[PATCH v4 0/3] Enhancements to the secvar interface in static key management mode

[PATCH v4 0/3] Enhancements to the secvar interface in static key management mode

[Srish Srinivasan]

The PLPKS enabled Power LPAR sysfs exposes all of the secure boot secure
variables irrespective of the key management mode. There is support for
both static and dynamic key management and the key management mode can
be updated using the management console. The user should be able to read
from and write to the secure boot secvars db, dbx, grubdb, grubdbx, and
sbat only in the dynamic managememnt key mode. But the sysfs interface
exposes these secvars even in the static key management mode even
though they are not getting consumed in this mode.

Update the secvar format property based on the key management mode and
expose only the secure variables relevant to the key management mode.
Enable loading of signed third-party kernel modules in the static key
mode when the platform keystore is enabled.

Changelog:

v4:

* Patch 2:

  - Changes to the documentation and the patch description based on
    feedback from Michal.

v3:

* Patch 1:

  - Minor changes to the docmentation based on feedback from Andrew.
  - Added reviewed-by from Andrew.

v2:

* Patch 1:

  - Updated plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode to handle -ENOENT and -EPERM in
    the case of static key management mode, based on feedback from
    Andrew.
  - Moved the documentation changes relevant to the secvar format
    property from Patch 2 to Patch 1.
  - Added reviewed-by from Nayna.

* Patch 2:

  - Moved the documentaton changes relevant to secure variables from
    /sys/firmware/secvar/format to
    /sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name>.
  - Added reviewed-by from Nayna and Andrew.

* Patch 3:
  - Added reviewed-by from Nayna and Andrew.


Srish Srinivasan (3):
  powerpc/pseries: Correct secvar format representation for static key
    management
  powerpc/secvar: Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode
  integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in the static key
    management mode

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar        |  17 ++-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 104 ++++++++++++------
 .../integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c   |   5 +-
 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

-- 
2.47.1

[PATCH v4 1/3] powerpc/pseries: Correct secvar format representation for static key management

[Srish Srinivasan]

On a PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR, the secvar format property for static
key management is misrepresented as "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown", creating
reason for confusion.

Static key management mode uses fixed, built-in keys. Dynamic key
management mode allows keys to be updated in production to handle
security updates without firmware rebuilds.

Define a function named plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode() to retrieve the
key management mode based on the existence of the SB_VERSION property
in the firmware.

Set the secvar format property to either "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>" or
"ibm,plpks-sb-v0" based on the key management mode, and return the
length of the secvar format property.

Co-developed-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar        | 10 ++-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 76 +++++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
index 857cf12b0904..f001a4f4bd2e 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
@@ -22,9 +22,13 @@ Description:	A string indicating which backend is in use by the firmware.
 		and is expected to be "ibm,edk2-compat-v1".
 
 		On pseries/PLPKS, this is generated by the kernel based on the
-		version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore, and
-		has the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>", or
-		"ibm,plpks-sb-unknown" if there is no SB_VERSION variable.
+		version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore. The
+		version numbering in the SB_VERSION variable starts from 1. The
+		format string takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>" in the
+		case of dynamic key management mode. If the SB_VERSION variable
+		does not exist (or there is an error while reading it), it takes
+		the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v0", indicating that the key management
+		mode is static.
 
 What:		/sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name>
 Date:		August 2019
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
index 257fd1f8bc19..767e5e8c6990 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
@@ -152,39 +152,55 @@ static int plpks_set_variable(const char *key, u64 key_len, u8 *data,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-// PLPKS dynamic secure boot doesn't give us a format string in the same way OPAL does.
-// Instead, report the format using the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore.
-// The string is made up by us, and takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<n>" (or "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown"
-// if the SB_VERSION variable doesn't exist). Hypervisor defines the SB_VERSION variable as a
-// "1 byte unsigned integer value".
-static ssize_t plpks_secvar_format(char *buf, size_t bufsize)
+/*
+ * Return the key management mode.
+ *
+ * SB_VERSION is defined as a "1 byte unsigned integer value", taking values
+ * starting from 1. It is owned by the Partition Firmware and its presence
+ * indicates that the key management mode is dynamic. Any failure in
+ * reading SB_VERSION defaults the key management mode to static. The error
+ * codes -ENOENT or -EPERM are expected in static key management mode. An
+ * unexpected error code will have to be investigated. Only signed variables
+ * have null bytes in their names, SB_VERSION does not.
+ *
+ * Return 0 to indicate that the key management mode is static. Otherwise
+ * return the SB_VERSION value to indicate that the key management mode is
+ * dynamic.
+ */
+static u8 plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode(void)
 {
-	struct plpks_var var = {0};
-	ssize_t ret;
-	u8 version;
-
-	var.component = NULL;
-	// Only the signed variables have null bytes in their names, this one doesn't
-	var.name = "SB_VERSION";
-	var.namelen = strlen(var.name);
-	var.datalen = 1;
-	var.data = &version;
-
-	// Unlike the other vars, SB_VERSION is owned by firmware instead of the OS
-	ret = plpks_read_fw_var(&var);
-	if (ret) {
-		if (ret == -ENOENT) {
-			ret = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown");
-		} else {
-			pr_err("Error %ld reading SB_VERSION from firmware\n", ret);
-			ret = -EIO;
-		}
-		goto err;
+	u8 mode;
+	ssize_t rc;
+	struct plpks_var var = {
+		.component = NULL,
+		.name = "SB_VERSION",
+		.namelen = 10,
+		.datalen = 1,
+		.data = &mode,
+	};
+
+	rc = plpks_read_fw_var(&var);
+	if (rc) {
+		if (rc != -ENOENT && rc != -EPERM)
+			pr_info("Error %ld reading SB_VERSION from firmware\n", rc);
+		mode = 0;
 	}
+	return mode;
+}
 
-	ret = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "ibm,plpks-sb-v%hhu", version);
-err:
-	return ret;
+/*
+ * PLPKS dynamic secure boot doesn't give us a format string in the same way
+ * OPAL does. Instead, report the format using the SB_VERSION variable in the
+ * keystore. The string, made up by us, takes the form of either
+ * "ibm,plpks-sb-v<n>" or "ibm,plpks-sb-v0", based on the key management mode,
+ * and return the length of the secvar format property.
+ */
+static ssize_t plpks_secvar_format(char *buf, size_t bufsize)
+{
+	u8 mode;
+
+	mode = plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode();
+	return snprintf(buf, bufsize, "ibm,plpks-sb-v%hhu", mode);
 }
 
 static int plpks_max_size(u64 *max_size)
-- 
2.47.1

Re: [PATCH v4 1/3] powerpc/pseries: Correct secvar format representation for static key management

[R Nageswara Sastry]

On 11/06/25 2:49 AM, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> On a PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR, the secvar format property for static
> key management is misrepresented as "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown", creating
> reason for confusion.
>
> Static key management mode uses fixed, built-in keys. Dynamic key
> management mode allows keys to be updated in production to handle
> security updates without firmware rebuilds.
>
> Define a function named plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode() to retrieve the
> key management mode based on the existence of the SB_VERSION property
> in the firmware.
>
> Set the secvar format property to either "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>" or
> "ibm,plpks-sb-v0" based on the key management mode, and return the
> length of the secvar format property.
>
> Co-developed-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>

Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
With the following scenarios:
1. With and with out secure boot by enabling keystore_signed_updates and 
keystore_kbytes
2. With Dynamic Key Guest Secure Boot
3. With Static Key Guest Secure Boot

> ---
>   Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar        | 10 ++-
>   arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 76 +++++++++++--------
>   2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
> index 857cf12b0904..f001a4f4bd2e 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
> @@ -22,9 +22,13 @@ Description:	A string indicating which backend is in use by the firmware.
>   		and is expected to be "ibm,edk2-compat-v1".
>   
>   		On pseries/PLPKS, this is generated by the kernel based on the
> -		version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore, and
> -		has the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>", or
> -		"ibm,plpks-sb-unknown" if there is no SB_VERSION variable.
> +		version number in the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore. The
> +		version numbering in the SB_VERSION variable starts from 1. The
> +		format string takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<version>" in the
> +		case of dynamic key management mode. If the SB_VERSION variable
> +		does not exist (or there is an error while reading it), it takes
> +		the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v0", indicating that the key management
> +		mode is static.
>   
>   What:		/sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable name>
>   Date:		August 2019
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
> index 257fd1f8bc19..767e5e8c6990 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
> @@ -152,39 +152,55 @@ static int plpks_set_variable(const char *key, u64 key_len, u8 *data,
>   	return rc;
>   }
>   
> -// PLPKS dynamic secure boot doesn't give us a format string in the same way OPAL does.
> -// Instead, report the format using the SB_VERSION variable in the keystore.
> -// The string is made up by us, and takes the form "ibm,plpks-sb-v<n>" (or "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown"
> -// if the SB_VERSION variable doesn't exist). Hypervisor defines the SB_VERSION variable as a
> -// "1 byte unsigned integer value".
> -static ssize_t plpks_secvar_format(char *buf, size_t bufsize)
> +/*
> + * Return the key management mode.
> + *
> + * SB_VERSION is defined as a "1 byte unsigned integer value", taking values
> + * starting from 1. It is owned by the Partition Firmware and its presence
> + * indicates that the key management mode is dynamic. Any failure in
> + * reading SB_VERSION defaults the key management mode to static. The error
> + * codes -ENOENT or -EPERM are expected in static key management mode. An
> + * unexpected error code will have to be investigated. Only signed variables
> + * have null bytes in their names, SB_VERSION does not.
> + *
> + * Return 0 to indicate that the key management mode is static. Otherwise
> + * return the SB_VERSION value to indicate that the key management mode is
> + * dynamic.
> + */
> +static u8 plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode(void)
>   {
> -	struct plpks_var var = {0};
> -	ssize_t ret;
> -	u8 version;
> -
> -	var.component = NULL;
> -	// Only the signed variables have null bytes in their names, this one doesn't
> -	var.name = "SB_VERSION";
> -	var.namelen = strlen(var.name);
> -	var.datalen = 1;
> -	var.data = &version;
> -
> -	// Unlike the other vars, SB_VERSION is owned by firmware instead of the OS
> -	ret = plpks_read_fw_var(&var);
> -	if (ret) {
> -		if (ret == -ENOENT) {
> -			ret = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "ibm,plpks-sb-unknown");
> -		} else {
> -			pr_err("Error %ld reading SB_VERSION from firmware\n", ret);
> -			ret = -EIO;
> -		}
> -		goto err;
> +	u8 mode;
> +	ssize_t rc;
> +	struct plpks_var var = {
> +		.component = NULL,
> +		.name = "SB_VERSION",
> +		.namelen = 10,
> +		.datalen = 1,
> +		.data = &mode,
> +	};
> +
> +	rc = plpks_read_fw_var(&var);
> +	if (rc) {
> +		if (rc != -ENOENT && rc != -EPERM)
> +			pr_info("Error %ld reading SB_VERSION from firmware\n", rc);
> +		mode = 0;
>   	}
> +	return mode;
> +}
>   
> -	ret = snprintf(buf, bufsize, "ibm,plpks-sb-v%hhu", version);
> -err:
> -	return ret;
> +/*
> + * PLPKS dynamic secure boot doesn't give us a format string in the same way
> + * OPAL does. Instead, report the format using the SB_VERSION variable in the
> + * keystore. The string, made up by us, takes the form of either
> + * "ibm,plpks-sb-v<n>" or "ibm,plpks-sb-v0", based on the key management mode,
> + * and return the length of the secvar format property.
> + */
> +static ssize_t plpks_secvar_format(char *buf, size_t bufsize)
> +{
> +	u8 mode;
> +
> +	mode = plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode();
> +	return snprintf(buf, bufsize, "ibm,plpks-sb-v%hhu", mode);
>   }
>   
>   static int plpks_max_size(u64 *max_size)

-- 
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry

[PATCH v4 2/3] powerpc/secvar: Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode

[Srish Srinivasan]

The PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR sysfs exposes all of the secure boot
secvars irrespective of the key management mode.

The PowerVM LPAR supports static and dynamic key management for secure
boot. The key management option can be updated in the management
console. The secvars PK, trustedcadb, and moduledb can be consumed both
in the static and dynamic key management modes for the loading of signed
third-party kernel modules. However, other secvars i.e. KEK, grubdb,
grubdbx, sbat, db and dbx, which are used to verify the grub and kernel
images, are consumed only in the dynamic key management mode.

Expose only PK, trustedcadb, and moduledb in the static key management
mode.

Co-developed-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar        |  7 +++++
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
index f001a4f4bd2e..1016967a730f 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ Description:	Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as
 		representation. The data and size can be determined by reading
 		their respective attribute files.
 
+		Only secvars relevant to the key management mode are exposed.
+		Only in the dynamic key management mode should the user have
+		access (read and write) to the secure boot secvars db, dbx,
+		grubdb, grubdbx, and sbat. These secvars are not consumed in the
+		static key management mode. PK, trustedcadb and moduledb are the
+		secvars common to both static and dynamic key management modes.
+
 What:		/sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/size
 Date:		August 2019
 Contact:	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
index 767e5e8c6990..f9e9cc40c9d0 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
@@ -59,7 +59,14 @@ static u32 get_policy(const char *name)
 		return PLPKS_SIGNEDUPDATE;
 }
 
-static const char * const plpks_var_names[] = {
+static const char * const plpks_var_names_static[] = {
+	"PK",
+	"moduledb",
+	"trustedcadb",
+	NULL,
+};
+
+static const char * const plpks_var_names_dynamic[] = {
 	"PK",
 	"KEK",
 	"db",
@@ -213,21 +220,34 @@ static int plpks_max_size(u64 *max_size)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops_static = {
+	.get = plpks_get_variable,
+	.set = plpks_set_variable,
+	.format = plpks_secvar_format,
+	.max_size = plpks_max_size,
+	.config_attrs = config_attrs,
+	.var_names = plpks_var_names_static,
+};
 
-static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops = {
+static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops_dynamic = {
 	.get = plpks_get_variable,
 	.set = plpks_set_variable,
 	.format = plpks_secvar_format,
 	.max_size = plpks_max_size,
 	.config_attrs = config_attrs,
-	.var_names = plpks_var_names,
+	.var_names = plpks_var_names_dynamic,
 };
 
 static int plpks_secvar_init(void)
 {
+	u8 mode;
+
 	if (!plpks_is_available())
 		return -ENODEV;
 
-	return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops);
+	mode = plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode();
+	if (mode)
+		return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops_dynamic);
+	return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops_static);
 }
 machine_device_initcall(pseries, plpks_secvar_init);
-- 
2.47.1

Re: [PATCH v4 2/3] powerpc/secvar: Expose secvars relevant to the key management mode

[R Nageswara Sastry]

On 11/06/25 2:49 AM, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> The PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR sysfs exposes all of the secure boot
> secvars irrespective of the key management mode.
>
> The PowerVM LPAR supports static and dynamic key management for secure
> boot. The key management option can be updated in the management
> console. The secvars PK, trustedcadb, and moduledb can be consumed both
> in the static and dynamic key management modes for the loading of signed
> third-party kernel modules. However, other secvars i.e. KEK, grubdb,
> grubdbx, sbat, db and dbx, which are used to verify the grub and kernel
> images, are consumed only in the dynamic key management mode.
>
> Expose only PK, trustedcadb, and moduledb in the static key management
> mode.
>
> Co-developed-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Souradeep <soura@imap.linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
With the following scenarios:
1. With and with out secure boot by enabling keystore_signed_updates and 
keystore_kbytes
2. With Dynamic Key Guest Secure Boot
3. With Static Key Guest Secure Boot
> ---
>   Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar        |  7 +++++
>   arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++---
>   2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
> index f001a4f4bd2e..1016967a730f 100644
> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-secvar
> @@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ Description:	Each secure variable is represented as a directory named as
>   		representation. The data and size can be determined by reading
>   		their respective attribute files.
>   
> +		Only secvars relevant to the key management mode are exposed.
> +		Only in the dynamic key management mode should the user have
> +		access (read and write) to the secure boot secvars db, dbx,
> +		grubdb, grubdbx, and sbat. These secvars are not consumed in the
> +		static key management mode. PK, trustedcadb and moduledb are the
> +		secvars common to both static and dynamic key management modes.
> +
>   What:		/sys/firmware/secvar/vars/<variable_name>/size
>   Date:		August 2019
>   Contact:	Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
> index 767e5e8c6990..f9e9cc40c9d0 100644
> --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
> +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/plpks-secvar.c
> @@ -59,7 +59,14 @@ static u32 get_policy(const char *name)
>   		return PLPKS_SIGNEDUPDATE;
>   }
>   
> -static const char * const plpks_var_names[] = {
> +static const char * const plpks_var_names_static[] = {
> +	"PK",
> +	"moduledb",
> +	"trustedcadb",
> +	NULL,
> +};
> +
> +static const char * const plpks_var_names_dynamic[] = {
>   	"PK",
>   	"KEK",
>   	"db",
> @@ -213,21 +220,34 @@ static int plpks_max_size(u64 *max_size)
>   	return 0;
>   }
>   
> +static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops_static = {
> +	.get = plpks_get_variable,
> +	.set = plpks_set_variable,
> +	.format = plpks_secvar_format,
> +	.max_size = plpks_max_size,
> +	.config_attrs = config_attrs,
> +	.var_names = plpks_var_names_static,
> +};
>   
> -static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops = {
> +static const struct secvar_operations plpks_secvar_ops_dynamic = {
>   	.get = plpks_get_variable,
>   	.set = plpks_set_variable,
>   	.format = plpks_secvar_format,
>   	.max_size = plpks_max_size,
>   	.config_attrs = config_attrs,
> -	.var_names = plpks_var_names,
> +	.var_names = plpks_var_names_dynamic,
>   };
>   
>   static int plpks_secvar_init(void)
>   {
> +	u8 mode;
> +
>   	if (!plpks_is_available())
>   		return -ENODEV;
>   
> -	return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops);
> +	mode = plpks_get_sb_keymgmt_mode();
> +	if (mode)
> +		return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops_dynamic);
> +	return set_secvar_ops(&plpks_secvar_ops_static);
>   }
>   machine_device_initcall(pseries, plpks_secvar_init);

-- 
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry

[PATCH v4 3/3] integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in the static key management mode

[Srish Srinivasan]

On PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR, there is no provision to load signed
third-party kernel modules when the key management mode is static. This
is because keys from secure boot secvars are only loaded when the key
management mode is dynamic.

Allow loading of the trustedcadb and moduledb keys even in the static
key management mode, where the secvar format string takes the form
"ibm,plpks-sb-v0".

Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
index c85febca3343..714c961a00f5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
@@ -75,12 +75,13 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	// Check for known secure boot implementations from OPAL or PLPKS
-	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf)) {
+	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) &&
+	    strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf)) {
 		pr_err("Unsupported secvar implementation \"%s\", not loading certs\n", buf);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
-	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0)
+	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0 || strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf) == 0)
 		/* PLPKS authenticated variables ESL data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp */
 		offset = 8;
 
-- 
2.47.1

Re: [PATCH v4 3/3] integrity/platform_certs: Allow loading of keys in the static key management mode

[R Nageswara Sastry]

On 11/06/25 2:49 AM, Srish Srinivasan wrote:
> On PLPKS enabled PowerVM LPAR, there is no provision to load signed
> third-party kernel modules when the key management mode is static. This
> is because keys from secure boot secvars are only loaded when the key
> management mode is dynamic.
>
> Allow loading of the trustedcadb and moduledb keys even in the static
> key management mode, where the secvar format string takes the form
> "ibm,plpks-sb-v0".
>
> Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: R Nageswara Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
With the following scenarios:
1. With and with out secure boot by enabling keystore_signed_updates and 
keystore_kbytes
2. With Dynamic Key Guest Secure Boot
3. With Static Key Guest Secure Boot
> ---
>   security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c | 5 +++--
>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> index c85febca3343..714c961a00f5 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_powerpc.c
> @@ -75,12 +75,13 @@ static int __init load_powerpc_certs(void)
>   		return -ENODEV;
>   
>   	// Check for known secure boot implementations from OPAL or PLPKS
> -	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf)) {
> +	if (strcmp("ibm,edk2-compat-v1", buf) && strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) &&
> +	    strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf)) {
>   		pr_err("Unsupported secvar implementation \"%s\", not loading certs\n", buf);
>   		return -ENODEV;
>   	}
>   
> -	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0)
> +	if (strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v1", buf) == 0 || strcmp("ibm,plpks-sb-v0", buf) == 0)
>   		/* PLPKS authenticated variables ESL data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp */
>   		offset = 8;
>   

-- 
Thanks and Regards
R.Nageswara Sastry