From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F2BC06D1A7; Tue, 14 May 2024 14:00:27 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1715695228; cv=none; b=ZU9y/AKtfIBr8nQXz3ZNoLEThY/2nVetChZHhXH2Rc1QjtTO8eaIEKyJRqtcYGkgrv/IY8tmITnQbRr0kGqMJrOPHK2SznmEUDny32eFaTHsUI7pb72GVbV7k6qN63FLGualOigz/1LNAT031JVmSkpOlb1Cd6Qzyqu++bX0rDA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1715695228; c=relaxed/simple; bh=j0dzL0HrEyzT3iXZm85NNMPwglJU2P1cUebvjgEaIlY=; h=Mime-Version:Content-Type:Date:Message-Id:Cc:Subject:From:To: References:In-Reply-To; b=gvzDXc1cP2kugt/Ez2geCjxl6NvZceDmnfT/tX1wj3CWQssTtwZHcnK77nE1pA5DvbgSodJH5/ISpe+dmmwF67nzc+b6jhFgJgbsMo72fV/5R4EZONo3Fuhzue9hPiuJW7+ScAczC9e0N9dzkZrjVlwGps0jG1e7sPQiCjSXnbY= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ZS7hjd5e; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ZS7hjd5e" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3FDBBC2BD10; Tue, 14 May 2024 14:00:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1715695227; bh=j0dzL0HrEyzT3iXZm85NNMPwglJU2P1cUebvjgEaIlY=; h=Date:Cc:Subject:From:To:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=ZS7hjd5ens9YbfEG+awL6UZghjnt5JHEcDclEDGEtOT9/K+oEoBtSu5N12Ue3xYCz sJE7HcNH58JhIReebqGvl4RXC8ZHbY8PcEMWZUTviUMlMga97xdN6rsGIUf3Uidpp0 lpnvUiTOFDlLyRDiGnA81xS3TigtgWaKL4h3uSxtTSnDtTXOF4ZB8FP0Nkh3P0WIgI o2ke+DPxtYGoY24wSsKqSwWxqrJPu5axunilVi0fZO9wiWYZHHkmO1ABBxzpeZY5ef Q/sJpfgYsW0dxjokq97HJUE7ADRAfA3B7smB8Fd3KsTL8Ju6E+OKi1lu+NWKBGydhN SawgGBPqvWYJA== Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 17:00:23 +0300 Message-Id: Cc: "James Bottomley" , "Mimi Zohar" , "David Howells" , "Paul Moore" , "James Morris" , , , , , Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/2] TPM derived keys From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" To: "Ignat Korchagin" X-Mailer: aerc 0.17.0 References: <20240503221634.44274-1-ignat@cloudflare.com> In-Reply-To: On Tue May 14, 2024 at 4:11 PM EEST, Ignat Korchagin wrote: > For example, a cheap NAS box with no internal storage (disks connected > externally via USB). We want: > * disks to be encrypted and decryptable only by this NAS box So how this differs from LUKS2 style, which also systemd supports where the encryption key is anchored to PCR's? If I took hard drive out of my Linux box, I could not decrypt it in another machine because of this. > * if someone steals one of the disks - we don't want them to see it > has encrypted data (no LUKS header) So what happens when you reconnect? > Additionally we may want to SSH into the NAS for configuration and we > don't want the SSH server key to change after each boot (regardless if > disks are connected or not). Right, interesting use case. Begin before any technical jargon exactly with a great example like this. Then it is easier to start to anchoring stuff and not be misleaded. BR, Jarkko