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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/9] Loadpol LSM: filter kernel module request according to the policy
Date: Wed, 21 May 2025 08:47:59 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <518c8bdd-4f73-4b8b-bdb9-be3294723c99@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250521140121.591482-4-git@nightmared.fr>

On 5/21/2025 7:01 AM, Simon THOBY wrote:
> When a kernel module is loaded, the LSM accepts or rejects the demand
> according to its policy.
>
> Signed-off-by: Simon THOBY <git@nightmared.fr>
> ---
>  security/loadpol/Makefile         |  2 +-
>  security/loadpol/loadpol.c        | 22 ++++++++++++
>  security/loadpol/loadpol.h        | 27 ++++++++++++++
>  security/loadpol/loadpol_policy.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>  create mode 100644 security/loadpol/loadpol_policy.c
>
> diff --git a/security/loadpol/Makefile b/security/loadpol/Makefile
> index a794c8cfbfee..062215e1f831 100644
> --- a/security/loadpol/Makefile
> +++ b/security/loadpol/Makefile
> @@ -1 +1 @@
> -obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPOL) := loadpol.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPOL) := loadpol.o loadpol_policy.o
> diff --git a/security/loadpol/loadpol.c b/security/loadpol/loadpol.c
> index 3fc29263e2f8..4d1a495a1462 100644
> --- a/security/loadpol/loadpol.c
> +++ b/security/loadpol/loadpol.c
> @@ -6,6 +6,15 @@
>  
>  #include "loadpol.h"
>  
> +// default policy: allow all modules
> +static struct loadpol_policy_entry default_policy_entries[] __ro_after_init = {
> +	{
> +		.origin = (ORIGIN_KERNEL | ORIGIN_USERSPACE),
> +		.action = ACTION_ALLOW,
> +		.module_name = NULL,
> +	},
> +};
> +
>  static int __init loadpol_init(void);
>  
>  static const struct lsm_id loadpol_lsmid = {
> @@ -14,6 +23,7 @@ static const struct lsm_id loadpol_lsmid = {
>  };
>  
>  static struct security_hook_list loadpol_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> +	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_load, loadpol_kernel_module_load),
>  };
>  
>  DEFINE_LSM(LOADPOL_NAME) = {
> @@ -23,6 +33,18 @@ DEFINE_LSM(LOADPOL_NAME) = {
>  
>  static int __init loadpol_init(void)
>  {
> +	for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_policy_entries); i++) {
> +		struct loadpol_policy_entry *entry = kmemdup(
> +			&default_policy_entries[i],
> +			sizeof(struct loadpol_policy_entry),
> +			GFP_KERNEL
> +		);
> +		if (!entry)
> +			return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +		list_add_tail(&entry->list, loadpol_policy);
> +	}
> +
>  	security_add_hooks(loadpol_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpol_hooks), &loadpol_lsmid);
>  	pr_info("Loadpol started.\n");
>  	return 0;
> diff --git a/security/loadpol/loadpol.h b/security/loadpol/loadpol.h
> index 5e11474191f0..a81d52f6d4da 100644
> --- a/security/loadpol/loadpol.h
> +++ b/security/loadpol/loadpol.h
> @@ -3,6 +3,33 @@
>  #ifndef _SECURITY_LOADPOL_LOADPOL_H
>  #define _SECURITY_LOADPOL_LOADPOL_H
>  
> +#include "linux/list.h"
> +
>  #define LOADPOL_NAME "loadpol"
>  
> +enum policy_entry_origin {
> +	ORIGIN_KERNEL = 1 << 0,
> +	ORIGIN_USERSPACE = 1 << 1,
> +};
> +
> +enum __packed policy_entry_action {
> +	ACTION_UNDEFINED,
> +	ACTION_ALLOW,
> +	ACTION_DENY
> +};
> +
> +struct loadpol_policy_entry {
> +	struct list_head list;
> +	// bitfield of policy_entry_origin

The // comment style is not used in the kernel.

> +	u8 origin;
> +	enum policy_entry_action action;
> +	// when NULL, the policy apply to every module
> +	char *module_name;
> +};
> +
> +extern struct list_head __rcu *loadpol_policy;
> +
> +// evaluate if a kernel module called 'kmod' is allowed to be loaded in the kernel
> +int loadpol_kernel_module_load(const char *kmod);
> +
>  #endif /* _SECURITY_LOADPOL_LOADPOL_H */
> diff --git a/security/loadpol/loadpol_policy.c b/security/loadpol/loadpol_policy.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..6ba5ab600e3e
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/loadpol/loadpol_policy.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +
> +#include "linux/rculist.h"
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
> +#include <linux/parser.h>
> +
> +#include "loadpol.h"
> +
> +/*  use A/B policy entries: switch from one to the next every time the policy get overwritten */
> +static LIST_HEAD(loadpol_policy_a);
> +static LIST_HEAD(loadpol_policy_b);
> +struct list_head __rcu *loadpol_policy = (struct list_head __rcu *)(&loadpol_policy_a);
> +
> +int loadpol_kernel_module_load(const char *kmod)
> +{
> +	struct task_struct *parent_task;
> +	struct loadpol_policy_entry *entry;
> +	struct list_head *policy_list_tmp;
> +	enum policy_entry_origin orig = ORIGIN_USERSPACE;
> +	bool allowed = false;
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	parent_task = rcu_dereference(current->parent);
> +	/* the parent of the current task is a workqueue -> the request comes from the kernel */
> +	if (parent_task && (parent_task->flags & PF_WQ_WORKER))
> +		orig = ORIGIN_KERNEL;
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	pr_debug("Loadpol: trying to load '%s' (asked by %s)",
> +		 kmod,
> +		 orig == ORIGIN_KERNEL ? "kernel" : "userspace");
> +
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	policy_list_tmp = rcu_dereference(loadpol_policy);
> +	list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, policy_list_tmp, list) {
> +		/* the requestor does not match */
> +		if ((orig & entry->origin) == 0)
> +			continue;
> +
> +		allowed = entry->action == ACTION_ALLOW;
> +
> +		if (!entry->module_name)
> +			goto unlock_and_exit;
> +
> +		if (entry->module_name && match_wildcard(entry->module_name, kmod))
> +			goto unlock_and_exit;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* No match -> reject the demand */
> +	allowed = false;
> +
> +unlock_and_exit:
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	pr_debug("Loadpol: load of module '%s' %s", kmod, allowed ? "allowed" : "blocked");
> +
> +	return allowed ? 0 : -EPERM;
> +}

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-21 15:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-21 14:01 [RFC PATCH 0/9] Introducing the Loadpol LSM Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] LSM: Introduce a new hook: security_kernel_module_load Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 22:03   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2025-05-22  8:57     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] Introduce a new LSM: loadpol Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] Loadpol LSM: filter kernel module request according to the policy Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 15:47   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2025-05-21 16:21     ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-21 16:26     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] Loadpol LSM: add a file in securityfs to read/modify " Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] Loadpol LSM: add a sysctl to lock " Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] Loadpol LSM: emit an audit log Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] module: expose the list of blacklisted modules Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] Loadpol LSM: include the blacklisted kernel modules in the policy Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 14:01 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] Loadpol LSM: add a minimal documentation Simon THOBY
2025-05-21 16:26   ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-21 16:29     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-21 21:31   ` Paul Moore
2025-05-22  9:23     ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-29 23:49       ` Paul Moore
2025-05-30  7:03         ` Simon Thoby
2025-05-30 14:59           ` Paul Moore

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