From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"Nícolas F. R. A. Prado" <nfraprado@collabora.com>
Cc: "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
"Linux Crypto Mailing List" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
<regressions@lists.linux.dev>, <kernel@collabora.com>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [v3 PATCH] hwrng: core - Remove add_early_randomness
Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 14:51:36 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D1G5GVUYCRZK.1G5UZ39NM96QJ@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zk2Eso--FVsZ5AF3@gondor.apana.org.au>
On Wed May 22, 2024 at 8:37 AM EEST, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 03:37:16PM -0400, Nícolas F. R. A. Prado wrote:
> >
> > FWIW this patch fixes the warning. So feel free to add
> >
> > Tested-by: Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <nfraprado@collabora.com>
>
> Could you please test this patch instead?
>
> ---8<---
> A potential deadlock was reported with the config file at
>
> https://web.archive.org/web/20240522052129/https://0x0.st/XPN_.txt
>
> In this particular configuration, the deadlock doesn't exist because
> the warning triggered at a point before modules were even available.
> However, the deadlock can be real because any module loaded would
> invoke async_synchronize_full.
>
> The issue is spurious for software crypto algorithms which aren't
> themselves involved in async probing. However, it would be hard to
> avoid for a PCI crypto driver using async probing.
>
> In this particular call trace, the problem is easily avoided because
> the only reason the module is being requested during probing is the
> add_early_randomness call in the hwrng core. This feature is
> vestigial since there is now a kernel thread dedicated to doing
> exactly this.
>
> So remove add_early_randomness as it is no longer needed.
"vestigial" did not know that word before ;-) Something learned.
What is the kthread doing this currently?
>
> Reported-by: Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <nfraprado@collabora.com>
> Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 1b6d7f9eb150 ("tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random()")
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/119dc5ed-f159-41be-9dda-1a056f29888d@notapiano/
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> index f5c71a617a99..4084df65c9fa 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> @@ -64,19 +64,6 @@ static size_t rng_buffer_size(void)
> return RNG_BUFFER_SIZE;
> }
>
> -static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
> -{
> - int bytes_read;
> -
> - mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
> - bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
> - mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
> - if (bytes_read > 0) {
> - size_t entropy = bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024;
> - add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read, entropy, false);
> - }
> -}
> -
> static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
> {
> struct hwrng *rng = container_of(kref, struct hwrng, ref);
> @@ -340,13 +327,12 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,
> const char *buf, size_t len)
> {
> int err;
> - struct hwrng *rng, *old_rng, *new_rng;
> + struct hwrng *rng, *new_rng;
>
> err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rng_mutex);
> if (err)
> return -ERESTARTSYS;
>
> - old_rng = current_rng;
> if (sysfs_streq(buf, "")) {
> err = enable_best_rng();
> } else {
> @@ -362,11 +348,8 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,
> new_rng = get_current_rng_nolock();
> mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
>
> - if (new_rng) {
> - if (new_rng != old_rng)
> - add_early_randomness(new_rng);
> + if (new_rng)
> put_rng(new_rng);
> - }
>
> return err ? : len;
> }
> @@ -544,7 +527,6 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
> {
> int err = -EINVAL;
> struct hwrng *tmp;
> - bool is_new_current = false;
>
> if (!rng->name || (!rng->data_read && !rng->read))
> goto out;
> @@ -573,25 +555,8 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
> err = set_current_rng(rng);
> if (err)
> goto out_unlock;
> - /* to use current_rng in add_early_randomness() we need
> - * to take a ref
> - */
> - is_new_current = true;
> - kref_get(&rng->ref);
> }
> mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
> - if (is_new_current || !rng->init) {
> - /*
> - * Use a new device's input to add some randomness to
> - * the system. If this rng device isn't going to be
> - * used right away, its init function hasn't been
> - * called yet by set_current_rng(); so only use the
> - * randomness from devices that don't need an init callback
> - */
> - add_early_randomness(rng);
> - }
> - if (is_new_current)
> - put_rng(rng);
> return 0;
> out_unlock:
> mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
> @@ -602,12 +567,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwrng_register);
>
> void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
> {
> - struct hwrng *old_rng, *new_rng;
> + struct hwrng *new_rng;
> int err;
>
> mutex_lock(&rng_mutex);
>
> - old_rng = current_rng;
> list_del(&rng->list);
> complete_all(&rng->dying);
> if (current_rng == rng) {
> @@ -626,11 +590,8 @@ void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
> } else
> mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
>
> - if (new_rng) {
> - if (old_rng != new_rng)
> - add_early_randomness(new_rng);
> + if (new_rng)
> put_rng(new_rng);
> - }
>
> wait_for_completion(&rng->cleanup_done);
> }
I have no doubts that such thread would not exist, so:
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-22 11:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-29 20:27 [PATCH v8 00/22] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 01/22] tpm: Remove unused tpm_buf_tag() James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 02/22] tpm: Remove tpm_send() James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 03/22] tpm: Move buffer handling from static inlines to real functions James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 04/22] tpm: Update struct tpm_buf documentation comments James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 05/22] tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 06/22] tpm: TPM2B formatted buffers James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 07/22] tpm: Add tpm_buf_read_{u8,u16,u32} James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 08/22] KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffers James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 09/22] crypto: lib - implement library version of AES in CFB mode James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 10/22] tpm: add buffer function to point to returned parameters James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 11/22] tpm: export the context save and load commands James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 12/22] tpm: Add NULL primary creation James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 13/22] tpm: Add TCG mandated Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 14/22] tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 16:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 15/22] tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:38 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 16/22] tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 17/22] tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 18/22] tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2024-05-17 0:25 ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-17 1:59 ` James Bottomley
2024-05-17 7:20 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-17 8:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-17 13:35 ` James Bottomley
2024-05-17 13:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-17 14:25 ` James Bottomley
2024-05-17 16:22 ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-17 16:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 4:31 ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-18 7:03 ` [PATCH] crypto: api - Do not load modules until algapi is ready Herbert Xu
2024-05-18 11:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 12:32 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-18 13:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 13:07 ` James Bottomley
2024-05-19 4:19 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-20 15:49 ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-21 2:53 ` [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Do not load modules if called by async probing Herbert Xu
2024-05-21 19:37 ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-22 5:37 ` [v3 PATCH] hwrng: core - Remove add_early_randomness Herbert Xu
2024-05-22 11:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-05-23 4:50 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-22 19:19 ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-22 22:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-23 4:49 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-23 9:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-23 9:58 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-23 10:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-23 10:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-23 10:40 ` Torsten Duwe
2024-05-18 10:56 ` [PATCH v8 18/22] tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 12:31 ` Herbert Xu
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 19/22] KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 20/22] tpm: add the null key name as a sysfs export James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 21/22] Documentation: add tpm-security.rst James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 22/22] tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 23:34 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 22:22 ` [PATCH v8 00/22] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 22:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 23:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 11:18 ` Stefan Berger
2024-04-30 18:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 18:57 ` Stefan Berger
2024-04-30 19:23 ` James Bottomley
2024-04-30 21:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 22:31 ` James Bottomley
2024-04-30 22:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 23:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-03 23:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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