From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9EA2AC433EF for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:34:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S232132AbiGFOeN (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jul 2022 10:34:13 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:55206 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S230146AbiGFOeL (ORCPT ); Wed, 6 Jul 2022 10:34:11 -0400 Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D83851836D for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 07:34:10 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 266CpVpO008264; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:34:00 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=message-id : subject : from : to : cc : date : in-reply-to : references : content-type : mime-version : content-transfer-encoding; s=pp1; bh=CE1VmX7bHoMcrXGqRMXiEj2kc/KDtLm+Dh8bAi9fHYM=; b=XCMayTtaBRh04vBZNIK1mfpgz4KVOdwAHWnMQkCHtl2wutAHmkY/gNOsRV2zukLkkYdl v0AXBvbcH4hyV14A4N0dMmIPTWhCJzmDhT5Nn2XE0SkWgWE21H36XtqXFyhvOQUuglKo hh0OFomGP/cGTtOdXB1HD3v631SiYJqndTdVhJUI+JI7jWiqPK+hFfMhs4fCHZYSh+n4 FyIlPiz7iCWMxes0KD0cDZyKZkuYWq5l8/ZBk0ZGFhgxfU65sPh7IkMKHg5WrJauXmrL 65mGWQD8szYkLLB520eAX995NnWJzXln6vYonGAlEh3KXoZnDCfUFuvEZDU6TlqEJRxI 8g== Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3h5as4atcy-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 06 Jul 2022 14:34:00 +0000 Received: from m0098419.ppops.net (m0098419.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 266E03sa017868; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:34:00 GMT Received: from ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com (63.31.33a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.51.49.99]) by mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3h5as4atbw-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 06 Jul 2022 14:33:59 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 266ELa8U018889; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:33:56 GMT Received: from b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06relay12.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.109.197]) by ppma04ams.nl.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3h4v4js88n-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Wed, 06 Jul 2022 14:33:56 +0000 Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com [9.149.105.59]) by b06cxnps4075.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 266EXstu23855556 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:33:54 GMT Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7B3ADA4040; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:33:54 +0000 (GMT) Received: from d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id DB3FEA4051; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:33:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from li-f45666cc-3089-11b2-a85c-c57d1a57929f.ibm.com (unknown [9.211.56.129]) by d06av23.portsmouth.uk.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Wed, 6 Jul 2022 14:33:51 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <45013a3990af13449c2d0deadab419e5d437eae7.camel@linux.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 0/4] unify the keyrings of arm64 and s390 with x86 to verify kexec'ed kernel signature From: Mimi Zohar To: Will Deacon Cc: Coiby Xu , kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Michal Suchanek , Baoquan He , Dave Young , "Eric W . Biederman" , Chun-Yi Lee Date: Wed, 06 Jul 2022 10:33:50 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20220706114806.GB2403@willie-the-truck> References: <20220704015201.59744-1-coxu@redhat.com> <711440de6340ef6ad73e4db5edd36fc391b8a11d.camel@linux.ibm.com> <20220706114806.GB2403@willie-the-truck> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="ISO-8859-15" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.28.5 (3.28.5-18.el8) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: 8diDWdoI3ABr3hEt6stGkIzHRaRnmt7N X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: vBAwSuJAH9IkATsrx7hVhlx9r0SE3mah X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.883,Hydra:6.0.517,FMLib:17.11.122.1 definitions=2022-07-06_08,2022-06-28_01,2022-06-22_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 mlxlogscore=889 lowpriorityscore=0 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1015 priorityscore=1501 suspectscore=0 mlxscore=0 spamscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2206140000 definitions=main-2207060057 Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Wed, 2022-07-06 at 12:48 +0100, Will Deacon wrote: > On Wed, Jul 06, 2022 at 07:35:36AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Mon, 2022-07-04 at 09:51 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote: > > > Currently when loading a kernel image via the kexec_file_load() system > > > call, x86 can make use of three keyrings i.e. the .builtin_trusted_keys, > > > .secondary_trusted_keys and .platform keyrings to verify a signature. > > > However, arm64 and s390 can only use the .builtin_trusted_keys and > > > .platform keyring respectively. For example, one resulting problem is > > > kexec'ing a kernel image would be rejected with the error "Lockdown: > > > kexec: kexec of unsigned images is restricted; see man > > > kernel_lockdown.7". > > > > > > This patch set enables arm64 and s390 to make use of the same keyrings > > > as x86 to verify the signature kexec'ed kernel image. > > [...] > > > > For arm64, the tests were done as follows, > > > 1. build 5.19.0-rc2 > > > 2. generate keys and add them to .secondary_trusted_keys, MOK, UEFI > > > db; > > > 3. sign different kernel images with different keys including keys > > > from .builtin_trusted_key, .secondary_trusted_keys keyring, a UEFI db > > > key and MOK key > > > 4. Without lockdown, all kernel images can be kexec'ed; with lockdown > > > enabled, only the kernel image signed by the key from the > > > .builtin_trusted_key keyring can be kexec'ed > > > > Just confirming, for arm64, this patch set allows verifying the > > kexec'ed kernel image signature using keys on either the .platform or > > .secondary_trusted_keys keyrings. > > It looks like this series is ready to go, but it's not clear who should > pick it up. Eric -- would you be the best person? Otherwise, I'm happy to > take it via the arm64 tree (on its own branch) if that would be helpful. Unless Eric is interested, I was asked to pick this patch set up. thanks, Mimi