[PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Shahriyar Jalayeri]

Ensure tpm_inf_recv() does not overflow the provided buffer when
the TPM reports more data than the caller expects.

Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
index 7638b65b8..eb6dd55ff 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
@@ -250,6 +250,12 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
 	number_of_wtx = 0;
 
 recv_begin:
+	if (count < 4) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev,
+			"count less than the header size!\n");
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	/* start receiving header */
 	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
 		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
@@ -268,6 +274,12 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
 		/* size of the data received */
 		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
 
+		if (size > count) {
+			dev_err(&chip->dev,
+				"Buffer too small for incoming data!\n");
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
 			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Paul Menzel]

Dear Shahriyar,


Thank you for your patch.

Am 03.10.25 um 11:25 schrieb Shahriyar Jalayeri:
> Ensure tpm_inf_recv() does not overflow the provided buffer when
> the TPM reports more data than the caller expects.

Is it possible to enforce this situation to ensure your patch works?

> Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>
> ---
>   drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> index 7638b65b8..eb6dd55ff 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> @@ -250,6 +250,12 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>   	number_of_wtx = 0;
>   
>   recv_begin:
> +	if (count < 4) {
> +		dev_err(&chip->dev,
> +			"count less than the header size!\n");

Mention both values count and 4?

> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +

This is not described in the commit message.

>   	/* start receiving header */
>   	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
>   		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
> @@ -268,6 +274,12 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>   		/* size of the data received */
>   		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
>   
> +		if (size > count) {
> +			dev_err(&chip->dev,
> +				"Buffer too small for incoming data!\n");

I’d log both values, and also specify that the operation is aborted.

> +			return -EIO;
> +		}
> +
>   		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
>   			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
>   			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);


Kind regards,

Paul

Re: [PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Shahriyar]

Dear Paul,

> 
> Is it possible to enforce this situation to ensure your patch works?
> 

Triggering the issue requires interposing the hardware or a MCU to 
emulate the TPM and send malformed TPM replies, I might be able to test 
this using Qemu, but that takes some time.

For the rest of your suggestions, I'll send another patch.

BR,
/shj

[PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Shahriyar Jalayeri]

Add two buffer size validations to prevent buffer
overflows in tpm_inf_recv():

1. Validate that the provided buffer can hold at
   least the 4-byte header before attempting to
   read it.
2. Validate that the buffer is large enough to
   hold the data size reported by the TPM before
   reading the payload.

Without these checks, a malicious or malfunctioning
TPM could cause buffer overflows by reporting data
sizes larger than the provided buffer, leading to
memory corruption.

The error messages include both the expected and
actual buffer sizes to indicate that the operation
is aborted.

Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
index 7638b65b8..385bac46a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
@@ -247,11 +247,20 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
 	int i;
 	int ret;
 	u32 size = 0;
+	u32 header_size = 4;
 	number_of_wtx = 0;
 
 recv_begin:
+	if (count < header_size) {
+		dev_err(&chip->dev,
+			"Buffer too small (count=%zd, header_size=%u), "
+			"operation aborted\n",
+			count, header_size);
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	/* start receiving header */
-	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < header_size; i++) {
 		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
 		if (ret)
 			return -EIO;
@@ -268,6 +277,14 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
 		/* size of the data received */
 		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
 
+		if (size > count) {
+			dev_err(&chip->dev,
+				"Buffer too small for incoming data "
+				"(count=%zd, size=%u), operation aborted\n",
+				count, size);
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
 			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Fri, Oct 03, 2025 at 09:25:47AM +0000, Shahriyar Jalayeri wrote:
> Ensure tpm_inf_recv() does not overflow the provided buffer when
> the TPM reports more data than the caller expects.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>

missing:

Fixes: ebb81fdb3dd0 ("[PATCH] tpm: Support for Infineon TPM")

> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 12 ++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> index 7638b65b8..eb6dd55ff 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> @@ -250,6 +250,12 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>  	number_of_wtx = 0;
>  
>  recv_begin:
> +	if (count < 4) {
> +		dev_err(&chip->dev,
> +			"count less than the header size!\n");
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}

Please remove dev_err() 

> +
>  	/* start receiving header */
>  	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
>  		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
> @@ -268,6 +274,12 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>  		/* size of the data received */
>  		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
>  
> +		if (size > count) {
> +			dev_err(&chip->dev,
> +				"Buffer too small for incoming data!\n");
> +			return -EIO;
> +		}


Ditto
>
>  		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
>  			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
>  			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);
> -- 
> 2.43.0

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Sat, Oct 04, 2025 at 09:04:17AM +0000, Shahriyar Jalayeri wrote:
> Add two buffer size validations to prevent buffer
> overflows in tpm_inf_recv():
> 
> 1. Validate that the provided buffer can hold at
>    least the 4-byte header before attempting to
>    read it.

What is this 4 byte header? Please describe what it is.

> 2. Validate that the buffer is large enough to
>    hold the data size reported by the TPM before
>    reading the payload.
> 
> Without these checks, a malicious or malfunctioning
> TPM could cause buffer overflows by reporting data
> sizes larger than the provided buffer, leading to
> memory corruption.
> 
> The error messages include both the expected and
> actual buffer sizes to indicate that the operation
> is aborted.

Paragraphs should be 75 chars per line.

> 
> Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>
> ---

Please version your patches e.g., "git format-patch -v2"

And before diff stat it would be good to have a changelog.


>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> index 7638b65b8..385bac46a 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> @@ -247,11 +247,20 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>  	int i;
>  	int ret;
>  	u32 size = 0;
> +	u32 header_size = 4;

Please don't use local variable for a constant.


>  	number_of_wtx = 0;
>  
>  recv_begin:
> +	if (count < header_size) {
> +		dev_err(&chip->dev,
> +			"Buffer too small (count=%zd, header_size=%u), "
> +			"operation aborted\n",
> +			count, header_size);
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* start receiving header */
> -	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
> +	for (i = 0; i < header_size; i++) {
>  		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
>  		if (ret)
>  			return -EIO;
> @@ -268,6 +277,14 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>  		/* size of the data received */
>  		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
>  
> +		if (size > count) {
> +			dev_err(&chip->dev,
> +				"Buffer too small for incoming data "
> +				"(count=%zd, size=%u), operation aborted\n",
> +				count, size);
> +			return -EIO;
> +		}
> +
>  		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
>  			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
>  			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 

Other than that, same comments apply as for the previous version.

BR, Jarkko

[PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Shahriyar Jalayeri]

Add two buffer size validations to prevent buffer overflows in
tpm_inf_recv():

1. Validate that the provided buffer can hold at least the 4-byte header
   before attempting to read it.
2. Validate that the buffer is large enough to hold the data size reported
   by the TPM before reading the payload.

Without these checks, a malicious or malfunctioning TPM could cause buffer
overflows by reporting data sizes larger than the provided buffer, leading
to memory corruption.

Fixes: ebb81fdb3dd0 ("[PATCH] tpm: Support for Infineon TPM")
Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
index 7638b65b8..8b90a8191 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
 	number_of_wtx = 0;
 
 recv_begin:
+    /* expect at least 1-byte VL header, 1-byte ctrl-tag, 2-byte data size */
+	if (count < 4) {
+		return -EIO;
+	}
+
 	/* start receiving header */
 	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
 		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
@@ -268,6 +273,10 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
 		/* size of the data received */
 		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
 
+		if (size + 6 > count) {
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
 			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
 			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH] tpm: infineon: add bounds check in tpm_inf_recv

[Jarkko Sakkinen]

On Tue, Oct 07, 2025 at 09:07:39AM +0000, Shahriyar Jalayeri wrote:
> Add two buffer size validations to prevent buffer overflows in
> tpm_inf_recv():
> 
> 1. Validate that the provided buffer can hold at least the 4-byte header
>    before attempting to read it.
> 2. Validate that the buffer is large enough to hold the data size reported
>    by the TPM before reading the payload.
> 
> Without these checks, a malicious or malfunctioning TPM could cause buffer
> overflows by reporting data sizes larger than the provided buffer, leading
> to memory corruption.
> 
> Fixes: ebb81fdb3dd0 ("[PATCH] tpm: Support for Infineon TPM")
> Signed-off-by: Shahriyar Jalayeri <shahriyar@posteo.de>
> ---
>  drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c | 9 +++++++++
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> index 7638b65b8..8b90a8191 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_infineon.c
> @@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>  	number_of_wtx = 0;
>  
>  recv_begin:
> +    /* expect at least 1-byte VL header, 1-byte ctrl-tag, 2-byte data size */
> +	if (count < 4) {
> +		return -EIO;
> +	}
> +
>  	/* start receiving header */
>  	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
>  		ret = wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
> @@ -268,6 +273,10 @@ static int tpm_inf_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 * buf, size_t count)
>  		/* size of the data received */
>  		size = ((buf[2] << 8) | buf[3]);
>  
> +		if (size + 6 > count) {
> +			return -EIO;
> +		}
> +
>  		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
>  			wait(chip, STAT_RDA);
>  			buf[i] = tpm_data_in(RDFIFO);
> -- 
> 2.43.0
> 

Nitpick: we don't use curly braces for one line statements.
AFAIK scripts/checkpatch.pl complains about this. Other than that
I don't see any issues.

BR, Jarkko