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From: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, zohar@linux.ibm.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, tytso@mit.edu, ebiggers@kernel.org,
	axboe@kernel.dk, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@kernel.org,
	eparis@redhat.com, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-block@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, audit@vger.kernel.org,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v11 5/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider
Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2023 15:46:52 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c40cd6a6-5c32-4e72-8831-f87ee0a09324@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhScdtqJeUTTUQVk4D70tTLz4TgU_aRTMRnHa0OARyubaw@mail.gmail.com>



On 10/26/2023 3:12 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 26, 2023 at 5:33 PM Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>> On 10/23/2023 8:52 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Oct  4, 2023 Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually
>>>> implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust,
>>>> which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies the
>>>> kernel and the initramfs.
>>>>
>>>> As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and
>>>> it's typically already verified by the bootloader, introduce a property
>>>> that causes the first superblock to have an execution to be "pinned",
>>>> which is typically initramfs.
>>>>
>>>> When the "pinned" device is unmounted, it will be "unpinned" and
>>>> `boot_verified` property will always evaluate to false afterward.
>>>>
>>>> We use a pointer with a spin_lock to "pin" the device instead of rcu
>>>> because rcu synchronization may sleep, which is not allowed when
>>>> unmounting a device.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ...
>>>> ---
>>>>    security/ipe/eval.c          | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>>    security/ipe/eval.h          |  2 +
>>>>    security/ipe/hooks.c         | 12 ++++++
>>>>    security/ipe/hooks.h         |  2 +
>>>>    security/ipe/ipe.c           |  1 +
>>>>    security/ipe/policy.h        |  2 +
>>>>    security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++-
>>>>    7 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/ipe/eval.c b/security/ipe/eval.c
>>>> index 8a8bcc5c7d7f..bdac4abc0ddb 100644
>>>> --- a/security/ipe/eval.c
>>>> +++ b/security/ipe/eval.c
>>>> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>>>>    #include <linux/file.h>
>>>>    #include <linux/sched.h>
>>>>    #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
>>>> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
>>>>
>>>>    #include "ipe.h"
>>>>    #include "eval.h"
>>>> @@ -16,6 +17,44 @@
>>>>
>>>>    struct ipe_policy __rcu *ipe_active_policy;
>>>>
>>>> +static const struct super_block *pinned_sb;
>>>> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pin_lock);
>>>> +#define FILE_SUPERBLOCK(f) ((f)->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb)
>>>> +
>>>> +/**
>>>> + * pin_sb - Pin the underlying superblock of @f, marking it as trusted.
>>>> + * @sb: Supplies a super_block structure to be pinned.
>>>> + */
>>>> +static void pin_sb(const struct super_block *sb)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    if (!sb)
>>>> +            return;
>>>> +    spin_lock(&pin_lock);
>>>> +    if (!pinned_sb)
>>>> +            pinned_sb = sb;
>>>> +    spin_unlock(&pin_lock);
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +/**
>>>> + * from_pinned - Determine whether @sb is the pinned super_block.
>>>> + * @sb: Supplies a super_block to check against the pinned super_block.
>>>> + *
>>>> + * Return:
>>>> + * * true   - @sb is the pinned super_block
>>>> + * * false  - @sb is not the pinned super_block
>>>> + */
>>>> +static bool from_pinned(const struct super_block *sb)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    bool rv;
>>>> +
>>>> +    if (!sb)
>>>> +            return false;
>>>> +    spin_lock(&pin_lock);
>>>> +    rv = !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_sb) && pinned_sb == sb;
>>>> +    spin_unlock(&pin_lock);
>>>
>>> It's okay for an initial version, but I still think you need to get
>>> away from this spinlock in from_pinned() as quickly as possible.
>>> Maybe I'm wrong, but this looks like a major source of lock contention.
>>>
>>> I understand the issue around RCU and the potential for matching on
>>> a reused buffer/address, but if you modified IPE to have its own LSM
>>> security blob in super_block::security you could mark the superblock
>>> when it was mounted and do a lockless lookup here in from_pinned().
>>
>> Thank you for the suggestion. After some testing, I discovered that
>> switching to RCU to pin the super block and using a security blob to
>> mark a pinned super block works. This approach do avoid many spinlock
>> operations. I'll incorporate these changes in the next version of the patch.
> 
> I probably wasn't as clear as I should have been, I was thinking of
> doing away with the @pinned_sb global variable entirely, as well as
> its associated lock problems and simply marking the initramfs/initrd
> superblock when it was mounted.  I will admit that I haven't fully
> thought about all the implementation details, but I think you could
> leverage the security_sb_mount() hook to set a flag in IPE's
> superblock metadata when the initramfs was mounted.
> 
> --
> paul-moore.com

I wasn't able to find a way to let LSM pin initramfs/initrd during mount 
time. But I think we could replace the global variable with a flag 
variable ipe_sb_state so we could use atomic operation to only mark one 
drive as pinned without any lock. The code will be like:

static void pin_sb(const struct super_block *sb)
{
	if (!sb)
		return;

	if (!test_and_set_bit_lock(IPE_SB_PINNED, &ipe_sb_state)) {
		ipe_sb(sb)->pinned = true;
	}
}

Would this sound better?

-Fan

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-02 22:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-04 22:09 [RFC PATCH v11 00/19] Integrity Policy Enforcement LSM (IPE) Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 01/19] security: add ipe lsm Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 02/19] ipe: add policy parser Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 2/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-25 22:45     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 21:36       ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 03/19] ipe: add evaluation loop Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 3/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-26  0:15     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 04/19] ipe: add LSM hooks on execution and kernel read Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 4/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 05/19] ipe: introduce 'boot_verified' as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 5/19] " Paul Moore
2023-10-26 21:33     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-26 22:12       ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:46         ` Fan Wu [this message]
2023-11-03 22:15           ` Paul Moore
2023-11-03 22:30             ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 06/19] security: add new securityfs delete function Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 07/19] ipe: add userspace interface Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 08/19] uapi|audit|ipe: add ipe auditing support Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 8/19] " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:55     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 09/19] ipe: add permissive toggle Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC v11 9/19] " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:56     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 10/19] block|security: add LSM blob to block_device Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 11/19] dm verity: set DM_TARGET_SINGLETON feature flag Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:40     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 12/19] dm: add finalize hook to target_type Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:41     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 13/19] dm verity: consume root hash digest and signature data via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:41     ` Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 14/19] ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 22:40     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 15/19] fsverity: consume builtin signature via LSM hook Fan Wu
2023-10-05  2:27   ` Eric Biggers
2023-10-05  2:49     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02  0:40     ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02  2:53       ` Eric Biggers
2023-11-02 15:42         ` Paul Moore
2023-11-02 19:33           ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 16/19] ipe: enable support for fs-verity as a trust provider Fan Wu
2023-10-04 23:58   ` Randy Dunlap
2023-10-05  2:45     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 17/19] scripts: add boot policy generation program Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:09     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 18/19] ipe: kunit test for parser Fan Wu
2023-10-24  3:52   ` [PATCH RFC " Paul Moore
2023-11-02 23:11     ` Fan Wu
2023-10-04 22:09 ` [RFC PATCH v11 19/19] documentation: add ipe documentation Fan Wu

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