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From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 19:49:59 -0500
In-Reply-To: <0d2b2635-d7fb-d240-7dd0-2a81014c58ba@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (Stefan
        Berger's message of "Thu, 26 Apr 2018 17:18:43 -0400")
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 1/3] ima: extend clone() with IMA namespace support
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Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:

> On 04/19/2018 11:35 AM, John Johansen wrote:

>> It sounds like its already decided, with ima and selinux going with an unshare file within their own fs.
>>
>> AppArmor went a different route already, splitting namespace creation (mkdir in the apparmorfs policy/namespace dir) and the task entering the namespace with a write apparmor's equiv of setexeccon.
>>
> I am supporting procfs entries for the IMA namespace spawned by writing a
> boolean '1' into IMA's securityfs 'unshare' file. It would allow to use
> setns(fd, 0), obviously with the 0 parameter. I think this is an important
> function to support considering entering a set of namespace. I am just wondering
> about the 0 parameter. We don't have a CLONE flag for it, so there's not other
> way to support it then. Does it matter ?

That should be fine.  We can pick a flag for setns at some point for
IMA.  The setns function uses the flag field as an enumeration so any of
the low 8 bits or a combination with overlapping bit is valid to setns.

Eric