From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 92E9013B588; Tue, 27 Aug 2024 10:28:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1724754503; cv=none; b=UgabDuaC+mzfkNRTx8ELoa+sNgDKqyjUFpcT2Tqk9cFpkDxiBEeZw4HpgTVL0NDy67RZmk/rcRXPBvKID3eb3wiJYuPsnfC7r7V6d1gKiW/uRwoQOAKpR1BxKB5rkdEOt6TgvEP2kaBp4vKcbiX6JykOYQFVVKiCHX08d7XvspM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1724754503; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ITTElo/b0xmcXLky20o3aXYvQkQonQvee1/DzBHfgOY=; h=MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Message-ID:Subject: To:Cc:Content-Type; b=EBOhRvvi0zTu18v/LcqbGj6ZbWrV7wg4CNoHR8rLkxQKqbrOqTrLSp8xF6ViklzXDnaEG4moeEso2m/H3wG5Y59UR/3upa/ESGLf0kIfHGugZ/ULXF1W/xbXvwNSTdpFFXiWRa018W3F1rxODV6yIKrgTzUi9BQ5MTD4m5B4tCU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Z0l/v28V; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Z0l/v28V" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 286B9C4AF0C; Tue, 27 Aug 2024 10:28:23 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1724754503; bh=ITTElo/b0xmcXLky20o3aXYvQkQonQvee1/DzBHfgOY=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc:From; b=Z0l/v28V7aAoV2n2ULTbT7WVve/56FzSdMbMfKLB6jCtUmD+Qi6t7T99lgqy28Tcg YRtiAN+ZzGjiK6d8YSxe3LK7Hiiqy818OulFcG4lbshKrb4Qfd9pcEfgx9pZTmjxNd fs51GyrtZoGTBnMHzu+XlKAvKYfiUVzaA/Rwnfxl2fDgxpoBrO2b8c5gIAlKhxkj2/ LdAICrf7XmrDQigKroyEDDLSLgEJfOwTUGRnr1vcxFg8/SMoMQmT3iiZTFBzdGbN0o 0XZgJ26nndoo3ksMg/X8SVymSv2o8INcbc9yyVrOaBw7+kfHLeF5o14bkILaMfAKy/ Q7yYhvMEOFCoA== Received: by mail-lf1-f46.google.com with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-53351642021so6154398e87.3; Tue, 27 Aug 2024 03:28:23 -0700 (PDT) X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCU7ezSuk3qLGFUTdtOwC9vGQ3pSb65MtV7frq9bwYdayyMWEV7DrrX7RkvVpWCOhoE3LcsbHhLVYWiq@vger.kernel.org, AJvYcCWA3CBQoh1VzI590XcVVSibMACl6r1CQlYGr5OEnESQ9+Md9nTGOb8DRUlg91hgIg7SRtKR+/53O2jK@vger.kernel.org, AJvYcCWRKjOzyiooEwSctpsVjm/pBTUX6MO898fTOfGoT+k/uK4N+XTN7QHsHg9JAF8Frb+H4QkP++dfp/KwkGg=@vger.kernel.org, AJvYcCXFKa8S0DPcfp21pIncN5Uun1ee+4RqvvPljB5/NwDIiSNpkSWESDsSjxni1KiN7709jZrmw+KzL9vl4qW7OcNB@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YzAsq+bDKGvoDAH+G/kRRE2QVyCr7JjInNWLJqYfiSqQPFALYqi Db1UL5zuIEU66BfwOo8XNT9o2oKIYWxRQJV7a/TqHdvx55KfG7c42sRhS9AGzOohaeT3CtZwCwz BxG6DrMIwl7/zbfr1/K4V0SJfcxg= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IEc4W3oYLEUVyAgQgD5lGc43eMGwkrzL5cq7+l4rmkv9sJdVmYWlyj3bwH/rt9Kls4pEV8Wy5JcfmVf76SJtlk= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:1103:b0:52f:c5c0:2879 with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-534387be5cemr9633786e87.41.1724754501384; Tue, 27 Aug 2024 03:28:21 -0700 (PDT) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <20240826223835.3928819-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> <20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson@oracle.com> In-Reply-To: <20240826223835.3928819-21-ross.philipson@oracle.com> From: Ard Biesheuvel Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2024 12:28:10 +0200 X-Gmail-Original-Message-ID: Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 20/20] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch To: Ross Philipson Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" On Tue, 27 Aug 2024 at 00:44, Ross Philipson wrote: > > This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub > launch of the Linux kernel is done. This is accomplished by providing > a handler to jump to when a Secure Launch is in progress. This has to be > called after the EFI stub does Exit Boot Services. > > Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel > --- > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 8 ++ > drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 106 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h > index d33ccbc4a2c6..baf42d6d0796 100644 > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h > @@ -135,6 +135,14 @@ void efi_set_u64_split(u64 data, u32 *lo, u32 *hi) > *hi = upper_32_bits(data); > } > > +static inline > +void efi_set_u64_form(u32 lo, u32 hi, u64 *data) > +{ > + u64 upper = hi; > + > + *data = lo | upper << 32; > +} > + > /* > * Allocation types for calls to boottime->allocate_pages. > */ > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c > index f8e465da344d..04786c1b3b5d 100644 > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c > @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -923,6 +925,99 @@ static efi_status_t efi_decompress_kernel(unsigned long *kernel_entry) > return efi_adjust_memory_range_protection(addr, kernel_text_size); > } > > +static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt, > + struct boot_params *boot_params) > +{ > + struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info; > + struct slr_entry_policy *policy; > + struct txt_os_mle_data *os_mle; > + bool updated = false; > + int i; > + > + txt_info = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO); > + if (!txt_info) > + return false; > + > + os_mle = txt_os_mle_data_start((void *)txt_info->txt_heap); > + if (!os_mle) > + return false; > + > + os_mle->boot_params_addr = (u64)boot_params; > + > + policy = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY); > + if (!policy) > + return false; > + > + for (i = 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) { > + if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type == SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) { > + policy->policy_entries[i].entity = (u64)boot_params; > + updated = true; > + break; > + } > + } > + > + /* > + * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will > + * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage > + * of the Secure Launch boot. > + */ > + if (image) { > + struct setup_header *hdr = (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_base + > + offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr)); > + u64 cmdline_ptr; > + > + boot_params->hdr.setup_sects = hdr->setup_sects; > + boot_params->hdr.syssize = hdr->syssize; > + boot_params->hdr.version = hdr->version; > + boot_params->hdr.loadflags = hdr->loadflags; > + boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment = hdr->kernel_alignment; > + boot_params->hdr.min_alignment = hdr->min_alignment; > + boot_params->hdr.xloadflags = hdr->xloadflags; > + boot_params->hdr.init_size = hdr->init_size; > + boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset = hdr->kernel_info_offset; > + efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_line_ptr, > + &cmdline_ptr); > + boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size = strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr); > + } > + > + return updated; > +} > + > +static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params) > +{ > + struct slr_entry_dl_info *dlinfo; > + efi_guid_t guid = SLR_TABLE_GUID; > + dl_handler_func handler_callback; > + struct slr_table *slrt; > + > + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)) > + return; > + > + /* > + * The presence of this table indicated a Secure Launch > + * is being requested. > + */ > + slrt = (struct slr_table *)get_efi_config_table(guid); > + if (!slrt || slrt->magic != SLR_TABLE_MAGIC) > + return; > + > + /* > + * Since the EFI stub library creates its own boot_params on entry, the > + * SLRT and TXT heap have to be updated with this version. > + */ > + if (!efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(slrt, boot_params)) > + return; > + > + /* Jump through DL stub to initiate Secure Launch */ > + dlinfo = slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_DL_INFO); > + > + handler_callback = (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler; > + > + handler_callback(&dlinfo->bl_context); > + > + unreachable(); > +} > + > static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr, > struct boot_params *boot_params) > { > @@ -1050,6 +1145,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle, > goto fail; > } > > + /* If a Secure Launch is in progress, this never returns */ > + efi_secure_launch(boot_params); > + > /* > * Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's > * GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI. > -- > 2.39.3 >