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From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"Nícolas F. R. A. Prado" <nfraprado@collabora.com>
Cc: "Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Linux Crypto Mailing List" <linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>, <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>,
	<regressions@lists.linux.dev>, <kernel@collabora.com>,
	"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [v3 PATCH] hwrng: core - Remove add_early_randomness
Date: Wed, 22 May 2024 14:51:36 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <D1G5GVUYCRZK.1G5UZ39NM96QJ@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Zk2Eso--FVsZ5AF3@gondor.apana.org.au>

On Wed May 22, 2024 at 8:37 AM EEST, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 03:37:16PM -0400, Nícolas F. R. A. Prado wrote:
> >
> > FWIW this patch fixes the warning. So feel free to add
> > 
> > Tested-by: Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <nfraprado@collabora.com>
>
> Could you please test this patch instead?
>
> ---8<---
> A potential deadlock was reported with the config file at
>
> https://web.archive.org/web/20240522052129/https://0x0.st/XPN_.txt
>
> In this particular configuration, the deadlock doesn't exist because
> the warning triggered at a point before modules were even available.
> However, the deadlock can be real because any module loaded would
> invoke async_synchronize_full.
>
> The issue is spurious for software crypto algorithms which aren't
> themselves involved in async probing.  However, it would be hard to
> avoid for a PCI crypto driver using async probing.
>
> In this particular call trace, the problem is easily avoided because
> the only reason the module is being requested during probing is the
> add_early_randomness call in the hwrng core.  This feature is
> vestigial since there is now a kernel thread dedicated to doing
> exactly this.
>
> So remove add_early_randomness as it is no longer needed.

"vestigial" did not know that word before ;-) Something learned.

What is the kthread doing this currently?

>
> Reported-by: Nícolas F. R. A. Prado <nfraprado@collabora.com>
> Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> Fixes: 1b6d7f9eb150 ("tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random()")
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/119dc5ed-f159-41be-9dda-1a056f29888d@notapiano/
> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> index f5c71a617a99..4084df65c9fa 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
> @@ -64,19 +64,6 @@ static size_t rng_buffer_size(void)
>  	return RNG_BUFFER_SIZE;
>  }
>  
> -static void add_early_randomness(struct hwrng *rng)
> -{
> -	int bytes_read;
> -
> -	mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
> -	bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
> -	mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
> -	if (bytes_read > 0) {
> -		size_t entropy = bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024;
> -		add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read, entropy, false);
> -	}
> -}
> -
>  static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
>  {
>  	struct hwrng *rng = container_of(kref, struct hwrng, ref);
> @@ -340,13 +327,12 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,
>  				 const char *buf, size_t len)
>  {
>  	int err;
> -	struct hwrng *rng, *old_rng, *new_rng;
> +	struct hwrng *rng, *new_rng;
>  
>  	err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&rng_mutex);
>  	if (err)
>  		return -ERESTARTSYS;
>  
> -	old_rng = current_rng;
>  	if (sysfs_streq(buf, "")) {
>  		err = enable_best_rng();
>  	} else {
> @@ -362,11 +348,8 @@ static ssize_t rng_current_store(struct device *dev,
>  	new_rng = get_current_rng_nolock();
>  	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
>  
> -	if (new_rng) {
> -		if (new_rng != old_rng)
> -			add_early_randomness(new_rng);
> +	if (new_rng)
>  		put_rng(new_rng);
> -	}
>  
>  	return err ? : len;
>  }
> @@ -544,7 +527,6 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
>  {
>  	int err = -EINVAL;
>  	struct hwrng *tmp;
> -	bool is_new_current = false;
>  
>  	if (!rng->name || (!rng->data_read && !rng->read))
>  		goto out;
> @@ -573,25 +555,8 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)
>  		err = set_current_rng(rng);
>  		if (err)
>  			goto out_unlock;
> -		/* to use current_rng in add_early_randomness() we need
> -		 * to take a ref
> -		 */
> -		is_new_current = true;
> -		kref_get(&rng->ref);
>  	}
>  	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
> -	if (is_new_current || !rng->init) {
> -		/*
> -		 * Use a new device's input to add some randomness to
> -		 * the system.  If this rng device isn't going to be
> -		 * used right away, its init function hasn't been
> -		 * called yet by set_current_rng(); so only use the
> -		 * randomness from devices that don't need an init callback
> -		 */
> -		add_early_randomness(rng);
> -	}
> -	if (is_new_current)
> -		put_rng(rng);
>  	return 0;
>  out_unlock:
>  	mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
> @@ -602,12 +567,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hwrng_register);
>  
>  void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
>  {
> -	struct hwrng *old_rng, *new_rng;
> +	struct hwrng *new_rng;
>  	int err;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&rng_mutex);
>  
> -	old_rng = current_rng;
>  	list_del(&rng->list);
>  	complete_all(&rng->dying);
>  	if (current_rng == rng) {
> @@ -626,11 +590,8 @@ void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)
>  	} else
>  		mutex_unlock(&rng_mutex);
>  
> -	if (new_rng) {
> -		if (old_rng != new_rng)
> -			add_early_randomness(new_rng);
> +	if (new_rng)
>  		put_rng(new_rng);
> -	}
>  
>  	wait_for_completion(&rng->cleanup_done);
>  }

I have no doubts that such thread would not exist, so:

Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2024-05-22 11:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 75+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-29 20:27 [PATCH v8 00/22] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 01/22] tpm: Remove unused tpm_buf_tag() James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 02/22] tpm: Remove tpm_send() James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 03/22] tpm: Move buffer handling from static inlines to real functions James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 04/22] tpm: Update struct tpm_buf documentation comments James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 05/22] tpm: Store the length of the tpm_buf data separately James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 06/22] tpm: TPM2B formatted buffers James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 07/22] tpm: Add tpm_buf_read_{u8,u16,u32} James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 08/22] KEYS: trusted: tpm2: Use struct tpm_buf for sized buffers James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 09/22] crypto: lib - implement library version of AES in CFB mode James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:27 ` [PATCH v8 10/22] tpm: add buffer function to point to returned parameters James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 11/22] tpm: export the context save and load commands James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 12/22] tpm: Add NULL primary creation James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 13/22] tpm: Add TCG mandated Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 14/22] tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:38   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 16:49   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 15/22] tpm: Add HMAC session name/handle append James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:38   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 16/22] tpm: Add the rest of the session HMAC API James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 17/22] tpm: add hmac checks to tpm2_pcr_extend() James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 18/22] tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() James Bottomley
2024-05-17  0:25   ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-17  1:59     ` James Bottomley
2024-05-17  7:20       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-17  8:26         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-17 13:35         ` James Bottomley
2024-05-17 13:43           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-05-17 14:25             ` James Bottomley
2024-05-17 16:22               ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-17 16:48                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18  4:31                   ` Eric Biggers
2024-05-18  7:03                     ` [PATCH] crypto: api - Do not load modules until algapi is ready Herbert Xu
2024-05-18 11:04                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 12:32                         ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-18 13:03                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 13:07                           ` James Bottomley
2024-05-19  4:19                             ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-20 15:49                       ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-21  2:53                         ` [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Do not load modules if called by async probing Herbert Xu
2024-05-21 19:37                           ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-22  5:37                             ` [v3 PATCH] hwrng: core - Remove add_early_randomness Herbert Xu
2024-05-22 11:51                               ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-05-23  4:50                                 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-22 19:19                               ` Nícolas F. R. A. Prado
2024-05-22 22:53                               ` Linus Torvalds
2024-05-23  4:49                                 ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-23  9:53                                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-23  9:58                                     ` Herbert Xu
2024-05-23 10:07                                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-23 10:02                                     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-23 10:40                                   ` Torsten Duwe
2024-05-18 10:56                     ` [PATCH v8 18/22] tpm: add session encryption protection to tpm2_get_random() Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-18 12:31                       ` Herbert Xu
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 19/22] KEYS: trusted: Add session encryption protection to the seal/unseal path James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 20/22] tpm: add the null key name as a sysfs export James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 21/22] Documentation: add tpm-security.rst James Bottomley
2024-04-29 20:28 ` [PATCH v8 22/22] tpm: disable the TPM if NULL name changes James Bottomley
2024-04-29 22:59   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 23:34   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 22:22 ` [PATCH v8 00/22] add integrity and security to TPM2 transactions Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 22:26   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-29 23:49     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 11:18       ` Stefan Berger
2024-04-30 18:37         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 18:57           ` Stefan Berger
2024-04-30 19:23   ` James Bottomley
2024-04-30 21:48     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 22:31       ` James Bottomley
2024-04-30 22:46         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-04-30 23:10           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-03 23:18         ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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