From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: "Mirsad Goran Todorovac" <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr>,
"Mirsad Goran Todorovac" <mirsad.goran.todorovac@alu.hr>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>,
"Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Frederick Lawler" <fred@cloudflare.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/2] Add destructor hook to LSM modules
Date: Tue, 14 Mar 2023 13:05:25 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZBBU9diKqetWQztO@smile.fi.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhTMoCAFhaa36Bq7_jiKGiaeMbYTuWv7tTQP1OHpY0EUsg@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 04:27:42PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 13, 2023 at 5:33 AM Andy Shevchenko
> <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> > On Sat, Mar 11, 2023 at 09:59:17AM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > > On Fri, Mar 10, 2023 at 5:53 PM Mirsad Goran Todorovac
> > > <mirsad.todorovac@alu.unizg.hr> wrote:
...
> > > With that out of the way, I wanted to make a quick comment on the
> > > patch itself. Currently LSMs do not support unloading, or dynamic
> > > loading for that matter. There are several reasons for this, but
> > > perhaps the most important is that in order to help meet the security
> > > goals for several of the LSMs they need to be present in the kernel
> > > from the very beginning and remain until the very end. Adding a
> > > proper "release" method to a LSM is going to be far more complicated
> > > than what you've done with this patchset, involving a lot of
> > > discussion both for the LSM layer itself and all of the currently
> > > supported LSMs, and ultimately I don't believe it is something we will
> > > want to support.
> > >
> > > I appreciate your desire to help, and I want to thank you for your
> > > patch and the effort behind it, but I don't believe the kobject memory
> > > leak you saw at kernel shutdown was a real issue (it was only "leaked"
> > > because the system was shutting down) and I'm not sure the current
> > > behavior is something we want to change in the near future.
> >
> > Currently the security module so secure that even adds an unneeded noise to
> > the debugging output.
> >
> > At very least it would be nice to add a stub and put a big comment
> > (on your taste) explaining why we do not do anything there.
> >
> > Agree?
>
> No.
Are you sure? I'm proposing to add a stub which is no-op, but with a comment
inside explaining why. In such case we:
1) shut the kobject infra up;
2) keep the status quo in LSM;
3) put in the code a good explanation for others on what's going on.
> At least not without a lot of additional work beyond what was
> presented in this patchset. What about all of the other kobject
> caches created by other LSMs, this is more than just the IMA
> iint_cache. I'm also skeptical that this patchset was ever tested and
> verified as the newly added release() method was never actually called
> from anywhere that I could see.
I'm not talking about this patchset, but you are right that it wasn't
tested.
> I think we would need to see a proper, verified fix before I could say
> for certain.
And continuing to spread the noise in the logs just because LSM is stubborn?
> If you want to discuss potential designs, we can do that
> too, but please remember the constraints that were already mentioned
> about intentionally not allowing the LSMs to be unloaded (prior to
> system shutdown).
>
> I don't know the answer to this, but I'm guessing the LSMs aren't the
> only kernel subsystems to "leak" memory on system shutdown; working on
> the assumption that this is the case, how are those "leaked"
> allocations handled?
Note, I'm full for the proper fix, but the current issue is logs flooding done
by LSM that needs to be addressed.
--
With Best Regards,
Andy Shevchenko
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-14 11:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-10 19:26 [PATCH v1 0/2] Add destructor hook to LSM modules Mirsad Goran Todorovac
2023-03-10 19:46 ` Andy Shevchenko
2023-03-10 20:49 ` Casey Schaufler
2023-03-10 22:33 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-10 22:53 ` Mirsad Goran Todorovac
2023-03-11 14:59 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-11 15:56 ` Mirsad Goran Todorovac
2023-03-13 9:32 ` Andy Shevchenko
2023-03-13 20:27 ` Paul Moore
2023-03-14 11:05 ` Andy Shevchenko [this message]
2023-03-14 12:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-03-14 16:32 ` Paul Moore
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