From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org, peterz@infradead.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
David.Kaplan@amd.com, bp@alien8.de, mingo@kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, regressions@leemhuis.info,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 17:31:25 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <786c9edfb4324eff764a279c96656db17d380b47.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <47e5f0a7-e3ee-79c8-7460-2c67cf9960cc@pengutronix.de>
On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 16:19 +0200, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:
> Hello Jarkko,
>
> On 10.10.23 15:49, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue, 2023-10-10 at 18:44 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 at 18:03, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Fri, 2023-10-06 at 10:48 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > > > > Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and
> > > > > __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led
> > > > > to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.
> > > > >
> > > > > However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init()
> > > > > and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or
> > > > > security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead.
> > > > >
> > > > > Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately
> > > > > the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its
> > > > > future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not.
> > > > >
> > > > > Reported-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
> > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t
> > > > > Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
> > > > > Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
> > > > > ---
> > > > >
> > > > > Changes in v2:
> > > > > - Polish commit message as per comments from Mimi
> > > > >
> > > > > security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 13 +++++--------
> > > > > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> > > > > index c6fc50d67214..85fb5c22529a 100644
> > > > > --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> > > > > +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> > > > > @@ -44,13 +44,12 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
> > > > > #endif
> > > > > };
> > > > >
> > > > > -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
> > > > > DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
> > > > > DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
> > > > > *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
> > > > > DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
> > > > > *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
> > > > > -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_exit, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->exit);
> > > > > +static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
> > > > > static unsigned char migratable;
> > > > >
> > > > > enum {
> > > > > @@ -359,19 +358,16 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
> > > > > if (!get_random)
> > > > > get_random = kernel_get_random;
> > > > >
> > > > > - static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
> > > > > - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
> > > > > static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
> > > > > trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
> > > > > static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
> > > > > trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
> > > > > static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
> > > > > get_random);
> > > > > - static_call_update(trusted_key_exit,
> > > > > - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit);
> > > > > + trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
> > > > > migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
> > > > >
> > > > > - ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)();
> > > > > + ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
> > > > > if (!ret)
> > > > > break;
> > > > > }
> > > > > @@ -388,7 +384,8 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
> > > > >
> > > > > static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
> > > > > {
> > > > > - static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
> > > > > + if (trusted_key_exit)
> > > > > + (*trusted_key_exit)();
> > > > > }
> > > > >
> > > > > late_initcall(init_trusted);
> > > >
> > > > Would it be less confusing to require trusted_key_exit from each?
> > > >
> > >
> > > It is already required for each trust source to provide exit callback
> > > but this NULL check was added via this fix [1] in case there isn't any
> > > trust source present.
> > >
> > > [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/stable/20220126184155.220814-1-dave.kleikamp@oracle.com/
> >
> > I'd considering creating a placeholder trusted_key_default_exit() with
> > perhaps pr_debug() statement acknowledging it getting called.
> >
> > Hmm.. if we had that I wonder if we could get away with __weak... Then
> > you would not need to assign anything. This is not through-out analyzed.
> > Tbh I'm not sure how module loader handles this type of scenario but
> > at least the placeholder function would make sense in any case.
>
> If you define a default exit function as __weak and expect trusted key sources
> to override it, you can only have one trust source at most in the compiled
> kernel and no boot-time selection would be possible.
Right, got it, thank you.
So, I still would consider trusted_key_default_exit() and assign that in the
declaration to trusted_exit.
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-10 14:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-06 5:18 [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage Sumit Garg
2023-10-06 5:56 ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2023-10-10 12:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 13:14 ` Sumit Garg
2023-10-10 13:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 14:19 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2023-10-10 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2023-10-10 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-10 19:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 19:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-11 5:54 ` Sumit Garg
2023-10-11 5:52 ` Sumit Garg
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=786c9edfb4324eff764a279c96656db17d380b47.camel@kernel.org \
--to=jarkko@kernel.org \
--cc=42.hyeyoo@gmail.com \
--cc=David.Kaplan@amd.com \
--cc=a.fatoum@pengutronix.de \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=jejb@linux.ibm.com \
--cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mingo@kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=regressions@leemhuis.info \
--cc=sumit.garg@linaro.org \
--cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
--cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox