations only occur when there are policy rules containing "func=FILE_CHECK"
> defined. The secure boot mode should only affects the arch specific policies,
> which do not include "func=FILE_CHECK" rules. There is a slight difference
> between the builtin the original "ima_tcb" and newer "ima_policy=tcb" policies,
> which might affect violations.
Thanks for the hints! I'll have to dig more into tthe problem to see what is
wrong.
Anyway at least for example policy I see the differences between the old [1] and
new [2]:
-measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ euid=0
+measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=^MAY_READ uid=0 # root opened r/o, r/w
I guess I'll just add for older kernels this example policy:
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
Kind regards,
Petr
[1] https://ima-doc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ima-policy.html#ima-policy-tcb
[2] https://ima-doc.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ima-policy.html#ima-tcb
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-12-17 14:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-12-11 11:10 [PATCH] ima_violations.sh: Another fix of condition evaluation Petr Vorel
2025-12-12 3:42 ` Mimi Zohar
2025-12-17 14:25 ` Petr Vorel [this message]
2025-12-12 8:50 ` [LTP] " Andrea Cervesato
2025-12-12 11:20 ` Petr Vorel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20251217142515.GA66146@pevik \
--to=pvorel@suse.cz \
--cc=andrea.cervesato@suse.de \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=ltp@lists.linux.it \
--cc=mdoucha@suse.cz \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).