From: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>,
"James Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
<linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <keyrings@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/6] tpm: add policy sessions
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 17:12:28 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D2R0WP82K6MI.5B2XEV90M0VB@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D2R0TZB6I6Z8.1R0YSFP46LXPF@kernel.org>
On Tue Jul 16, 2024 at 5:08 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Tue Jul 16, 2024 at 5:07 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > On Tue Jul 16, 2024 at 2:53 PM EEST, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > - u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE];
> > > > + u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE];
> >
> > Ouch, we definitely do not want 2-dimensional arrays. I missed this in
> > the hmac review.
> >
> > Why this is based on count (AUTH_MAX_NAMES) rather than space? Is that
> > value from the specs?
> >
> > You could just as well replace name and name_h with a single tpm_buf
> > instance in "sized" mode and return -E2BIG from the functions that use
> > it. Right, those don't return anything but void, which should be also
> > fixed.
>
> tpm_buf_write_u32()
> tpm_buf_write()
> tpm_buf_write_u32()
> tpm_buf_write()
>
> Two buffers stored. The read functions are non-destructive. Let's not
> invent ad-hoc crap when we have already a tested and legit tool for
> this.
Other issues that I saw is that the patch set does not apply anymore but
it is been two months so no wonder.
For the next version you should also specify a test transcript that
allows to test the functionality similarly as I've done for asymmetric
keys:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/20240528210823.28798-1-jarkko@kernel.org/T/#mb07f85a8c3f4af388cbc08438e71ac8aea447d85
I don't want to invent the test case myself, and very few will do
I'd figure.
BR, Jarkko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-07-16 14:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-24 13:04 [PATCH 0/6] Add policy to sealed keys James Bottomley
2024-05-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 1/6] tpm: consolidate TPM to crypto hash algorithm conversion James Bottomley
2024-05-24 13:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-27 3:45 ` Ben Boeckel
2024-05-27 11:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-16 11:13 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 2/6] tpm: add policy sessions James Bottomley
2024-07-16 11:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-16 14:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-16 14:08 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-16 14:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2024-07-18 2:30 ` James Bottomley
2024-07-19 13:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-07-19 13:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 3/6] KEYS: trusted: add PCR policy to TPM2 keys James Bottomley
2024-07-16 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 4/6] KEYS: trusted: add ability to specify arbitrary policy James Bottomley
2024-07-16 12:01 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 5/6] KEYS: trusted: implement counter/timer policy James Bottomley
2024-07-16 12:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:04 ` [PATCH 6/6] KEYS: trusted: add support for TPM keys with signed policy James Bottomley
2024-07-16 12:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2024-05-24 13:24 ` [PATCH 0/6] Add policy to sealed keys Jarkko Sakkinen
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