From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADD71C4332F for ; Wed, 23 Nov 2022 23:05:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S229672AbiKWXEf (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Nov 2022 18:04:35 -0500 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58100 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S229379AbiKWXEE (ORCPT ); Wed, 23 Nov 2022 18:04:04 -0500 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [IPv6:2604:1380:4601:e00::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8828511606C; Wed, 23 Nov 2022 15:04:02 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1B742B82503; Wed, 23 Nov 2022 23:04:01 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E4796C433D6; Wed, 23 Nov 2022 23:03:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1669244639; bh=fodNWFCnK99nf9cCB5JVdcPjA29jpW8jq+blyhz2q6o=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=it+bU4LoTPoaoOCObZ7rvgJQztBfZB50NG5VVnzE2C45MUKwlDYw0IF3DLeiXQn65 tAcfhnXAP8eJIznswpxSw699I+MR43nBvvr04+sS0YzbeuFnNN/C79OAgupsPNDXxl GxpfEZDD3XqYu8z6AQ3S7UrOcexqLtpL7NGa1hWjk5q31sPNikwl5c1HWpuauuMXut it+/ww5puGAjmeFjmcCr2eaqQJSa6O9LU4mlrecgLz2kZa3rlctoI28EUoHgafby2F pap8u8c7a3IAbpOi56ANQrQGfo1lDPWzVlR2lPiaM/Jqa13Kd6eP63PHJAvpEcO3T2 WgB8oR9Kbe1gQ== Date: Thu, 24 Nov 2022 01:03:54 +0200 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: Evan Green Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, rjw@rjwysocki.net, gwendal@chromium.org, apronin@chromium.org, Pavel Machek , Kees Cook , Matthew Garrett , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, jejb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, dlunev@google.com, Eric Biggers , Ben Boeckel , Matthew Garrett , Matthew Garrett , Jason Gunthorpe , Peter Huewe Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Message-ID: References: <20221103180120.752659-1-evgreen@chromium.org> <20221103105558.v4.3.I9ded8c8caad27403e9284dfc78ad6cbd845bc98d@changeid> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Nov 07, 2022 at 10:15:27AM -0800, Evan Green wrote: > On Mon, Nov 7, 2022 at 3:40 AM Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > > > > On Thu, Nov 03, 2022 at 11:01:11AM -0700, Evan Green wrote: > > > From: Matthew Garrett > > > > > > Introduce a new Kconfig, TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR, which if enabled > > > restricts usermode's ability to extend or reset PCR 23. > > > > > > Under certain circumstances it might be desirable to enable the creation > > > of TPM-backed secrets that are only accessible to the kernel. In an > > > ideal world this could be achieved by using TPM localities, but these > > > don't appear to be available on consumer systems. An alternative is to > > > simply block userland from modifying one of the resettable PCRs, leaving > > > it available to the kernel. If the kernel ensures that no userland can > > > access the TPM while it is carrying out work, it can reset PCR 23, > > > extend it to an arbitrary value, create or load a secret, and then reset > > > the PCR again. Even if userland somehow obtains the sealed material, it > > > will be unable to unseal it since PCR 23 will never be in the > > > appropriate state. > > > > > > This Kconfig is only properly supported for systems with TPM2 devices. > > > For systems with TPM1 devices, having this Kconfig enabled completely > > > restricts usermode's access to the TPM. TPM1 contains support for > > > tunnelled transports, which usermode could use to smuggle commands > > > through that this Kconfig is attempting to restrict. > > > > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210220013255.1083202-3-matthewgarrett@google.com/ > > > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett > > > Signed-off-by: Evan Green > > > --- > > > > > > Changes in v4: > > > - Augment the commit message (Jarkko) > > > > > > Changes in v3: > > > - Fix up commit message (Jarkko) > > > - tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() was split (Jarkko) > > > - Simply fully restrict TPM1 since v2 failed to account for tunnelled > > > transport sessions (Stefan and Jarkko). > > > > > > Changes in v2: > > > - Fixed sparse warnings > > > > > > drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 8 ++++++++ > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c | 13 +++++++++++++ > > > drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+) > > > > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > > > index 927088b2c3d3f2..c8ed54c66e399a 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig > > > @@ -211,4 +211,16 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE > > > This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE. > > > > > > source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig" > > > + > > > +config TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > > + bool "Restrict userland access to PCR 23" > > > + depends on TCG_TPM > > > + help > > > + If set, block userland from extending or resetting PCR 23. This allows it > > > + to be restricted to in-kernel use, preventing userland from being able to > > > + make use of data sealed to the TPM by the kernel. This is required for > > > + secure hibernation support, but should be left disabled if any userland > > > + may require access to PCR23. This is a TPM2-only feature, and if enabled > > > + on a TPM1 machine will cause all usermode TPM commands to return EPERM due > > > + to the complications introduced by tunnelled sessions in TPM1.2. > > > endif # TCG_TPM > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > > > index dc4c0a0a512903..7a4e618c7d1942 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c > > > @@ -198,6 +198,14 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > > > priv->response_read = false; > > > *off = 0; > > > > > > + if (priv->chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) > > > + ret = tpm2_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); > > > + else > > > + ret = tpm1_cmd_restricted(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer, size); > > > + > > > + if (ret) > > > + goto out; > > > + > > > /* > > > * If in nonblocking mode schedule an async job to send > > > * the command return the size. > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > > > index f1e0f490176f01..c0845e3f9eda17 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h > > > @@ -245,4 +245,23 @@ void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > > void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); > > > int tpm_dev_common_init(void); > > > void tpm_dev_common_exit(void); > > > + > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > > +#define TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR 23 > > > + > > > +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); > > > +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size); > > > +#else > > > +static inline int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, > > > + size_t size) > > > +{ > > > + return 0; > > > +} > > > + > > > +static inline int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, > > > + size_t size) > > > +{ > > > + return 0; > > > +} > > > +#endif > > > #endif > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > > > index cf64c738510529..1869e89215fcb9 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c > > > @@ -811,3 +811,16 @@ int tpm1_get_pcr_allocation(struct tpm_chip *chip) > > > > > > return 0; > > > } > > > + > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > > +int tpm1_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) > > > +{ > > > + /* > > > + * Restrict all usermode commands on TPM1.2. Ideally we'd just restrict > > > + * TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND and TPM_ORD_PCR_RESET, but TPM1.2 also supports > > > + * tunnelled transport sessions where the kernel would be unable to filter > > > + * commands. > > > + */ > > > + return -EPERM; > > > +} > > > +#endif > > > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > index 303ce2ea02a4b0..e0503cfd7bcfee 100644 > > > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c > > > @@ -778,3 +778,25 @@ int tpm2_find_cc(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 cc) > > > > > > return -1; > > > } > > > + > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM_RESTRICT_PCR > > > +int tpm2_cmd_restricted(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buffer, size_t size) > > > +{ > > > + int cc = tpm2_find_and_validate_cc(chip, NULL, buffer, size); > > > + __be32 *handle; > > > + > > > + switch (cc) { > > > + case TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND: > > > + case TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET: > > > + if (size < (TPM_HEADER_SIZE + sizeof(u32))) > > > + return -EINVAL; > > > + > > > + handle = (__be32 *)&buffer[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]; > > > + if (be32_to_cpu(*handle) == TPM_RESTRICTED_PCR) > > > + return -EPERM; > > > + break; > > > + } > > > + > > > + return 0; > > > +} > > > +#endif > > > -- > > > 2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog > > > > > > > This looks otherwise good but I have still one remark: what is the reason > > for restricting PCR23 for TPM 1.x? > > Mostly I was trying to do the least surprising thing for someone who > had compiled with this RESTRICT_PCR Kconfig enabled but booted a TPM1 > system. If we do nothing for TPM1, then the encrypted hibernation > mechanism appears to work fine, but leaves a gaping hole where > usermode can manipulate PCR23 themselves to create forged encrypted > hibernate images. Denying all usermode access makes the Kconfig > correct on TPM1 systems, at the expense of all usermode access (rather > than just access to PCR23). OK, I buy this. Can you add inline comment perhaps denoting this? BR, Jarkko