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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	gwendal@chromium.org, dianders@chromium.org,
	apronin@chromium.org, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Ben Boeckel <me@benboeckel.net>,
	rjw@rjwysocki.net, jejb@linux.ibm.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	dlunev@google.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	Matthew Garrett <mgarrett@aurora.tech>,
	linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>,
	axelj <axelj@axis.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs
Date: Sun, 27 Nov 2022 18:07:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y4OLVoErV4VHxsCx@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y4OK9aXt0SrFzbT7@kernel.org>

On Sun, Nov 27, 2022 at 06:06:13PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 11, 2022 at 03:16:26PM -0800, Evan Green wrote:
> > Add an internal command for resetting a PCR. This will be used by the
> > encrypted hibernation code to set PCR23 to a known value. The
> > hibernation code will seal the hibernation key with a policy specifying
> > PCR23 be set to this known value as a mechanism to ensure that the
> > hibernation key is genuine. But to do this repeatedly, resetting the PCR
> > is necessary as well.
> > 
> > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210220013255.1083202-2-matthewgarrett@google.com/
> > Co-developed-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Evan Green <evgreen@chromium.org>
> > 
> > ---
> > 
> > Changes in v5:
> >  - Change to co-developed by Matthew (Kees)
> > 
> > Changes in v4:
> >  - Open code tpm2_pcr_reset implementation in tpm-interface.c (Jarkko)
> >  - Rename interface symbol to tpm2_pcr_reset, fix kerneldocs (Jarkko)
> > 
> > Changes in v3:
> >  - Unify tpm1/2_pcr_reset prototypes (Jarkko)
> >  - Wait no, remove the TPM1 stuff altogether (Jarkko)
> >  - Remove extra From tag and blank in commit msg (Jarkko).
> > 
> >  drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c      |  7 -----
> >  include/linux/tpm.h              | 14 ++++++++++
> >  3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > index 1621ce8187052c..886277b2654e3b 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
> > @@ -342,6 +342,53 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> >  }
> >  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
> >  
> > +/**
> > + * tpm2_pcr_reset - Reset the specified PCR
> > + * @chip: A &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip
> > + * @pcr_idx: The PCR to be reset
> > + *
> > + * Return: Same as with tpm_transmit_cmd(), or ENOTTY for TPM1 devices.
> > + */
> > +int tpm2_pcr_reset(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx)
> > +{
> > +	struct tpm2_null_auth_area auth_area;
> > +	struct tpm_buf buf;
> > +	int rc;
> > +
> > +	chip = tpm_find_get_ops(chip);
> > +	if (!chip)
> > +		return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > +	if (!(chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)) {
> > +		rc = -ENOTTY;
> > +		goto out;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET);
> > +	if (rc)
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> > +	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, pcr_idx);
> > +
> > +	auth_area.handle = cpu_to_be32(TPM2_RS_PW);
> > +	auth_area.nonce_size = 0;
> > +	auth_area.attributes = 0;
> > +	auth_area.auth_size = 0;
> > +
> > +	tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, sizeof(struct tpm2_null_auth_area));
> > +	tpm_buf_append(&buf, (const unsigned char *)&auth_area,
> > +		       sizeof(auth_area));
> > +
> > +	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "attempting to reset a PCR");
> > +
> > +	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	tpm_put_ops(chip);
> > +	return rc;
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_pcr_reset);
> > +
> >  /**
> >   * tpm_send - send a TPM command
> >   * @chip:	a &struct tpm_chip instance, %NULL for the default chip
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > index 65d03867e114c5..303ce2ea02a4b0 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
> > @@ -216,13 +216,6 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> >  	return rc;
> >  }
> >  
> > -struct tpm2_null_auth_area {
> > -	__be32  handle;
> > -	__be16  nonce_size;
> > -	u8  attributes;
> > -	__be16  auth_size;
> > -} __packed;
> > -
> >  /**
> >   * tpm2_pcr_extend() - extend a PCR value
> >   *
> > diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
> > index dfeb25a0362dee..70134e6551745f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/tpm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
> > @@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ enum tpm2_command_codes {
> >  	TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CONTROL       = 0x0121,
> >  	TPM2_CC_HIERARCHY_CHANGE_AUTH   = 0x0129,
> >  	TPM2_CC_CREATE_PRIMARY          = 0x0131,
> > +	TPM2_CC_PCR_RESET		= 0x013D,
> >  	TPM2_CC_SEQUENCE_COMPLETE       = 0x013E,
> >  	TPM2_CC_SELF_TEST	        = 0x0143,
> >  	TPM2_CC_STARTUP		        = 0x0144,
> > @@ -293,6 +294,13 @@ struct tpm_header {
> >  	};
> >  } __packed;
> >  
> > +struct tpm2_null_auth_area {
> > +	__be32  handle;
> > +	__be16  nonce_size;
> > +	u8  attributes;
> > +	__be16  auth_size;
> > +} __packed;
> > +
> >  /* A string buffer type for constructing TPM commands. This is based on the
> >   * ideas of string buffer code in security/keys/trusted.h but is heap based
> >   * in order to keep the stack usage minimal.
> > @@ -423,6 +431,7 @@ extern ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf,
> >  				size_t min_rsp_body_length, const char *desc);
> >  extern int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> >  			struct tpm_digest *digest);
> > +extern int tpm2_pcr_reset(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx);
> >  extern int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> >  			  struct tpm_digest *digests);
> >  extern int tpm_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, size_t buflen);
> > @@ -440,6 +449,11 @@ static inline int tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx,
> >  	return -ENODEV;
> >  }
> >  
> > +static inline int tpm2_pcr_reset(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx)
> > +{
> > +	return -ENODEV;
> > +}
> > +
> >  static inline int tpm_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx,
> >  				 struct tpm_digest *digests)
> >  {
> > -- 
> > 2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog
> > 
> 
> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

Please ignore, wrong patch, sorry.

BR, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-27 16:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 61+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-11 23:16 [PATCH v5 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 01/11] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Evan Green
2022-11-13 20:31   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-27 16:06   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-27 16:07     ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 02/11] tpm: Export and rename tpm2_find_and_validate_cc() Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 03/11] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Evan Green
2022-11-13 20:46   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-14 17:11   ` James Bottomley
2022-11-27 16:33     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-27 16:41       ` James Bottomley
2022-11-30 20:22         ` Dr. Greg
2022-11-30 21:34           ` Casey Schaufler
2022-12-02  1:10             ` Dr. Greg
2023-01-03 20:42     ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-03 21:04       ` William Roberts
2023-01-03 21:10         ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-14 14:55           ` James Bottomley
2023-01-14 15:11             ` William Roberts
2023-01-15  3:05             ` Matthew Garrett
2023-01-15 14:41               ` William Roberts
2023-01-17 21:26               ` James Bottomley
2023-01-21  3:29             ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-23 17:48               ` William Roberts
2023-01-24 11:51                 ` Dr. Greg
2023-01-24 12:38                 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-24 15:05                   ` William Roberts
2023-01-26 17:21                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:32                     ` William Roberts
2023-01-26 21:30                       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 22:01                         ` William Roberts
2023-02-07 23:20                           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:07                 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:12                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2023-01-26 17:20                     ` William Roberts
2023-01-10 16:07       ` William Roberts
2022-11-27 16:29   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 04/11] security: keys: trusted: Include TPM2 creation data Evan Green
2022-11-13 21:20   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-14  3:32     ` James Bottomley
2022-11-14 16:32       ` Evan Green
2022-11-14 16:56         ` James Bottomley
2022-11-14 17:43           ` Evan Green
2022-11-14 18:00             ` James Bottomley
2022-12-02 21:03               ` James Bottomley
2022-12-05 18:43                 ` Evan Green
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 05/11] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in " Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:01   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 06/11] security: keys: trusted: Verify " Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:13   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 07/11] PM: hibernate: Add kernel-based encryption Evan Green
2022-11-13 22:55   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 08/11] PM: hibernate: Use TPM-backed keys to encrypt image Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:33   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 09/11] PM: hibernate: Mix user key in encrypted hibernate Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:44   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 10/11] PM: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:47   ` Eric Biggers
2022-11-11 23:16 ` [PATCH v5 11/11] PM: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Evan Green
2022-11-13 23:51   ` Eric Biggers
2022-12-07 23:54 ` [PATCH v5 00/11] Encrypted Hibernation Evan Green

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