From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
To: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jeremy Kerr <jk@ozlabs.org>,
Matthew Garret <matthew.garret@nebula.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@linux.ibm.com>,
George Wilson <gcwilson@linux.ibm.com>,
Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com>,
Eric Ricther <erichte@linux.ibm.com>,
Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com>,
Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring
Date: Fri, 08 Nov 2019 20:42:26 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <87eeyi4scd.fsf@mpe.ellerman.id.au> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191107042205.13710-5-erichte@linux.ibm.com>
Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> writes:
> From: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
>
> The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as
> secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform
> keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables
> verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which
> are trusted by firmware.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/integrity/Kconfig | 8 ++
> security/integrity/Makefile | 4 +-
> .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 110 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> index cabc091f3fe1..498967a5ef4e 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
> @@ -939,6 +939,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> bool
> depends on PPC_POWERNV
> depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY
> + select LOAD_PPC_KEYS
This gave me a warning:
WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for LOAD_PPC_KEYS
Depends on [n]: INTEGRITY [=y] && INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING [=n] && PPC_SECURE_BOOT [=y]
Selected by [y]:
- PPC_SECURE_BOOT [=y] && PPC_POWERNV [=y] && IMA_ARCH_POLICY [=y]
I think you should probably just drop the select ..
> diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
> index 0bae6adb63a9..26abee23e4e3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
> @@ -72,6 +72,14 @@ config LOAD_IPL_KEYS
> depends on S390
> def_bool y
>
> +config LOAD_PPC_KEYS
> + bool "Enable loading of platform and blacklisted keys for POWER"
> + depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
> + depends on PPC_SECURE_BOOT
> + help
> + Enable loading of keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted
> + hashes to the .blacklist keyring for powerpc based platforms.
And instead make this default y, if you think it should be enabled by
default when its prerequisites are met.
cheers
prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-11-08 9:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-11-07 4:22 [PATCH v7 0/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to the kernel and userspace Eric Richter
2019-11-07 4:22 ` [PATCH v7 1/4] powerpc/powernv: Add OPAL API interface to access secure variable Eric Richter
2019-11-07 4:22 ` [PATCH v7 2/4] powerpc: expose secure variables to userspace via sysfs Eric Richter
2019-11-07 7:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2019-11-07 4:22 ` [PATCH v7 3/4] x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file Eric Richter
2019-11-07 4:22 ` [PATCH v7 4/4] powerpc: load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyring Eric Richter
2019-11-08 9:42 ` Michael Ellerman [this message]
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