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Tue, 1 Sep 2026 15:37:56 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 21:07:55 +0530 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] keys/trusted_keys: move TPM-specific fields into trusted_tpm_options To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, stefanb@linux.ibm.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, nayna@linux.ibm.com, rnsastry@linux.ibm.com, sudhakar@linux.ibm.com References: <20260829130917.699516-1-ssrish@linux.ibm.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Srish Srinivasan In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details-Enc: AW1haW4tMjYwOTAxMDEzNyBTYWx0ZWRfX7Jw1nxbOJLt/ yTbG3PbvJRAX+06IXNScP1q02kRM5Ry6X27TR/tSDeeq3yJyHxHnhbyX5YZVReNzihF2I1ySdLT kLotCV5uJ+IsWYJbaQ5Dmu2GMiOhV1WMOnkscyLJT59l/qCJCofWCVcr/l+/ZZeMZNXC7JE10+0 x6GkLAhTaFxvND2BMvf1yHaITRcZ+8loha2FTNo9qiRYo3rp2F3XEZ47wIj5WqpxRCqFxSIlDsd BHs/2DTuRcVw8V2ZthaurRWYghC+YuIEjes05E9PEBWUifLC7bgGnIZxb4bk2iU1OSUORPxEg/u M1iPLS6+2ZciJUi20/oioqFjZTQF6hoUhx6aR2GQLe00+YDovad6N1R6HoGBc+EF8Bv6HY/mAAe U4ctYB3h3awK7DEOJzJFRa42Ib7d2awZ52fZH8DlxRSje7SoiAzhtFY5qsNNYz2Cv2HUp9J9gnY 5PbTzjmFXOYYGvluJiw== X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: lMShfTuOCE-fh-rTyM58P0A6Xj7bQ3Z3 X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=CNgamxrD c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=6a96f15b cx=c_pps a=bLidbwmWQ0KltjZqbj+ezA==:117 a=bLidbwmWQ0KltjZqbj+ezA==:17 a=IkcTkHD0fZMA:10 a=VdqzKS8jKosA:10 a=VkNPw1HP01LnGYTKEx00:22 a=RnoormkPH1_aCDwRdu11:22 a=U7nrCbtTmkRpXpFmAIza:22 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=xjarCH93Yz3lLH4agZoA:9 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 X-Proofpoint-GUID: lMShfTuOCE-fh-rTyM58P0A6Xj7bQ3Z3 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Info: AW1haW4tMjYwOTAxMDEzNyBTYWx0ZWRfX+ALOA5Sv1tTZ tXtTrNfRrhoK4NNdMGbFBD0+Y5loEqtPZvMW+whn/ELwCe9JwdnlcCmVzX2DRUq1lNBFCj4Xd9M Cw00d0NLqtpqFy/cS861eZI+rYYKgOc= X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1176,Hydra:6.1.134,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-09-01_04,2026-09-01_02,2025-10-01_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 priorityscore=1501 clxscore=1015 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 malwarescore=0 classifier=typeunknown authscore=0 authtc= authcc= route=outbound adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.22.0-2606150000 definitions=main-2609010137 Hi Jarkko On 9/1/26 6:54 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Sat, Aug 29, 2026 at 06:39:17PM +0530, Srish Srinivasan wrote: >> The trusted_key_options struct contains TPM-specific fields (keyhandle, >> keyauth, blobauth_len, blobauth, pcrinfo_len, pcrinfo, pcrlock, hash, >> policydigest_len, policydigest, and policyhandle). This leads to the >> accumulation of backend-specific fields in the generic options structure. >> >> Define a trusted_tpm_options structure and move the TPM-specific fields >> there. Store a pointer to trusted_tpm_options in the private member of >> trusted_key_options. >> >> No functional change intended. >> >> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan >> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger >> --- >> Changelog: >> v4: >> - Rebased onto mainline after tpm-buf memory-safe allocation changes were >> merged >> - Resolved the resulting merge conflicts >> >> v3: >> - Exclude the preparatory clean up patch as the problem has been addressed >> in commit 9ec4175a30eb ("KEYS: trusted: Debugging as a feature") >> >> v2: >> - Exclude the bug-fix patch as it has already been applied to 6.19-rc7 >> - Rename instances of trusted_tpm_options from tpm_opts to private >> - Use pr_debug and KERN_DEBUG for logging debug messages (preparatory clean >> up patch) >> - Address other minor comments from Jarkko >> >> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 11 --- >> include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 14 ++++ >> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 96 ++++++++++++++--------- >> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 50 ++++++------ >> 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h >> index 9f9940482da4..3db61b57cf73 100644 >> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h >> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h >> @@ -39,17 +39,6 @@ struct trusted_key_payload { >> >> struct trusted_key_options { >> uint16_t keytype; >> - uint32_t keyhandle; >> - unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> - uint32_t blobauth_len; >> - unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> - uint32_t pcrinfo_len; >> - unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; >> - int pcrlock; >> - uint32_t hash; >> - uint32_t policydigest_len; >> - unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> - uint32_t policyhandle; >> void *private; >> }; >> >> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h >> index 3a0fa3bc8454..98d638d13ecb 100644 >> --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h >> +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h >> @@ -6,6 +6,20 @@ >> >> extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; >> >> +struct trusted_tpm_options { > To be aligned with existing convention a better name would be "trusted_key_tpm". Sure, will make this change and send out v5. Thanks, Srish. > >> + uint32_t keyhandle; >> + unsigned char keyauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> + uint32_t blobauth_len; >> + unsigned char blobauth[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> + uint32_t pcrinfo_len; >> + unsigned char pcrinfo[MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE]; >> + int pcrlock; >> + uint32_t hash; >> + uint32_t policydigest_len; >> + unsigned char policydigest[MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; >> + uint32_t policyhandle; >> +}; >> + >> int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> struct trusted_key_options *options); >> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c >> index bf0bf7f36970..14d005e76a1c 100644 >> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c >> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c >> @@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ enum { >> #ifdef CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_DEBUG >> static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; >> + >> if (!trusted_debug) >> return; >> >> pr_debug("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); >> - pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); >> - pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); >> - pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); >> + pr_debug("sealing key handle %0X\n", private->keyhandle); >> + pr_debug("pcrlock %d\n", private->pcrlock); >> + pr_debug("pcrinfo %d\n", private->pcrinfo_len); >> print_hex_dump_debug("pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, >> - 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); >> + 16, 1, private->pcrinfo, private->pcrinfo_len, 0); >> } >> >> static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) >> @@ -626,6 +628,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, >> static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, >> struct trusted_key_options *o) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; >> int ret; >> >> struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); >> @@ -637,9 +640,10 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, >> /* include migratable flag at end of sealed key */ >> p->key[p->key_len] = p->migratable; >> >> - ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, >> + ret = tpm_seal(tb, o->keytype, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, >> p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, >> - o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); >> + private->blobauth, private->pcrinfo, >> + private->pcrinfo_len); >> if (ret < 0) >> pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); >> >> @@ -652,6 +656,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, >> static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, >> struct trusted_key_options *o) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = o->private; >> int ret; >> >> struct tpm_buf *tb __free(kfree) = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE, GFP_KERNEL); >> @@ -660,8 +665,8 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, >> >> tpm_buf_init(tb, TPM_BUFSIZE); >> >> - ret = tpm_unseal(tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, >> - o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); >> + ret = tpm_unseal(tb, private->keyhandle, private->keyauth, p->blob, >> + p->blob_len, private->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); >> if (ret < 0) >> pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); >> else >> @@ -697,6 +702,7 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { >> static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> struct trusted_key_options *opt) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = opt->private; >> substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; >> char *p = c; >> int token; >> @@ -712,7 +718,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> if (tpm2 < 0) >> return tpm2; >> >> - opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; >> + private->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; >> >> if (!c) >> return 0; >> @@ -726,11 +732,11 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> >> switch (token) { >> case Opt_pcrinfo: >> - opt->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; >> - if (opt->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) >> + private->pcrinfo_len = strlen(args[0].from) / 2; >> + if (private->pcrinfo_len > MAX_PCRINFO_SIZE) >> return -EINVAL; >> - res = hex2bin(opt->pcrinfo, args[0].from, >> - opt->pcrinfo_len); >> + res = hex2bin(private->pcrinfo, args[0].from, >> + private->pcrinfo_len); >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> break; >> @@ -739,12 +745,12 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> opt->keytype = SEAL_keytype; >> - opt->keyhandle = handle; >> + private->keyhandle = handle; >> break; >> case Opt_keyauth: >> if (strlen(args[0].from) != 2 * SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) >> return -EINVAL; >> - res = hex2bin(opt->keyauth, args[0].from, >> + res = hex2bin(private->keyauth, args[0].from, >> SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> @@ -755,21 +761,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> * hex strings. TPM 2.0 authorizations are simple >> * passwords (although it can take a hash as well) >> */ >> - opt->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); >> + private->blobauth_len = strlen(args[0].from); >> >> - if (opt->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { >> - res = hex2bin(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, >> + if (private->blobauth_len == 2 * TPM_DIGEST_SIZE) { >> + res = hex2bin(private->blobauth, args[0].from, >> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> - opt->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; >> + private->blobauth_len = TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; >> break; >> } >> >> - if (tpm2 && opt->blobauth_len <= sizeof(opt->blobauth)) { >> - memcpy(opt->blobauth, args[0].from, >> - opt->blobauth_len); >> + if (tpm2 && >> + private->blobauth_len <= >> + sizeof(private->blobauth)) { >> + memcpy(private->blobauth, args[0].from, >> + private->blobauth_len); >> break; >> } >> >> @@ -787,14 +795,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lock); >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> - opt->pcrlock = lock; >> + private->pcrlock = lock; >> break; >> case Opt_hash: >> if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) >> return -EINVAL; >> for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { >> if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { >> - opt->hash = i; >> + private->hash = i; >> break; >> } >> } >> @@ -806,14 +814,14 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> } >> break; >> case Opt_policydigest: >> - digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; >> + digest_len = hash_digest_size[private->hash]; >> if (!tpm2 || strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * digest_len)) >> return -EINVAL; >> - res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, >> + res = hex2bin(private->policydigest, args[0].from, >> digest_len); >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> - opt->policydigest_len = digest_len; >> + private->policydigest_len = digest_len; >> break; >> case Opt_policyhandle: >> if (!tpm2) >> @@ -821,7 +829,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); >> if (res < 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> - opt->policyhandle = handle; >> + private->policyhandle = handle; >> break; >> default: >> return -EINVAL; >> @@ -832,6 +840,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, >> >> static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private; >> struct trusted_key_options *options; >> int tpm2; >> >> @@ -844,14 +853,22 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) >> /* set any non-zero defaults */ >> options->keytype = SRK_keytype; >> >> - if (!tpm2) >> - options->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; >> + private = kzalloc_obj(*private); >> + if (!private) { >> + kfree_sensitive(options); >> + options = NULL; >> + } else { >> + if (!tpm2) >> + private->keyhandle = SRKHANDLE; >> + options->private = private; >> + } >> } >> return options; >> } >> >> static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL; >> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; >> int ret = 0; >> int tpm2; >> @@ -869,7 +886,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) >> goto out; >> dump_options(options); >> >> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { >> + private = options->private; >> + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { >> ret = -EINVAL; >> goto out; >> } >> @@ -883,20 +901,23 @@ static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) >> goto out; >> } >> >> - if (options->pcrlock) { >> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); >> + if (private->pcrlock) { >> + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); >> if (ret < 0) { >> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); >> goto out; >> } >> } >> out: >> + if (options) >> + kfree_sensitive(options->private); >> kfree_sensitive(options); >> return ret; >> } >> >> static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = NULL; >> struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; >> int ret = 0; >> int tpm2; >> @@ -914,7 +935,8 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) >> goto out; >> dump_options(options); >> >> - if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { >> + private = options->private; >> + if (!private->keyhandle && !tpm2) { >> ret = -EINVAL; >> goto out; >> } >> @@ -926,14 +948,16 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) >> if (ret < 0) >> pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); >> >> - if (options->pcrlock) { >> - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); >> + if (private->pcrlock) { >> + ret = pcrlock(private->pcrlock); >> if (ret < 0) { >> pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); >> goto out; >> } >> } >> out: >> + if (options) >> + kfree_sensitive(options->private); >> kfree_sensitive(options); >> return ret; >> } >> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c >> index 67225dd562a9..07b831b515bb 100644 >> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c >> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c >> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> struct trusted_key_options *options, >> u8 *src, u32 len) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; >> const int SCRATCH_SIZE = PAGE_SIZE; >> u8 *scratch = kmalloc(SCRATCH_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); >> u8 *work = scratch, *work1; >> @@ -45,7 +46,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> work = asn1_encode_oid(work, end_work, tpm2key_oid, >> asn1_oid_len(tpm2key_oid)); >> >> - if (options->blobauth_len == 0) { >> + if (private->blobauth_len == 0) { >> unsigned char bool[3], *w = bool; >> /* tag 0 is emptyAuth */ >> w = asn1_encode_boolean(w, w + sizeof(bool), true); >> @@ -68,7 +69,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_encode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> goto err; >> } >> >> - work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, options->keyhandle); >> + work = asn1_encode_integer(work, end_work, private->keyhandle); >> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, pub, pub_len); >> work = asn1_encode_octet_string(work, end_work, priv, priv_len); >> >> @@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> struct trusted_key_options *options, >> u8 **buf) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; >> int ret; >> struct tpm2_key_context ctx; >> u8 *blob; >> @@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ static int tpm2_key_decode(struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> return -ENOMEM; >> >> *buf = blob; >> - options->keyhandle = ctx.parent; >> + private->keyhandle = ctx.parent; >> >> memcpy(blob, ctx.priv, ctx.priv_len); >> blob += ctx.priv_len; >> @@ -232,6 +234,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> struct trusted_key_payload *payload, >> struct trusted_key_options *options) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; >> off_t offset = TPM_HEADER_SIZE; >> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; >> struct tpm_buf *sized __free(kfree) = NULL; >> @@ -240,11 +243,11 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> u32 flags; >> int rc; >> >> - hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(options->hash); >> + hash = tpm2_find_hash_alg(private->hash); >> if (hash < 0) >> return hash; >> >> - if (!options->keyhandle) >> + if (!private->keyhandle) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip); >> @@ -274,18 +277,18 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> >> tpm_buf_init_sized(sized, TPM_BUFSIZE); >> >> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); >> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); >> if (rc) >> goto out; >> >> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_DECRYPT, >> - options->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); >> + private->keyauth, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); >> >> /* sensitive */ >> - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->blobauth_len); >> + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->blobauth_len); >> >> - if (options->blobauth_len) >> - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); >> + if (private->blobauth_len) >> + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); >> >> tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, payload->key_len); >> tpm_buf_append(sized, payload->key, payload->key_len); >> @@ -298,14 +301,15 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> >> /* key properties */ >> flags = 0; >> - flags |= options->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; >> + flags |= private->policydigest_len ? 0 : TPM2_OA_USER_WITH_AUTH; >> flags |= payload->migratable ? 0 : (TPM2_OA_FIXED_TPM | TPM2_OA_FIXED_PARENT); >> tpm_buf_append_u32(sized, flags); >> >> /* policy */ >> - tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, options->policydigest_len); >> - if (options->policydigest_len) >> - tpm_buf_append(sized, options->policydigest, options->policydigest_len); >> + tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, private->policydigest_len); >> + if (private->policydigest_len) >> + tpm_buf_append(sized, private->policydigest, >> + private->policydigest_len); >> >> /* public parameters */ >> tpm_buf_append_u16(sized, TPM_ALG_NULL); >> @@ -376,6 +380,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> u32 *blob_handle) >> { >> u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL; >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; >> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; >> unsigned int private_len; >> unsigned int public_len; >> @@ -395,7 +400,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> } >> >> /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ >> - if (!options->keyhandle) >> + if (!private->keyhandle) >> return -EINVAL; >> >> /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ >> @@ -439,11 +444,11 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); >> tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); >> >> - rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); >> + rc = tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, private->keyhandle, NULL); >> if (rc) >> return rc; >> >> - tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, options->keyauth, >> + tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, private->keyauth, >> TPM_DIGEST_SIZE); >> >> tpm_buf_append(buf, blob, blob_len); >> @@ -483,6 +488,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> struct trusted_key_options *options, >> u32 blob_handle) >> { >> + struct trusted_tpm_options *private = options->private; >> struct tpm_header *head; >> struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) = NULL; >> u16 data_len; >> @@ -507,10 +513,10 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> if (rc) >> return rc; >> >> - if (!options->policyhandle) { >> + if (!private->policyhandle) { >> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, >> - options->blobauth, >> - options->blobauth_len); >> + private->blobauth, >> + private->blobauth_len); >> } else { >> /* >> * FIXME: The policy session was generated outside the >> @@ -523,9 +529,9 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, >> * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated >> * password. >> */ >> - tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, options->policyhandle, >> + tpm2_buf_append_auth(buf, private->policyhandle, >> NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0, >> - options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); >> + private->blobauth, private->blobauth_len); >> if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { >> tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, >> NULL, 0); >> -- >> 2.53.0 >> > BR, Jarkko