From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v11 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 16:09:59 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <674f6e74-e630-4ed3-b7e8-1de89a83f032@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0c3ac562e5b8ea82d962478459bc7047.paul@paul-moore.com>
On 10/23/2023 8:52 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Oct 4, 2023 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>
>> Enables an IPE policy to be enforced from kernel start, enabling access
>> control based on trust from kernel startup. This is accomplished by
>> transforming an IPE policy indicated by CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY into a
>> c-string literal that is parsed at kernel startup as an unsigned policy.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>> v2:
>> + No Changes
>>
>> v3:
>> + No Changes
>>
>> v4:
>> + No Changes
>>
>> v5:
>> + No Changes
>>
>> v6:
>> + No Changes
>>
>> v7:
>> + Move from 01/11 to 14/16
>> + Don't return errno directly.
>> + Make output of script more user-friendly
>> + Add escaping for tab and '?'
>> + Mark argv pointer const
>> + Invert return code check in the boot policy parsing code path.
>>
>> v8:
>> + No significant changes.
>>
>> v9:
>> + No changes
>>
>> v10:
>> + Update the init part code for rcu changes in the eval loop patch
>>
>> v11:
>> + Fix code style issues
>> ---
>> MAINTAINERS | 1 +
>> scripts/Makefile | 1 +
>> scripts/ipe/Makefile | 2 +
>> scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore | 1 +
>> scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile | 6 ++
>> scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> security/ipe/.gitignore | 1 +
>> security/ipe/Kconfig | 10 +++
>> security/ipe/Makefile | 11 +++
>> security/ipe/fs.c | 8 ++
>> security/ipe/ipe.c | 12 +++
>> 11 files changed, 198 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/Makefile
>> create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/.gitignore
>> create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/Makefile
>> create mode 100644 scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c
>> create mode 100644 security/ipe/.gitignore
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c b/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..40b6fe07f47b
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/scripts/ipe/polgen/polgen.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
>
> ...
>
>> +static int write_boot_policy(const char *pathname, const char *buf, size_t size)
>> +{
>> + int rc = 0;
>> + FILE *fd;
>> + size_t i;
>> +
>> + fd = fopen(pathname, "w");
>> + if (!fd) {
>> + rc = errno;
>> + goto err;
>> + }
>> +
>> + fprintf(fd, "/* This file is automatically generated.");
>> + fprintf(fd, " Do not edit. */\n");
>> + fprintf(fd, "#include <linux/stddef.h>\n");
>> + fprintf(fd, "\nextern const char *const ipe_boot_policy;\n\n");
>> + fprintf(fd, "const char *const ipe_boot_policy =\n");
>> +
>> + if (!buf || size == 0) {
>> + fprintf(fd, "\tNULL;\n");
>> + fclose(fd);
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> +
>> + fprintf(fd, "\t\"");
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < size; ++i) {
>> + switch (buf[i]) {
>> + case '"':
>> + fprintf(fd, "\\\"");
>> + break;
>> + case '\'':
>> + fprintf(fd, "'");
>> + break;
>
> The revision of IPE proposed in this patchset doesn't support parsing
> single or double quotes, yes? >
Actually all characters can be used in the policy. The previous revision
was removing the quote syntax, which supports having space in the policy
name like policy_name="example policy". But that is not related to the
boot policy generation code here.
The code here is to generate a C source code that will be linked into
IPE. Thus we have to escape these characters to conform with the C
language string literal standard.
-Fan
>> + case '\n':
>> + fprintf(fd, "\\n\"\n\t\"");
>> + break;
>> + case '\\':
>> + fprintf(fd, "\\\\");
>> + break;
>> + case '\t':
>> + fprintf(fd, "\\t");
>> + break;
>> + case '\?':
>> + fprintf(fd, "\\?");
>> + break;
>
> Similar, are question marks supported by the parser?
>
>> + default:
>> + fprintf(fd, "%c", buf[i]);
>> + }
>> + }
>> + fprintf(fd, "\";\n");
>> + fclose(fd);
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> +err:
>> + if (fd)
>> + fclose(fd);
>> + return rc;
>> +}
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/security/ipe/.gitignore b/security/ipe/.gitignore
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..eca22ad5ed22
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/ipe/.gitignore
>> @@ -0,0 +1 @@
>> +boot-policy.c
>> \ No newline at end of file
>
> Add a newline please.
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-02 23:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-04 22:09 [RFC PATCH v11 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 01/19] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 02/19] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 2/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-25 22:45 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 03/19] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 3/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-26 0:15 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 04/19] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 4/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 05/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 5/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:33 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 22:12 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:46 ` Fan Wu
2023-11-03 22:15 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 22:30 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 07/19] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 8/19] " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:55 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 09/19] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 9/19] " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:56 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 10/19] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 11/19] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:40 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 12/19] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:41 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 13/19] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:41 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 14/19] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:40 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-05 2:27 ` Eric Biggers
2023-10-05 2:49 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:40 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 2:53 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 15:42 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 19:33 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 16/19] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 23:58 ` Randy Dunlap
2023-10-05 2:45 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:09 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 18/19] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:11 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 19/19] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
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