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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Cc: "Rodolfo Giometti" <giometti@enneenne.com>,
	"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	"Herbert Xu" <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
	"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>,
	op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org,
	"Horia Geantă" <horia.geanta@nxp.com>,
	"Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>,
	"Sahil Malhotra" <sahil.malhotra@nxp.com>,
	"Ahmad Fatoum" <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>,
	"Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP)" <chleroy@kernel.org>,
	"Eric Biggers" <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 02:55:14 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <av5I8lhExyKvf9w_@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <75946579-8335-4491-86da-fcda25ae9fd8@gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 07:25:09PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 11/18/26 9:12 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
> > This patch is a proposal on its own: nothing before it needs it, so it
> > can be discussed, or left out, apart from the rest.

If there is no one who needs this, this is literally throwing a dice
with Claude.

> > 
> > aes256-cbc does not authenticate what it decrypts, and a file or a
> > transfer longer than one call cannot be sealed with a single AES-GCM
> > invocation without buffering all of it, nor decrypted without
> > releasing plaintext before its tag is checked.
> > 
> > Add aes256-gcm-stream: the STREAM construction (Hoang, Reyhanitabar,
> > Rogaway, Vizar) over AES-256-GCM. A message is split into segments
> > of up to 64 KiB, each sealed with its own tag under a subkey derived
> > with HKDF-SHA256 from the key and a 16-byte salt drawn at
> > KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN; the nonce carries the segment's position and a
> > last-segment flag, and the counter lives in the kernel, so segments
> > can be neither reordered nor dropped from the end unnoticed. The
> > segments go through a new ioctl, KEYCRYPT_IOC_SEGMENT, and
> > KEYCRYPT_IOC_FINAL reports a stream whose last segment never came.
> > A tee or hsm backend draws the salt and keeps the counter in its
> > secure side; the sw and optee backends implement it.
> 
> Please use Cobblestone-128 or Cobblestone-256 instead.
> https://c2sp.org/chunked-encryption has the spec, and you can check
> against the implementation in pyca/cryptography or (for Cobblestone-128)
> the Go package filippo.io/cobblestone.  This assumes your CPU has AES
> and GCM instructions; if not, you should see about using one that does
> or work with a cryptographer to standardize an alternative that doesn't
> need them.
> 
> Nonstandard constructions like this one are to be avoided.

The wider problem in crypto without a use case there is nothing
to protect.

> -- 
> Sincerely,
> Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)


Br, Jarkko

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19  0:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18 14:04 [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add a key type for keys user space never reads Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the sw backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:04 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the OP-TEE backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:07 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] docs: keycrypt: document keycrypt keys Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:08 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] MAINTAINERS: add KEYS-KEYCRYPT Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:09 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the engine tier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:10 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] crypto: caam - add an internal cbc(paes) taking the blob's key modifier Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:11 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the CAAM backend Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-18 14:12 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] KEYS: keycrypt: Add the aes256-gcm-stream algorithm Rodolfo Giometti
2026-11-19  0:25   ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:55     ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-18 14:31 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] KEYS: keycrypt: keys that user space can use but never read Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:39   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 14:57 ` Marco Felsch
2026-11-18 15:07   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 23:42 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  0:37   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-19  0:43     ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-11-19  1:01       ` Jarkko Sakkinen

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