From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
matthewgarrett@google.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policy
Date: Wed, 20 Jul 2022 16:24:40 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YtgQKHwPAVBSHjcY@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220719171647.3574253-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
On Tue, Jul 19, 2022 at 01:16:47PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> The lockdown LSM is primarily used in conjunction with UEFI Secure Boot.
> This LSM may also be used on machines without UEFI. It can also be enabled
> when UEFI Secure Boot is disabled. One of lockdown's features is to prevent
> kexec from loading untrusted kernels. Lockdown can be enabled through a
> bootparam or after the kernel has booted through securityfs.
>
> If IMA appraisal is used with the "ima_appraise=log" boot param,
> lockdown can be defeated with kexec on any machine when Secure Boot is
> disabled or unavailable. IMA prevents setting "ima_appraise=log"
> from the boot param when Secure Boot is enabled, but this does not cover
> cases where lockdown is used without Secure Boot.
>
> To defeat lockdown, boot without Secure Boot and add ima_appraise=log
> to the kernel command line; then:
>
> $ echo "integrity" > /sys/kernel/security/lockdown
> $ echo "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig" > \
> /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
> $ kexec -ls unsigned-kernel
>
> Add a call to verify ima appraisal is set to "enforce" whenever lockdown
> is enabled. This fixes CVE-2022-21505.
>
> Fixes: 29d3c1c8dfe7 ("kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down")
> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 73917413365b..a8802b8da946 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -2247,6 +2247,10 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
> if (id >= READING_MAX_ID)
> return false;
>
> + if (id == READING_KEXEC_IMAGE && !(ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
> + && security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_KEXEC))
> + return false;
> +
> func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> --
> 2.27.0
>
<formletter>
This is not the correct way to submit patches for inclusion in the
stable kernel tree. Please read:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/stable-kernel-rules.html
for how to do this properly.
</formletter>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-20 14:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-19 17:16 [PATCH] lockdown: Fix kexec lockdown bypass with ima policy Eric Snowberg
2022-07-19 17:38 ` John Haxby
2022-07-20 14:24 ` Greg KH [this message]
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