From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
eparis@redhat.com
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v11 9/19] ipe: add permissive toggle
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 15:56:51 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b315474c-77f7-49c1-8983-c8d1de80cc86@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1ef52e983dd5b9a7759dc76bfe156804.paul@paul-moore.com>
On 10/23/2023 8:52 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Oct 4, 2023 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>
>> IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy
>> authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it effecting their
>> programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS
>> be reported.
>>
>> This patch adds the following audit records:
>>
>> audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295
>> ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
>> audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295
>> ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
>>
>> The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is
>> different from the current enforce value.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>> v2:
>> + Split evaluation loop, access control hooks,
>> and evaluation loop from policy parser and userspace
>> interface to pass mailing list character limit
>>
>> v3:
>> + Move ipe_load_properties to patch 04.
>> + Remove useless 0-initializations
>> + Prefix extern variables with ipe_
>> + Remove kernel module parameters, as these are
>> exposed through sysctls.
>> + Add more prose to the IPE base config option
>> help text.
>> + Use GFP_KERNEL for audit_log_start.
>> + Remove unnecessary caching system.
>> + Remove comments from headers
>> + Use rcu_access_pointer for rcu-pointer null check
>> + Remove usage of reqprot; use prot only.
>> + Move policy load and activation audit event to 03/12
>>
>> v4:
>> + Remove sysctls in favor of securityfs nodes
>> + Re-add kernel module parameters, as these are now
>> exposed through securityfs.
>> + Refactor property audit loop to a separate function.
>>
>> v5:
>> + fix minor grammatical errors
>> + do not group rule by curly-brace in audit record,
>> reconstruct the exact rule.
>>
>> v6:
>> + No changes
>>
>> v7:
>> + Further split lsm creation into a separate commit from the
>> evaluation loop and audit system, for easier review.
>> + Propagating changes to support the new ipe_context structure in the
>> evaluation loop.
>> + Split out permissive functionality into a separate patch for easier
>> review.
>> + Remove permissive switch compile-time configuration option - this
>> is trivial to add later.
>>
>> v8:
>> + Remove "IPE" prefix from permissive audit record
>> + align fields to the linux-audit field dictionary. This causes the
>> following fields to change:
>> enforce -> permissive
>>
>> + Remove duplicated information correlated with syscall record, that
>> will always be present in the audit event.
>> + Change audit types:
>> + AUDIT_TRUST_STATUS -> AUDIT_MAC_STATUS
>> + There is no significant difference in meaning between
>> these types.
>>
>> v9:
>> + Clean up ipe_context related code
>>
>> v10:
>> + Change audit format to comform with the existing format selinux is
>> using
>> + Remove the audit record emission during init to align with selinux,
>> which does not perform this action.
>>
>> v11:
>> + Remove redundant code
>> ---
>> security/ipe/audit.c | 22 ++++++++++++++
>> security/ipe/audit.h | 1 +
>> security/ipe/eval.c | 14 +++++++--
>> security/ipe/eval.h | 1 +
>> security/ipe/fs.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 5 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> ...
>
>> diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c
>> index 499b6b3338f2..78c54ff1fdd3 100644
>> --- a/security/ipe/eval.c
>> +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c
>> @@ -167,9 +172,12 @@ int ipe_evaluate_event(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx)
>> ipe_audit_match(ctx, match_type, action, rule);
>>
>> if (action == IPE_ACTION_DENY)
>> - return -EACCES;
>> + rc = -EACCES;
>> +
>> + if (!enforcing)
>> + rc = 0;
>
> Why the local @enforcing variable? Why not:
>
> if (!READ_ONCE(enforce))
> rc = 0;
>
Yes the variable is unnecessary, I will remove it.
-Fan
>> - return 0;
>> + return rc;
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -198,3 +206,5 @@ void ipe_invalidate_pinned_sb(const struct super_block *mnt_sb)
>>
>> module_param(success_audit, bool, 0400);
>> MODULE_PARM_DESC(success_audit, "Start IPE with success auditing enabled");
>> +module_param(enforce, bool, 0400);
>> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Start IPE in enforce or permissive mode");
>
> "enforcing"
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-02 22:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-04 22:09 [RFC PATCH v11 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 01/19] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 02/19] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 2/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-25 22:45 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:36 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 03/19] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 3/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-26 0:15 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 04/19] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 4/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 05/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 5/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:33 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 22:12 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:46 ` Fan Wu
2023-11-03 22:15 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 22:30 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 07/19] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 8/19] " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:55 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 09/19] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC v11 9/19] " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:56 ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 10/19] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 11/19] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:40 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 12/19] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:41 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 13/19] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:41 ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 14/19] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:40 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-05 2:27 ` Eric Biggers
2023-10-05 2:49 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 0:40 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 2:53 ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 15:42 ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 19:33 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 16/19] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 23:58 ` Randy Dunlap
2023-10-05 2:45 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:09 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 18/19] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-10-24 3:52 ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:11 ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 19/19] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu
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