From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, peterz@infradead.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
jejb@linux.ibm.com, David.Kaplan@amd.com, bp@alien8.de,
mingo@kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, regressions@leemhuis.info,
Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage
Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 15:33:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <8eeac047a59667912a45b21050a6e4c57d7cccd5.camel@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231006051801.423973-1-sumit.garg@linaro.org>
On Fri, 2023-10-06 at 10:48 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
> Static calls invocations aren't well supported from module __init and
> __exit functions. Especially the static call from cleanup_trusted() led
> to a crash on x86 kernel with CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y.
>
> However, the usage of static call invocations for trusted_key_init()
> and trusted_key_exit() don't add any value from either a performance or
> security perspective. Hence switch to use indirect function calls instead.
>
> Note here that although it will fix the current crash report, ultimately
> the static call infrastructure should be fixed to either support its
> future usage from module __init and __exit functions or not.
>
> Reported-by: Hyeonggon Yoo <42.hyeyoo@gmail.com>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZRhKq6e5nF%2F4ZIV1@fedora/#t
> Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
> ---
>
> Changes in v2:
> - Polish commit message as per comments from Mimi
>
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 13 +++++--------
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> index c6fc50d67214..85fb5c22529a 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
> @@ -44,13 +44,12 @@ static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = {
> #endif
> };
>
> -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init);
> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal);
> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal,
> *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal);
> DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random,
> *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random);
> -DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_exit, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->exit);
> +static void (*trusted_key_exit)(void);
> static unsigned char migratable;
>
> enum {
> @@ -359,19 +358,16 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
> if (!get_random)
> get_random = kernel_get_random;
>
> - static_call_update(trusted_key_init,
> - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init);
> static_call_update(trusted_key_seal,
> trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal);
> static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal,
> trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal);
> static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random,
> get_random);
> - static_call_update(trusted_key_exit,
> - trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit);
> + trusted_key_exit = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit;
> migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable;
>
> - ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)();
> + ret = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init();
> if (!ret)
> break;
> }
> @@ -388,7 +384,8 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void)
>
> static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
> {
> - static_call_cond(trusted_key_exit)();
> + if (trusted_key_exit)
> + (*trusted_key_exit)();
> }
>
> late_initcall(init_trusted);
Would it be less confusing to require trusted_key_exit from each?
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-10 12:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-06 5:18 [PATCH v2] KEYS: trusted: Remove redundant static calls usage Sumit Garg
2023-10-06 5:56 ` Hyeonggon Yoo
2023-10-10 12:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2023-10-10 13:14 ` Sumit Garg
2023-10-10 13:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 14:19 ` Ahmad Fatoum
2023-10-10 14:31 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 18:28 ` Linus Torvalds
2023-10-10 19:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-10 19:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-10-11 5:54 ` Sumit Garg
2023-10-11 5:52 ` Sumit Garg
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